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Possession is a legal concept applying in a variety of legal contexts. In Scottish legal 
literature, however, there is little in-depth writing on the law of possession, and much 
of the law is uncertain. This thesis is intended to be a contribution to remedying this 
deficiency as far as one aspect of the law of possession is concerned, the physical 
element of possession of corporeal moveable property. As part of this, in the hope 
that this comparative and historical consideration would shed some light on the 
issues raised, the law of Rome is considered, along with the law of France, Germany 
and South Africa, as examples of the Civil Law tradition of legal systems drawing on 
Roman law. English law is also considered. The thesis is thus able to draw on both of 
the major traditions influencing the development of Scots law, namely the Civil Law 
and the Common Law. In this way, the thesis is able to consider the extent to which 
the Scots law on possession has been influenced by these two traditions. 
The thesis begins giving an outline of the law of possession and the place of 
the physical element within it. The remainder of the thesis considers in detail the 
physical element and its role in both the acquisition and the loss of possession of 
corporeal moveable property. One of the difficulties with this is that many different 
areas of law use a concept called 'possession', and views differ as to the extent to 
which it is appropriate to talk of a general concept of possession. It is argued in the 
thesis that a general test can be developed for the physical element of possession, 
based on control of the property in a manner consistent with the assertion of a right 
to the property. This test is then developed through consideration of how it applies in 
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FOREWORD: SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND GENERAL APPROACH 
 
The nineteenth century German jurist Savigny begins his book on possession by 
noting that works on the subject usually begin: 
 
...with complaints as to the extraordinary difficulty of the subject. Some, 
indeed, have been so serious with their complaints, as to have been driven by 




This thesis examines the acquisition and loss of the physical element of possession of 
corporeal moveable property. However, before embarking on this examination, it is 
necessary first to consider the general question of what possession means. Part of the 
difficulty that Savigny mentions lies in the general principles on which possession is 
based. However, there is a further difficulty. Possession is a concept used in a wide 
variety of contexts. It is not immediately apparent that there need be such a thing as 
'possession' in the first place, if by that is meant a single concept applying to all areas 
of the law that depend on some concept of possession. 
 Chapter 1 is concerned with these issues, considering first the meaning of 
possession. The remainder of chapter 1 will consider the extent to which it is 
reasonable to treat possession as a unitary concept. This is necessary background to 
any consideration of a particular aspect of possession. The remainder of the thesis 
will be concerned specifically with the physical element of possession of corporeal 
moveable property. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with various historical and comparative 
considerations of the physical element of possession of corporeal moveable property. 
Chapter 3 considers the acquisition of the physical element in Scots law, 
taking account of the historical and comparative sources. 
Chapter 4 does the same for the loss of the physical element of possession. 
Chapter 5 considers the case where a would-be possessor has established only 
momentary control of the property. 
Chapter 6 considers whether one may acquire possession through symbolical 
acts. 
                                   
1
 Savigny, Possession 1. 
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Chapter 7 considers the possession of animals. 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes. 
 Although the focus is on Scots law, it will be apparent from the content of 
chapter 2 that there will be a historical and comparative element to the thesis. This 
approach may be justified on two grounds. 
 First, as a smaller jurisdiction, Scotland has generated only limited literature 
and authority on the issues to be considered. Accordingly, as long as one is sensitive 
to the differences between legal systems, it is sensible to expand the net to take in 
consideration of the issues by those writing in other traditions. 
 Second, such consideration is especially valuable when it comes from a 
system of law with a historical relationship with Scots law. A shared tradition 
increases the likelihood that the solution found in one system will also be correct in 
another. 
 On the basis of these points, it seems clearly reasonable to give significant 
consideration to Roman law, which has had considerable influence over the 
development of Scots law. Thus, in Stair's general account of possession,
2
 of the six 
paragraphs referring to authority four
3
 refer only to Roman sources. Of the two 
referring to Scots sources, one
4
 replicates the Roman rule that possession of part is 
possession of the whole.
5
 Of the eleven paragraphs citing no authority, one in fact is 
following Labeo's etymology of the word possessio.
6
 Erskine's account makes more 
use of authority generally, but uses Roman sources in much the same proportion: in 
the eleven paragraphs of Erskine's general account of possession,
7
 he refers thirty-
five times to authority. Of these, twenty-two are references to Roman sources.
8
 
Bankton also makes extensive use of Roman sources in the thirteen paragraphs of his 
                                   
2
 This extends to seventeen paragraphs: Inst. 2,1,8-24. Other relevant material appears elsewhere, eg 
2,1,33 (occupatio), 2,1,42 (presumption of ownership arising from possession) and 4,28 and 4,30 
(possessory remedies). 
3
 Inst. 2,1,18-20 and 23, on the nature of the physical element of possession (18), loss of possession 
(19-20) and the bona fide possessor's right to fruits (23). 
4
 Inst. 2,1,13. The other paragraph referring to Scots authority is Inst. 2,1,24, which contains a 
substantial account of the detailed rules for the bona fide possessor's right to fruits. 
5
 Paul, D.41.2.3.1. 
6
 Reported by Paul, D.41.2.1pr. Stair cites this at Inst. 2,1,9. 
7
 Erskine, Inst. 2,1,20-30. 
8
 Of the other thirteen, ten are references to Scots cases and three are references to Stair's Institutions. 
24 
 
general account of possession,
9
 with a majority of references being to Roman sources 
and with no references to any non-Roman source until the eighth paragraph.
10
 
As for the law before Stair, it is true that before Stair there existed no general, 
systematic account of Scots private law. The earlier literature is almost entirely in the 
form of practicks, largely consisting of the decisions of the Scottish courts.
11
 
However, the fact that earlier writers did not give such general accounts of the law 
does not however mean that they did not understand the law in that way: Stair's 
approach does not represent as radical a break with the previous law as at first 
appears. Reid observes that: 
 
'The absence of [general] literature is itself an important historical fact. The 





The earlier writers were quite prepared to draw on Ius Commune sources, and did so 
extensively,
13
 and considerable importance was attached to learning in the Civil Law 
in admission to the Faculty of Advocates.
14
 It is clear enough, therefore, that this 
literature whose existence elsewhere was presupposed was the literature of the Ius 
Commune. Stair, in giving a general account of possession drawing on both native 
and Ius Commune sources, was reflecting the practice of his time. This influence still 
                                   
9
 Bankton, Inst. 2,1,26-35 (paragraph numbers 31-33 are repeated). 
10
 Bankton, Inst. 2,1,33. 
11
 In fact, two types of practicks can be distinguished. One, the decision practicks, is as described here. 
A later form, digest practicks, supplements this with material from other sources, such as legislation 
and the medieval treatise Regiam Majestatem, and practical observations. Neither form was, however, 
particularly systematic or comprehensive. On the distinction between decision and digest practicks, 
see H McKechnie, 'Practicks, 1469-1700' in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of 
Scots Law (Stair Society vol 1, 1936) 28. 
12
 K Reid, 'Property Law: Sources and Doctrine', in K Reid & R Zimmermann, A History of Private 
Law in Scotland: Volume I. Introduction and Property (Oxford University Press 2000) 199. See also 
H McKechnie, 'Practicks, 1469-1700' in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of Scots 
Law (Stair Society, vol 1, 1936) 29. 
13
 See eg G Dolezalek, 'The Court of Session as a Ius Commune Court – Witnessed by ‘Sinclair’s 
Practicks’, 1540-1549' in Stair Society (ed), Miscellany Four (Stair Society 2000); P Stein, 'The 
Influence of Roman Law on the Law of Scotland' 1963 JR 205; WM Gordon, 'Roman Law in 
Scotland' in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Stair Society 1995); JW Cairns, 
'The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought' in DL Carey Miller & R Zimmermann (eds), The 
Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (Duncker  & Humblot 1997). 
14
 JW Cairns, 'Historical Introduction', in K Reid & R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in 
Scotland: Volume I. Introduction and Property (Oxford University Press 2000) 126-127. 
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continues today, with Roman and Ius Commune sources being referred to in the 
courts more often than is sometimes realised.
15
 
 By the same token, it seems reasonable also to consider other systems 
influenced by Roman law. As their development has been based on the same sources, 
they may have insights of use in our own system. For this reason, French, German 
and South African law have been considered as a fair sample of Roman-influenced 
systems of property law. Occasional reference to other systems has also been made. 
 Finally, also considered is the Common Law tradition of systems finding 
their origin in English law. Although the English law of possession is, as we shall 
see, markedly different from the Scots law, reference to English cases in the absence 
of Scots authority is a common practice.
16
 If they are going to be referred to by the 
courts, then they also need to be considered. In addition, some statutory uses of the 
term 'possession' are common to Scotland and England, and so cases on those 
statutory uses are of clear relevance. 
 
                                   
15
 See eg JW Cairns & P du Plessis, 'Ten years of Roman law in Scottish courts' 2008 SLT (News) 
191 on the use of Roman authorities in the Scottish courts. For a recent example of discussion of a Ius 
Commune source (in this case Pothier), see the decision of the Supreme Court in Morris v Rae [2012] 
UKSC 50. 
16
 See eg Reid, Property, para 124, where Parker v British Airways Board [1982] 1 QB 1004 is 
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1 THE MEANING OF POSSESSION 
 
At the outset of a thesis on possession, it seems best to give some idea of the 
meaning of possession and of its role within the law. We shall see that possession is a 
concept that is used in a number of different areas of the law. This chapter therefore 
has two purposes. The first is to show what possession means. The second is to ask 
whether, given the variety of contexts in which possession is important, it makes 
sense to talk in terms of a general law of possession. 
 
A. WHAT IS POSSESSION? 
 
(1) Possession and ownership 
 
A comparative approach to possession is immediately faced with the difficulty that 
the two leading legal traditions diverge in the meaning and role of possession. It is 
therefore necessary first to explain this distinction. 
 
(a) The Civilian tradition. The Civilian tradition of property law is characterised 
by, among other things, a sharp distinction between possession and ownership: as 
Ulpian puts it, 'ownership has nothing in common with possession'.
1
 Possession is 
protected, without regard to who has the right to possess the property.
2
 The point, 
says Justinian, is merely to determine who must raise the action based on ownership,
3
 
the party in possession normally being entitled to remain in possession until another 
party proves a right to possess, based on ownership or another real right. This 
distinction has been received into modern Civilian systems of property law.
4
 
 In Scots law, too, possession is seen as a 'distinct lesser right than property',
5
 
and is given interim protection without determining who has the right to possess.
6
  




 Paul, D.41.2.3.5. 
3
 J.4.15.4. See also Ulpian, D.41.2.35. 
4
 See eg Silberberg & Schoeman, para 12.1; van der Merwe, Law of Things, para 55 (South Africa). 
The definitions of possession in France and Germany make no reference to any requirement for the 
existence of a right to possess (Code civil, art 2255; BGB, s 854(1)). 
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(b) The Common Law tradition. In his preface to the Essay on Possession in the 
Common Law, co-written with Wright, Pollock notes the absence of any general, 
systematic account of the law of possession in England.
7
 Thus, among earlier writers 
on English law, neither Glanvill, Bracton nor Blackstone has such a general account, 
nor does Kent’s formative work on the law of the United States, the Commentaries 
on American Law.
8
  Indeed, Pollock indicates that it is this lack that separately 
caused him and Wright to conceive of such a study. The reason for the absence of 
such a study before Pollock and Wright's book appears to lie in the way English 
lawyers understand the concepts of ownership and possession. 
 While, as we have seen, civilian jurists draw a clear distinction between 
ownership and possession, English law has historically seen ownership as a relative 
concept,
9
 with no clear distinction drawn between ownership and possession.
10
 In 
English law, the 'mere act of taking possession bestows a right to exclusive 
possession'.
11
 The question in a dispute over title in England is not who is objectively 
owner, but rather which of the parties has a better right, and it would be entirely 
possible to be held to have a good title as against one person, but not as against 
another.
12
 Such a title may be derived from possession.
13
 Thus, in Armory v 
Delamirie,
14
 the finder of a ring was held entitled to retain the ring against anyone 
except one with a prior right. Even a wrongful possessor is protected against any 
subsequent holder.
15
 Thus, in Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire 
Constabulary,
16
 the possessor of a stolen car was held to have a possessory title good 
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against anyone except the party from whom it had been stolen, despite knowing of 
(and possibly being a party to) the theft. He was therefore entitled to recover the car 
from the police, by whom it had been seized.  
Even with Pollock and Wright's general treatment of the matter available, 
there appears to be little inclination amongst English jurists to view possession as a 
general concept and, in modern accounts of English property law, the tendency is to 
make no link between possession of land and possession of moveable property.
17
 
Again, the lack of clear distinction between possession and ownership has continued 
into modern law.
18
 An example may be found in Holmes' account of possession. He 
is talking about how possession comes to an end, arguing that possession need not 
come to an end just because control of the property is lost. He supports this by 
reference to a US case, Clark v Maloney.
19
 In that case, a man found logs afloat in a 
river, and took possession. The logs then got free and were taken by another. The 
logs were awarded to the first taker. For Holmes, the justification for this was that the 
first taker's possession lasted until the second taker interrupted it. No doubt this is 
correct as a matter of US law, but from the point of view of the Civilian tradition of 
property law the justification appears to confuse the issues. From that point of view, 
the first taker's claim would be based on ownership, acquired through possession. As 
ownership is not dependent on possession for its continuance, there is no need to 
hold the first taker's possession to continue, despite the loss of control, in order to 
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(2) Possession and the right to possess 
 
In England, as we have seen, a possessor by virtue of that possession acquires a right 
in the property, enforceable against any but one with a prior right. Even a thief 
becomes, in a sense, owner of the property he has stolen. A person acquires a right to 
possess, enforceable against the world at large, because he has once had possession. 
 In the Civilian tradition, on the other hand, the distinction drawn between 
possession and ownership means that a possessor acquires no right to continue to 
possess the property beyond the very limited protection afforded by the possessory 
remedies, considered below. This protection, however, is only an interim one, and 
gives no right to continue in possession once the question of right has been resolved. 
Thus, in Scots law, the decision in Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire 
Constabulary would be impossible. In Scotland, Costello would have no right to 
possess the car. He would not even be able to recover the car from the police on the 
basis of spuilzie, because the police took possession on the basis of statutory 
authority. 
 This difference of approach between the Civilian and Common Law 
traditions means that particular caution is needed with English cases on possession. 
The question of possession is likely to arise in different circumstances in the 
Common Law and, given the different consequences of possession, it may be that the 
test for possession will itself be different. 
 
(3) The elements of possession 
 
The everyday idea of possession involves physical holding of the property. However, 
not all holders are possessors. Paul observes that: 
 










On this view, there are two requirements to satisfy before one can be said to possess: 
one must have some form of physical relationship to the property, and one must have 
a certain state of mind. These two elements are respectively known as corpus and 
animus. 
 
(a) Animus. The nature of the mental element in the Roman law of possession is 
disputed, the two leading theories being those of Savigny, who considered that the 
intention to hold as owner was required,
22
 and Jhering, in whose view every 
conscious holder was a possessor unless the ground of his holding was one that the 
law did not allow as a basis of possession.
23
 The holder’s actual intention is neither 
here nor there: 'die Rechtsregel, nicht der Wille, entscheidet über Besitz und 
Detention'.
24
 The weakness of this position is that Jhering's theory cannot 
satisfactorily explain why possession exists on certain grounds but not on others. 
Equally, Savigny's theory cannot explain adequately those cases where one is held to 
possess without the intention to hold as an owner, such as the case of a pledgee, a 




Whatever the correct answer may have been for Roman law, there has been a 
tendency in later law to broaden the scope of possession. This can be done directly, 
as in Germany, by broadening the definition of the mental element.
26
 Alternatively, it 
can be done indirectly, as in France, by extending possessory protection to certain 
non-possessors.
27
 Scots law takes the former approach. The mental element is 
defined by Stair as 'the inclination or affection to make use of the thing detained'.
28
 
This formulation is adopted by Bankton,
29
 and is also used in Reid's account.
30
 On 
this view, all that is required is an intention to hold for one's own benefit. 
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 Erskine appears at first to adopt a stricter test of holding by a person 'as his 
own property',
31
 with the result that Carey Miller considers 'possession proper' to 
exist only where the property is held with the intention to hold as owner (animo 
domini).
32
 Certainly, one holding entirely on another's behalf, such as a depositee or 
a steward, does not possess,
33
 and nor does one holding by 'tolerance or bare license 
[sic]'.
34
 However, it does not appear that Erskine intends to restrict possession to 
those holding animo domini, for he allows possession to exist also in the cases of 
liferenters, tenants 'and generally in every case where there are inferior rights 
affecting any subject distinct from the property of that subject'.
35
 
 It appears, therefore, that it is enough to hold in the manner of one asserting a 
real right. What is less clear is whether it is enough to hold on the basis of a personal 
right. Certainly, it appears to be enough in German
36
 and South African
37
 law. Stair's 
test suggests that the same is true of Scots law, as long as the holder holds at least in 
part for his own benefit. However, while it is not inconsistent with Erskine's 
approach, all of the specific examples he gives are of holdings on the basis of real 
rights.
38
 As we shall see below, however, support for the view that holding on the 
basis of a personal right may be found in some cases on delictual liability for pure 
economic loss caused by negligence. What is certainly clear, though, is that one who 
holds entirely on another’s behalf is not a possessor. Such a holder is said to have 
only custody, and is known as a custodier. 
 
(b) Corpus. In addition to the mental element of possession, it is also required that 
the would-be possessor establish some physical relationship to the property. Without 
this requirement, as Erskine points out, 'possession would be too vague and 
uncertain'.
39
 The physical element of possession may be seen, therefore, as the 
outward expression of the possessory intention. Its purpose is to convey that 
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intention to the outside world. We may suspect, therefore, that what is required of the 
physical element is sufficient acts that an objective bystander would infer the mental 
element to exist. We shall see in this thesis the extent to which this is the case. 
 
(c) Relationship between corpus and animus. Although this thesis is concerned 
with the physical element of possession, it must be accepted that it is artificial to 
view the mental and physical elements in isolation from each other. The two are 
intimately connected. Although regard may be had to other evidence of possessory 
intention,
40
 it is clear that the primary means of determining someone's intentions is 
to look at his actions. The intention may be inferred from those actions and their 
context. Thus, the intention to possess is presumed 'whensoever the profit of the 
detainer may be to make use of the thing'.
41
 The contrary is presumed when to take 
possession would constitute a crime,
42
 perhaps on the basis of the presumption of 
innocence of crime. 
 If the acts of a party are sufficiently unambiguous, it may indeed be 
impossible to prove an intention contradicting those acts. Thus, for example, in 
Henry v Dunlop & Co,
43
 the court held that there was a valid delivery of cattle when 
the seller allowed the buyer's employee to drive them off, even though the seller's 
employees, who had helped in this, were under secret instructions to retain control 
until the price was paid. Thus, the seller was held on the basis of the employees' acts 
to have delivered possession to the buyer, even though this was contrary to the 
seller's actual intention. 
 On the other hand, an ambiguity may sometimes be resolved by using 
extraneous evidence of animus to assist in interpreting the physical acts: 
 
Acts which taken by themselves are equivocal and without apparent 
significance may be treated as good evidence of corpus in circumstances 
where the necessary animus is clearly present. One who buys, for example, 
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It appears then that both corpus and animus are to be interpreted according to 
surrounding circumstances. The significance of this point is that, while this thesis is 
concerned with the physical element of possession, the mental element cannot be 
disregarded. 
 
(d) Natural and civil possession. This thesis is mostly concerned with natural 
possession, which is possession held by the possessor personally. It must be noted, 
however, that possession may also be held through another's acts, this being known 
as civil possession.
45
 For example, if a person's property is in the hands of an agent 
or let to a tenant, that person possesses civilly. 
 Occasionally there will be some doubt as to which of two (or more) parties is 
the civil possessor. In such cases, Reid seems justified in suggesting that: 
 
The probable resolution is that possession is attributed to the person from 
whom the detentor derives his title or, if they are different, to the person 




Thus, in Birrell Ltd v City of Edinburgh District Council,
47
 where the former owner 
was allowed to stay in the property following compulsory purchase, the local 
authority was held to have entered possession on the basis that the former owner's 
right to continue in occupation was derived from the local authority. Supporting the 
alternative given by Reid is Earl of Fife’s Trustees v Sinclair,
48
 in which 
acknowledgement by a vassal of one of two parties claiming to be superior was held 
to demonstrate possession by that claimant.
49
 
 More difficult is the case where the custodier is not, by the nature of the case, 
called upon to acknowledge either of the possible civil possessors. This situation 
arose in Lubbock v Feakins,
50
 in which the seller of an extensive area of land claimed 
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that a smaller area containing a house had been wrongly included in the registered 
title. The buyer argued that the house had been correctly included (which the sheriff 
ultimately held to be the case), and that in any case he was a proprietor in possession 
and so the Land Register could not be rectified without his consent.
51
 The difficulty 
with this argument was that the house was occupied by a liferenter, and it is not clear 
that the liferenter ever acknowledged the buyer as possessor. The sheriff took the 
view that the buyer was in possession, but his reasoning is not convincing. At 
paragraph (37) of his opinion, the sheriff lists eleven factors which he considers to be 
relevant to the question: 
 
1. The buyer was in possession of the rest of the estate. 
2. There were other houses or cottages on the estate. 
3. The buyer continued the previous insurance cover. 
4. The buyer took legal advice on his responsibilities towards the liferenter. 
5. On the basis of the advice received, the buyer cancelled the insurance, but 
otherwise left the liferenter in undisturbed occupation. 
6. The buyer subsequently re-insured the liferented property. 
7. The 'most prominent natural boundary of [ the liferented property] is the 
hedge bounding the road and the natural boundary of the Estate is the road'. 
8. The liferenter was in natural possession, but 'it was never portrayed that she 
owned it outright'. 
9. The sellers had 'no title to the Lodge and [the liferenter] could not have 
occupied it on their behalf'.  
10. The buyer had title to and possession of the road bordering the liferented 
subjects. 
11. The liferented subjects lay 'between the road bounding it and the remainder of 
the Estate' and the buyer had 'natural possession of both the road and the 
Estate which surround the Lodge'. 
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No doubt the third, fourth, fifth and sixth of these factors clearly demonstrate the 
buyer’s intention to possess, but as far as the physical element of possession none of 
the remainder seem relevant to possession of the liferented subjects. 
 Perhaps the difficulty in Lubbock v Feakins can be resolved by an analogy 
with cases on corporeal moveable property. It is the existence of civil possession that 
allows delivery of goods to take place without any change of physical control, when 
the goods are held by an independent third party, by giving notice to that third 
party.
52
 In the same way, it could be suggested that the buyer in Lubbock v Feakins 
acquired possession when notice of the change of ownership was given to the 
liferenter.  
Civil possession also allows possession to be acquired by constitutum 
possessorium, in which the transferor retains custody but begins to hold on behalf of 
the transferee.
53
 However, as this form of delivery appears to undermine the purpose 
of delivery, it is only permitted where there is a clear justification for leaving the 
property with the transferor. Hume gives the examples of a horse bought but left at 
livery with the seller, or a carriage left with the seller for alterations to be made, or a 
cart left with the seller on hire.
54
 A case of the last kind also appears in Orr's Trustee 
v Tullis,
55
 in which machinery was sold by a tenant to the landlord and leased back to 
the tenant. 
 
(4) Summary of requirements for possession 
 
There is insufficient space here for a full consideration of the requirements for 
possession, but a brief definition may at least be attempted. Possession consists in the 
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physical holding of property, either personally or by another on the possessor’s 
behalf, with the intention to derive benefit from that holding. It does not imply any 
right to possess, and the question of who has possession does not pre-determine who 
has the right to possess. Possession is, however, given interim protection until the 
question of right is determined. As we shall see, possession also gives certain other 
rights. 
 
B. IS POSSESSION A UNITARY CONCEPT? 
 
The discussion so far has assumed possession to be a unitary concept. However, 
numerous areas of law make use of this concept. The concern is then whether it 
makes sense to talk in terms of a general concept of possession. After all, each of the 
contexts in which possession is used involves different policy objectives to be 
attained. It is entirely reasonable, therefore, to suppose that the precise requirements 
for possession will vary depending on the situation.
56
 Equally, differences between 
different legal systems may lead to different definitions of possession.
57
 Certainly, it 
would not be appropriate to apply the concept inflexibly across different areas of law 
where that does not suit the ends of the law. Nor would it be appropriate to adopt 
uncritically a solution from one system of law, where different conditions may justify 
a different solution. There is no particular reason why the definition of possession 
ought necessarily to be the same in all circumstances.  
 
(1) Common Law concerns 
 
This concern has been a particular feature of discussions of possession in the 
Common Law tradition. Of course, even if in that tradition it should be inappropriate 
to talk of a general law of possession, it would by no means follow from that fact that 
the same was true in Scots law. It is notable that the same reluctance to approve 
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general theories of possession is not found in the Civilian tradition. All the same, 
though, it is necessary to pay attention to the Common Law debate, for two reasons. 
The first reason is that, as has been said, in this thesis Common Law sources will be 
drawn on where appropriate, and so it seems reasonable first to consider the extent to 
which writers in the Common Law tradition themselves consider it appropriate to 
draw general conclusions on possession. The second reason is that it is conceivable 
that some of the arguments used will be applicable to Scotland. 
One of the difficulties in the use of Common Law materials lies in the 
different way in which possession is understood in that tradition, and the different 
ways in which it is used. For example, in English law the concept of possession was 
used in the crime of larceny, this crime traditionally requiring the taking of 
possession and the dishonest intention to coincide, so there was a tendency to 
interpret possession to meet this requirement.
58
 Thus, in The Carrier’s Case,
59
 it was 
held that a carrier possessed a package but not the individual items within it, so he 
was guilty of larceny if he 'broke bulk' and took individual items. Again, in 
Cartwright v Green,
60
 a bureau was delivered to a carpenter for repair. It was held 
that the carpenter committed larceny when he broke open a hidden drawer and 
appropriated money concealed therein. On the other hand, in Merry v Green,
61
 a 
bureau was bought at auction. A secret drawer was found containing money. The 
court held that the buyer did acquire possession of this, and so was not guilty of 
larceny, because he had no reason to believe that possession of the money was 
retained by the seller.  
 The difference in outcome between these cases appears to turn on the need to 
achieve justice in the particular case, rather than on any issue of general principles of 
possession.
62
 For this reason, Dias describes possession as 'no more than a device of 
convenience and policy',
63
 and calls for its abandonment as a general concept.
64
 From 
the point of view of the Civilian tradition, however, a case like The Carrier's Case 
could be explained readily enough by saying that the carrier did not at first possess at 
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all, and only took possession when he demonstrated the relevant animus by breaking 
open the containers and appropriating their contents. Cartwright v Green and Merry 
v Green can be distinguished on the same ground: in Scots law, at least, a repairer 
generally does not acquire possession at all,
65
 whereas a purchaser acquires 
possession on delivery. 
Dias is not however alone in rejecting the notion of a general concept of 
possession. Shartel insists that each instance where the idea of possession is used 
represents an entirely distinct concept of possession, the question of possession being 
determined, not only by the physical and mental acts of the intending possessor, but 
also the best outcome in the particular case.
66
 Kocourek dismisses the larceny cases 
as not depending consistently on possession at all.
67
 Again, he holds the law on the 
seller’s lien
68
 and lost property
69
 to depend policy decisions regarding who should 
have the right to possession as between two competing parties: 'The physical 
situation may be determinative of this question, but when it is, the reason is that the 
law adopts it as a basis of legal policy'.
70
 His conclusion is that '[t]he idea of 
possession does not exist because there is no need of such an idea':
71
 all that is 
needed is the 'right of possessing',
72
 which may exist without the fact of physical 
detention. Hart holds that a search for a general concept of possession risks distortion 
of the actual rules.
73
 However, as Paton observes: 
 
[T]he idea, however vague and imprecise, which colours and gives a family 
relationship to all the uses of the word ‘possession’ in the law, is the 
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The persons referred to here would appear to be the possessor and those subject to 
rights acquired by the possessor by virtue of his possession. A similar view is offered 
by Tay: 
 
A living body of law cannot be tied into the strait-jacket of an a priori 
conceptual system; but to insist, as a matter of principle, that we should not 
ask for general conceptions underlying what appear to be specific rules 
separating one possession from another, is to live in the intellectual Ice Age 




Indeed, the argument may be made that these divergences in the meaning of 
possession are in themselves a reason to find a general concept of possession, even if 
it requires modification in its application to particular cases, because: 
 
[A] multitude of unrelated regulations becomes in due course not only 




Of course, the desire for law to be intellectually satisfying cannot provide the sole 
criterion by which the law is to be judged. Conceptually tidy law need not be good 
law, judged by the ends that the law is trying to achieve. However, the second 
argument has more weight. It is better for all that the law be kept in some order, for 
reasons of accessibility and of predictability of outcome. If a concept exists in 
common between different areas of law, it can surely do no harm to consider 
different instances of use of a concept of 'possession', as long as the differing policy 
issues are kept in mind. This allows a central body of principle to be developed, 
which can then be a starting point for exploration of specific cases of possession. 
Resistance to this perhaps arises from a particular habit of English legal thought 
alluded to by Maitland when he commented that '[t]he forms of action we have 
buried, but they still rule us from their graves'.
77
 This tendency is noted by Tay in the 
passage quoted above. Of course, there are limits to the extent to which we can rely 
in any legal system on possession meaning the same thing in all contexts, as we have 
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seen here in relation to the Common Law and as we shall see in Scotland in the rest 
of this chapter. Nonetheless, we shall also see that there are clear commonalities 
between different areas in which some concept of possession is used. 
 
(2) The Scots position 
 
The preliminary position is taken here that it is permissible to consider all areas 
where some concept of possession is used, as long as due regard is paid to the 
possibility that, in a particular case, possession may have a meaning that is distinct to 
that area of law. The purpose of this section is to outline the areas where possession 
is relevant and to consider the extent to which differing policy considerations may 
lead to different definitions of possession. 
 The consequences of possession may be divided into two groups. The first is 
concerned with the protection of possession. 
 
 A possessor is entitled not to be dispossessed without his consent or an order 
of the court. In Scots law, the main possessory remedy is spuilzie, often 
known as ejection or intrusion in the case of land, allowing for a dispossessed 




 One who has possessed land for seven years on the basis of an apparently 
good title is entitled to a possessory judgment, with the consequence that that 
title is taken to be valid until it is reduced in separate proceedings.
79
 The 
possessory judgment may be used both to protect and to recover possession, 
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 As discussed below, it has been suggested that possession may provide a 
basis for recovery of pure economic loss in delict. 
 
 The second group of consequences of possession relates to the various 
situations in which possession is important, not for its own sake, but because of its 
contribution to some other legal consequence.  
 
 In certain circumstances, possession is necessary for the constitution or 
transfer of a real right. Thus, ownership of corporeal moveable property may 
be transferred by delivery of the property.
81
 A real right of pledge is 
constituted by delivery.
82
 A real right of lien requires possession.
83
 
Ownership of ownerless property may be acquired by taking possession of it, 
through the doctrine of occupatio.
84
 In the case of ownership and certain 
other real rights in land, acquisition is possible in certain circumstances based 
on possession for a specified period.
85
 
 One who possesses property in good faith is entitled to retain the fruits of the 
property
86








 A possessor of corporeal moveable property is presumed to be its owner89 
and, where the actual owner colludes with another to the effect that, by 
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leaving the latter in possession without a genuine ground for doing so, third 




 In criminal law, there are certain statutory offences based on possession,91 




We shall see a number of other examples as we proceed. The examples given, 
though, illustrate that in looking at possession we are concerned with a concept that 
applies across a number of different areas of law. It is, of course, impossible here to 
give a full account of all of these areas and, as this thesis is concerned only with 
possession of corporeal moveable property, there will be no further consideration of 
those areas where possession of land is significant. However, subject to these points, 
some consideration of the policy behind the different applications of possession may 
help in considering whether possession is indeed a unitary concept. Although the 
areas of law that involve possession are diverse, nonetheless there are some common 
elements. First, whatever one may say about the mental element of possession, there 
must be some element of physical control. The contrary cannot be the case without 
doing violence to the meaning of the word. How much control is required may of 
course vary, and as we have seen the control need not be exercised personally, but 
something must be present that can be said to constitute control. 
 Second, we can in some of these uses for possession make some conjecture as 
to the manner of control that is required. The most straightforward example is the 
presumption of ownership that arises from possession. It would make no sense to 
presume someone to be owner on the basis of a physical relationship with the 
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property that did not bear the appearance of ownership. Thus we can hypothesise that 
the presumption of ownership requires that the property be held in a manner 
consistent with ownership of it. This is in fact what we find when we look at the 
relevant authorities, as in Warrander v Alexander,
93
 in which the presumption was 
held not to apply to goods in the custody of a ship's master acting in that capacity. 
The same must certainly be true of the doctrine of collusive possession, the whole 
basis of which is that the possessor is being held out as owner. 
 It would seem reasonable to add occupatio to this list. As ownership is being 
acquired, it would seem reasonable to require of the acquirer acts in a way 
demonstrating a claim to the property. 
 The rights of a good faith possessor appear also to be consistent with this 
idea. For Stair, the right to fruits is justified by two considerations. The first is that 
the possessor, being in good faith, does not deserve to lose out.
94
 As Erskine points 
out, the possessor may have expended money and effort on the property, and could 
be impoverished by a demand for the value of the fruits consumed.
95
 Secondly, the 
right to fruits is justified 'in hatred of the negligence of the other party not pursuing 
his right'.
96
 It is the owner of the property who has caused the situation by failing to 
enforce his rights. To these considerations, Hume adds the 'trouble and vexation' of 'a 




 It is the second of Stair's considerations that is significant here. If the owner 
of the property is to be properly blameable for failure to enforce his rights, it seems 
reasonable to insist that the possessor act in such a way as to give warning that he is 
asserting a right to the property.  
 The possession of a thief or, to a lesser extent, of a resetter is unlikely to have 
the same quality of openness that would be expected of an owner or a bona fide 
possessor. However, to steal property is to act as if one has a right to the property. It 
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is true that one may be guilty of theft or reset without having the intention to hold for 
oneself,
98
 but this would be a matter of animus. 
 The suggestion then is that all of the instances of possession considered so far 
have in common the idea that possession is a manifestation of an intention to assert a 
right to possess the property. The inference drawn from this is that the physical 
element of possession will in some way reflect this assertion of a right. This assertion 
of right requirement is less clear, however, with the possessory remedies. For Stair, 
the justification for the protection of possession is that: 
 
[I]t is the main foundation of the peace, and preservation thereof, that 




Erskine's view is to much the same effect.
100
 The only explanation given by Bankton 
is that of Justinian,
101
 that the determination of possession is a necessary preliminary 
to the determination of right. It is not clear that Stair's justification tells us a great 
deal about what the requirements for possession should be, as it does not explain why 
(as appears to be the case) one holding entirely on another's behalf does not possess 
for these purposes. However, although possession does not determine the question of 
the right to possess, it is nonetheless true that, as Justinian's justification hints, behind 
every possessory dispute there is likely to be a dispute over the right to the property. 
The fact that possessory protection is dependent on having the intention to hold on 
one's own behalf suggests this also. It is of interest to note in this regard that 
Jhering's view was that possession was protected in order better to protect ownership: 
possessory protection is 'eine Eigenthumsposition' or 'ein Vorwerk des 
Eigenthums'.
102
 On this view, possessory protection is 'eine nothwendige 
Vervollständigung und Ergänzung des Eigenthumsschutzes'.
103
 This then appears to 
be based on some form of presumption of ownership in favour of the possessor. 
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None of this is conclusive, of course. To reach a conclusion, analysis of the 
authorities on the question will be required. There are also three areas mentioned 
above, but not yet considered, that are more difficult to fit into the view that 
possession requires holding of the property in the manner of one asserting a right to 
the property. These are the right of a possessor to damages for pure economic loss, 
statutory offences, and the case of delivery. They will now be considered. 
 
(3) Three difficult areas 
 
(a) Pure economic loss. Normally, there is no remedy in delict when a party has 
suffered loss as a result of damage to someone else's property, such loss falling into 
the category of pure economic loss.
104
 However, it has been suggested that there is an 
exception to this rule when the party suffering the loss is in possession of the 
property.
105
 Reid suggests that this possession must normally be founded on a real 
right to possession, although a contractual right 'may also be sufficient if it confers 
on the claimant, in a question between the parties, the substance of ownership or 
other real right'.
106
 It is unclear whether this is based on possession in the sense 
required for the possessory remedies. However, it is at least strongly arguable that it 
is. Thus, in Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd
107
 and in Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd v 
Martin Black & Co (Wire Ropes) Ltd,
108
 in which the pursuers did not have 
possession as defined earlier in this chapter, they failed.
109
 On the other hand, in 
North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies Corporation Inc,
110
 a hirer of a 
helicopter was held to have title to sue for damage negligently caused to it by the 
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defender. Again, in Main v Leask,
111
 a fishing boat was being operated as a joint 
venture, with profits to be divided between the owners of the boat, the owners of the 
nets and the crew. When the boat was damaged by the defender's negligence, no 
obstacle was found to recovery of damages by the crew for loss of profits. In both of 
these cases, the successful pursuers met the requirements for possession laid down 
earlier, at least if it is possible to possess on the basis of a personal right. 
The suggestion has been made that the different areas where possession is 
significant have in common the requirement to hold as if by right. The considerations 
leading to this conclusion clearly do not apply, however, to remedies for damage 
caused to property by negligence. The policy here has been described as being based: 
 
...not so much on any ground of principle, but because of the dictates of 




This is the case even though the result is that two equally deserving pursuers are 
treated differently. Nonetheless, on the assumption that this is an example of the 
general right of a possessor not to have that possession interfered with, it must be 
assumed likewise that possession here means the same as possession for the purposes 
of spuilzie. 
 
(b) Statutory offences. Of potentially substantial assistance in a general study of 
possession are the numerous cases on various statutory offences of possession,
113
 
assuming that they do in fact represent the same concept. Of course, if the word 
'possession' is to retain any connection to its ordinary meaning, its use in one area 
must bear some relationship to its use in other areas. Thus, Bovey, considering 




The assistance provided by these cases is, however, potentially reduced by 
the well-known principle that, in cases of ambiguity, penal statutes are to be 
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interpreted in favour of the accused.
115
 According to Bennion, this is based on the 
'just principle that a person is not to be put in peril upon an ambiguity'.
116
 
 However, this is not a universal rule. There will be circumstances where the 
policy of an Act requires a broader interpretation, and this possibility must also be 
taken into account by the court.
117
 It is not correct to say that in cases of doubt a 
penal statute must always be interpreted in favour of the accused.
118
 Thus, for 
example, in Smith v Stirling,
119
 a private party was held by the licensee in licensed 
premises, which were also his own home. The licence was in the form provided for 
by schedule (A) of the Public Houses (Scotland) Acts Amendment Act 1862, which 
had as a condition that the licensee did not, among other things, 'permit or suffer any 
drinking in any part of the premises' between 11pm and 8am. Despite the apparently 
clear words of the statute, an interpretation was adopted to the effect that activities 
not related to the licensee's business were not affected by it. At first sight, this 
appears to be an example of the principle that penal statutes will be interpreted in 
favour of the accused. However, the Lord Justice-Clerk makes it clear that the court 
is engaged in a balancing of policy objectives: 
 
 I should certainly always resist such a construction of this statute as would 
open a door to the contravention of its spirit though not of its letter. But I 
should also always resist such a construction being put upon it as would 




Thus, while the court will interpret the legislation to exclude acts from the scope of 
the offence which are within the strict letter of the legislation but not its objectives, 
equally the court is prepared to adopt a broader interpretation to give effect to those 
objectives where necessary.  
 We find the same in statutory offences concerned with possession. Where 
possession of an item is prohibited, the interpretation that is most favourable to the 
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accused is one restricting the scope of the offence to cases where the item is actually 
on the accused's person, or at least under his direct control. That, however, is not the 
interpretation that has found favour with the courts. For example, in Sullivan v Earl 
of Caithness,
121
 the accused was held to be in possession of a firearm stored in his 
mother's flat, where he was not resident. 
 Indeed, the policy of these statutes may lead to a broader interpretation of 
possession rather than a narrower one.
122
 Suppose that I find a package containing (to 
my knowledge) controlled drugs. I decide to hold onto them, not for my own use, but 
so that I can return them to their owner (if he should appear). On these facts, I am not 
in possession for the purposes of spuilzie,
123
 but I may be held to possess for the 
purposes of the criminal law. This seems insufficient basis, however, for 
distinguishing entirely between possession for the purposes of the criminal law and 
possession for other purposes. 
 
(c) Delivery. The requirement for delivery to transfer ownership or to create a pledge 
is, as we have seen, of reduced scope in modern Scots law, though it remains the law 
in Germany
124
 and South Africa
125
. In the developed Roman law, it was seen as 
involving an acquisition of possession by the transferee.
126
 Thus, Ulpian, speaking of 
delivery of property to one co-owner acting on behalf of both, talks of ownership 
being acquired here through possession.
127
 He also speaks elsewhere of a slave who 
'buys and acquires possession'
128
 for his owner. Again, for Ulpian, in a contract of 
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mutuum, ownership is transferred by possession.
129
 Similarly, Celsus speaks of 
delivery in terms of possession.
130
 Again, in the Digest title on acquisition and loss of 
possession
131
 there is included much on delivery. 
 Following Roman law, it is typically accepted in the Civilian tradition that 
delivery involves an acquisition of possession by the transferee through a transfer of 
physical control in that person’s favour accompanied by the necessary intention to 
possess.
132
 For Scots law, it does appear that Stair, Erskine and Bankton all 
considered the requirements for delivery to be the same as the requirements for the 
acquisition of possession for the purposes of the possessory remedies. It is true that 
Stair does not directly deal with delivery in his general account of possession. 
However, he does refer at the beginning of this account to possession as 'the way to 
property',
133
 and he makes passing reference to symbolical delivery during this 
account.
134




 Erskine is clearer: not only does he define delivery as involving a giving of 
possession,
136
 he uses his discussion of delivery as an introduction to his discussion 
of possession. For Bankton, too, his discussion of delivery leads to discussion of 
possession on the basis that it is 'the ordinary means of acquiring real rights'.
137
 
 Bell defines delivery as: 
 
...the delivery of possession by the owner, with the design of transferring the 




Elsewhere, having given a definition of possession derived from that of Erskine, he 
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 Reference to delivery as involving a transfer of possession is also found in 
decisions of the courts.
140
 
That this should be the case is not surprising. It has been suggested earlier 
that the policy justifications for the use of the concept of possession suggest that the 
possessor will be required to act in a way consistent with having a right to possess. In 
the case of the delivery requirement, we see Stair taking the same approach: 
 
For the security of the people, and anticipation of error and fraud, and that 
evident probation may be had, men do most profitably order deeds to be done 
in such a palpable and plain form, as it may easily appear, whether false or 
not...Thus, though the dispositive will of the proprietor be sufficient to 
alienate anything that is his, and to constitute the right thereof in another, yet 
by the civil law and custom of most nations, delivery or apprehension of 




These considerations are suggestive of the same approach as the one already 
suggested for possession generally, namely requiring that the transferee act with 
regard to the property in the manner of one with a right to possess. 
 The difficulty, however, is that there are competing policy considerations 
which appear to require a more lenient approach to delivery. In accounts of 
possession, in both the Civil and Common Law traditions, there is a tendency to 
mark out as a special case possession derived from, and with the consent of, a 
previous possessor. For example, Bufnoir denies that delivery involves any physical 
element at all,
142
 possession passing to the transferee by the transferor’s intention 
alone. This, it is true, is a fairly extreme view, and may be influenced by the absence 
of a requirement for delivery to transfer ownership of corporeal moveables in 
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 However, it is widely held that possession is more easily 
acquired by delivery than in other situations.
144
 In Germany, this rule is statutory.
145
 
 The same tendency is found in Scotland, and is based on the idea that the 
interests of commerce lie in the direction of ease of transfer. Carey Miller suggests 
that: 
 
[C]ommercial necessity, rather than adherence to rational form consistent 




Normally, this 'necessity' is invoked by the buyer to avoid the consequences of the 
seller's insolvency before the goods have changed hands. Bell criticises this 
tendency: 
 
It is by no means uncommon...to find every fancied conveniency or facility to 
the dealings of traders represented as a case of that sort of necessity which the 
law has in contemplation in admitting constructive delivery...There is no end 
to the multiplication of small distinctions, and traders will be found infinitely 
ingenious in discovering cases in which mere conveniency or facility in the 
management of their dealings may be made to assume the appearance of 
necessity, till all the fixed principles of the law shall be unsettled, and a 
miserable pretence of mercantile usage, varying in every port, and with each 
new set of dealers, be permitted to usurp the place of those great rules to 




Bell singles out Broughton v Aitchison
148
 for criticism on this head. In that case, a 
quantity of wheat had been sold, but was kept in a granary under the care of an 
employee of the transferor. The majority of the court, in holding delivery to have 
been made, appears to rely on two factors, namely the issuing of a delivery order by 
the transferor to the employee and the payment of the sum of one shilling by the 
transferee to the employee for taking care of the wheat. It does seem, however, that it 
is going much too far to say that this made him the transferee's employee. A sum of 
this kind seems more like a tip. The discussion above of constitutum possessorium 
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suggests that instead there would be needed some kind of separate storage contract 
with the transferor.  
 In other cases, the transferee has been protected by disregarding the 
requirement for delivery altogether, as in Lang v Bruce.
149
 In this case, after sale at 
auction, animals which had been bought were driven back to and left on the seller's 
land. The seller then became insolvent. After the insolvency was declared, but before 
sequestration, the buyer attempted to take possession of the animals. However, he 
was prevented from doing so by a self-appointed committee of creditors. In the view 
of the majority opinion,
150
 where the transferee is only prevented from taking 
possession by unlawful interference of another, he is to be treated as taking 
possession: 
 
[A]s the pursuer did what he could to obtain complete possession of the 
stock, and was only prevented from obtaining it by an interference on the part 
of interested and unauthorized individuals, the case must clearly be treated in 




As this makes plain, there is here an exception to the delivery requirement. An 
exception was made on similar grounds in Crawford v Kerr.
152
 In this case, money 
was placed by a debtor in an envelope and handed to his own servant to be sent to his 
creditors the following morning. However, the debtor died unexpectedly during the 
night. In the morning, a guest in the house took charge of the money, which was not 
then handed to the creditors. The court held that there had been delivery to the 
creditors on these facts. This decision seems, however, to go unacceptably further 
than the decision in Lang v Bruce. In Lang, there was at least an attempt at delivery. 
In Crawford, on the other hand, there was no more than the formation of an intention 
to make delivery. Although the court was influenced by a desire not to give effect to 
the visitor's unlawful act, its reasoning implies the same result even without that 
interference. 
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 We see therefore that, in certain cases, the courts have been prepared to 
disregard the delivery requirement. In Lang v Bruce, at least, this seems justifiable on 
the basis that delivery would have occurred but for the wrongful interference of those 
most interested in its failure. More commonly, though, we find the requirement for 
delivery being leniently applied rather than ignored. There is no doubt a commercial 
interest in ease of transfer, which may result in the law being more lenient in 
considering whether a requirement for delivery has been satisfied than would 
necessarily be the case in other cases where possession is significant.
153
  
 It may be thought, therefore, that authorities on delivery will be of limited use 
in considering general questions of possession. Certainly, care must be taken. 
However, this does not justify disregarding authorities on delivery altogether. For 
one thing, commercial convenience has not always been decisive. For example, in 
Anderson v McCall,
154
 on facts very similar to those in Broughton v Aitchison, the 
Inner House declined to recognise an alleged custom of the grain trade in Glasgow to 
the effect that a delivery order was sufficient to operate delivery in such cases. In 
addition, some cases that apparently take a lenient approach to delivery are in fact 
examples of the parties’ acts being construed in light of the surrounding facts rather 
than being examples of difference of principle. Thus, Savigny explains the more 
lenient approach to delivery in this way: 
 
[T]he previous possessor is the only person who could prevent me from 
dealing with the thing at will, but it is expressly said of this very person, that 




This recognition of the transferee's possession by the transferor thus makes it easier 
to demonstrate that the transferee has in fact taken possession. Facts that might 
otherwise have been seen as ambiguous are explained by the parties' intentions. It 
does not follow from this that possession may be held to be acquired without any acts 
at all that are capable of being construed as possessory acts, in the absence of some 
special rule. As Savigny says, if there is a difference in outcome, this is 'referable, 
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not to the principle itself, but to the application of it'.
156
 In his view, the requirements 
of possession are the same in all cases, but the consent of a previous holder makes it 
easier to infer their existence.  
 Even in modern German law, where the distinction is statutory, it is accepted 
that delivery nonetheless requires a transfer of control, the distinction being less a 




Likewise, Pollock & Wright observe: 
 
[A]cts which if opposed would be insignificant are accepted as a sufficient 
and actual entering on possession when they are fortified by the concurrence 




For example, if A hands to B, as part of a sale, the key to the enclosure in which the 
goods are kept, B may readily be seen as having acquired possession. In the 
circumstances, B will expect to be able to get access to the goods without difficulty, 
and it is clear enough on the face of it that he intends to do so. If, on the other hand, 
B has merely found the key, it is less probable that he would be held to possess. For 
one thing, in the absence of an underlying transaction justifying his holding of the 
key, there is nothing as yet to suggest that he intends to take access to the goods. For 
another, control of the goods is less clear in this case. For example, A may have a 
duplicate key, or may have changed the locks. B may not even know where the 
goods are kept. Thus, the significance of the fact of holding the key varies depending 
on the background facts. In the case of delivery:  
 
[T]here is every reason to think that the acquirer can and will in fact have 
those contents at his disposal...In the case of a wrongful acquirer the bent of 
expectation is the other way. The loser of the key may have already missed it; 
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So this is not about some technical difference between occupatio and traditio; it is 
about deciding whether there is sufficient control on the basis of the specific facts of 
the case. 
 On this view, it is an exaggeration to say that the development of the law on 
transfer of ownership by delivery has been dominated by commercial considerations 
rather than the general principles of possession. Of course, such commercial 
considerations have undoubtedly been present. However, what may appear at first 
sight to be evidence that such delivery is easier than other cases of acquisition of 
possession may in fact turn out to be the result of the surrounding facts rather than a 
difference of principle.
160
 Certainly, there seems insufficient basis to require the 
exclusion of the delivery cases from a general account of possession. 
 
(4) Conclusion: is it reasonable to treat possession as a unitary concept? 
 
It cannot be denied that there are difficulties with any attempt to formulate general 
principles of possession, applying across all areas of the law where possession is 
significant. Policy issues applying in particular areas may lead to a different 
conclusion as to possession, even when dealing with the same or similar facts. We 
see this point particularly strongly where possession is required for the transfer or 
constitution of a real right and with criminal cases. Another problem, which will 
become apparent as the thesis progresses, is that all or most of the cases on a 
particular point will often come from one particular area of law. Thus, all of the cases 
on possession of very small items arise under the misuse of drugs legislation.
161
 
Likewise, almost all of the cases on possession of animals are concerned with 
acquisition of ownership by occupatio.
162
 This makes it more difficult to draw 
general conclusions. 
 However, even though there may be differences of application in different 
areas of law, it has been suggested in this chapter that there are nonetheless 
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similarities in how possession is defined in different areas of the law. There must 
always be some notion of control, however that is defined. We have even been able 
to go further and hypothesise that this control must normally be exercised in a 
manner consistent with an assertion of a right to the property. We shall see as we go 
on whether this hypothesis is supported by the authorities. However, even the 
common factor of control seems sufficient that authorities interpreting a possession 
requirement in one area may be of use in interpreting that requirement in another. If a 
case on spuilzie of a wild animal were to arise, it would seem absurd to disregard 
from the beginning cases on acquisition of ownership by occupatio. Of course, it 
would be open to the court to reach a different conclusion on possession for the 
spuilzie question, but that does not justify a refusal even to consider such authorities. 
This is particularly true given that Scotland is a smaller jurisdiction than many, and 
so is limited in the quantity of cases or literature on any particular point that is likely 
to arise. A small jurisdiction cannot afford to waste authority, and, when considering 
an issue of possession in one area, the general law gives at least a starting point. 
Accordingly, the approach taken in this thesis is to draw freely on possession cases 
from all areas of the law, while remaining aware that the result in a particular case 








The approach taken in this thesis is to make use of comparative and historical 
perspectives drawn from Roman, German, French, South African and English law. 
Reference will be made to sources from these systems as the thesis proceeds. In this 
chapter we shall see an overview of the law in these systems, first of acquisition of 
the physical element, then of loss. 
 
B. THE PHYSICAL ELEMENT IN THE ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION 
 
(1) Roman law 
 
The physical element of possession is generally defined as requiring some degree of 
control of the property.
1
 The requirements for possession will vary depending on the 
specific circumstances of the case,
2
 but physical control is the fundamental issue. As 
a result, it is not possible for two or more parties to possess separately the same 
property.
3
 There is no need for actual physical contact, if there is sufficient control.
4
 
Thus, if I give you the key to the building in which goods are kept, that is an 
effective delivery of the goods themselves,
5
 at least if the handing over of the key 
takes place at the building.
6
 Justinian does not mention any requirement for the key 
to be handed over at the building.
7
 From this it has been taken that he intended to 
remove this requirement, the key then becoming 'merely the symbol of what is 
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 However, it is not clear that Justinian in fact intended this.
9
 Nor is it clear 
that such a change makes the key merely symbolic. After all, we may suppose that, 
by giving up the key, the transferor has lost possession. Who else but the transferee 
now has possession? If the key gives control it does so wherever it may be that the 
key is handed over, unless there is some external factor preventing the exercise of 
that control. As Gordon observes: 
 
[I]f the principle of acquisition of possession is control of the thing it is 
probably too narrow to limit the efficacy of a transfer of keys to the case 




If the point is control, then it hardly seems decisive where the handing over of the 
key takes place. To require presence at the store is to introduce an additional, purely 
symbolical, element. 
 Again, says Javolenus, I gain possession of a pile of logs by placing a guard 
on it,
11
 the reference to the guard suggesting that actual control is necessary rather 
than simply being in a position to take control (as where the pile is merely pointed 
out to me, but I do nothing actually to take control). Similarly, says Javolenus: 
 
Should I direct you to put money or anything else which you owe me where I 
can see it, the result is that you are released at once and that it becomes mine. 
For in such a case, no one else having physical control [possessio] of the 





Although Javolenus does not say as much, Thomas reasonably assumes that this 
event is taking place in the creditor's own premises.
13
 Even if this is not the case, 
however, there would seem to be no reason why this could not work satisfactorily in 
a public place, providing that sufficient control has been given that it can be said that 
the money is within the creditor's sphere of control. In the creditor's own house, this 
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sphere of control will be extensive, and so anything placed in my house may be said 
to have been placed within my control. Certainly, viewed objectively, this is how the 
matter would be viewed by a third party coming onto the scene. On the other hand, in 
a public place, such a third party would be less ready to draw such an inference. 
Suppose that I order a drink in a bar. I then return to my table while the drink is 
poured. The drink is then placed on the bar for me to collect. At this point, it is 
difficult to see that the drink is under my control. In a busy room, another person 
may pick up the drink from the bar either dishonestly or in the belief that it is his 
own. However, once it is in place in front of me on my table, it is patent that I am 
asserting control over it. 
 What this may be taken to suggest, at least provisionally, is that what is 
necessary to satisfy the physical element of possession is to act in such a manner as 
to give the outward impression of ownership.
14
 In other words, stress is placed on the 
view of a hypothetical objective third party. This, it will be recalled, was the 
hypothesis developed in chapter 1 based on the policy considerations underlying the 
various uses of possession. In a sense, therefore, the corpus appears to depend on the 
animus of others, or at least of a hypothetical objective onlooker. In a sense this is to 
be expected, as my intentions are only made known through my actions.
15
 As we 
shall see, this idea has been received also in modern systems. When the drink is on 
the bar, the objective impression is that it still belongs to the transferor; once it is on 
my table, a bystander would assume it to be mine. Likewise, I will be readily 
assumed to be the owner of money lying on a table in my house. Thus, Celsus 
observes that: 
 
If I instruct the vendor to leave at my house what I have bought, it is certainly 




Presumably this instruction has actually been carried out.
17
 It appears that the goods 
have been left at the house without being placed in the hands of anyone acting on the 
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transferee's behalf: we are told that no-one has yet touched the goods. It does not 
appear that this outcome can be based on the idea that the occupier of a house 
automatically possesses everything in it, at least if Paul's view is accepted.
18
 
Similarly, I do not possess an item just because it is buried on my land, if I have not 
in fact exercised any control over it.
19
 The point is rather that, if an item is on my 
land or in my house, control of it may readily be inferred. On the other hand, I would 
need a closer control of money placed in a public area, and in the case of buried 
property I am not able to exercise any control at all without digging it up.
20
 This 
being the case, it may be that Celsus's view requires qualification: property left inside 
the door of a house leads more readily to an inference of possession than property 
left lying outside in the street. This is an issue considered in more detail in section 
C(3) of chapter 3. 
 Both of the examples given by Javolenus are concerned with delivery. 
However, they would seem to be consistent with the general requirements for 
interdictal possession. In Roman law, then, we can see that possession depends on 
some degree of physical control. The suggestion here is that what is required is a 
holding in a manner that reflects the possessory intention: where one is possessing 
animo domini, in other words with the intention to hold as owner, the acts required 
for the physical element would be the acts of an owner.  
 
(2) The French tradition 
 
(a) Pre-codification. Writing before the Code civil, Pothier defined the physical 
element of possession as 'appréhension corporelle'.
21
 This appears to be meant 
literally, stressing that the thing must actually be placed within the possessor's 
hands.
22
 Accordingly, I do not possess an object just because it is buried in my 
land.
23
 However, he accepts that exceptions to this will be found necessary in 
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 What does not appear in Pothier's account, however, is 
any discussion of the significance of the manner in which this control is exercised. 
There is no talk of a requirement to hold in the manner of one exercising a right. The 




(b) Modern law. In modern French law, the definition of possession is found in the 
Code civil, according to which possession is 'la détention ou la jouissance d'une 
chose...'
26
 This definition is echoed in the civil code of Louisiana, which defines 
possession as 'the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing'.
27
 In Quebec, the 
definition differs somewhat from this. Possession is defined as 'l'exercice de 
fait...d'un droit réel'.
28
 This definition draws out more clearly the idea of corpus as 
reflecting animus: if one wishes to possess as owner, one must act like an owner.
29
 In 
fact, this is the standard that is applied also in French law, where possession is 
explained as consisting in: 
 
...holding a thing in an exclusive manner and in carrying out on it the same 




Danos, too, takes this approach. For him, possession is 'la jouissance effective d’une 
chose'.
31
 This means the outward expression of ownership, being the exercise in fact 
of the rights given by ownership.
32
 In other words, one possesses not simply through 
physical detention, but through asserting some form of right to the property. Holders 
on a basis other than ownership appear, therefore, to be excluded from possession. 
For pre-Code French law, Domat indeed considers the only true possession to be that 
of an owner,
33
 and for him the reason why there can only be one possession is that 
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 Domat, Civil law in its natural order, Pt 1 3.7.1.1. 
62 
 
there can only be one right of ownership.
34
 From this it is reasonable to take it that he 
considers that the possessor must hold in the manner of an owner. As with Roman 
law, this must mean an objective standard: one holds in the manner of an owner if an 
objective onlooker would consider that to be the case.
35
 It is sufficient to take control 
indirectly, as where delivery is made of the keys to the premises where the goods are 
kept,
36




If the possessor has organised a mechanism for receipt of new possessions, 
like having a letterbox with his name on it, the general intention to possess 




The physical element in such a case would appear to be satisfied by the control over 
the receptacle. 
 It is not surprising that French law should make such a strong connection 
between possession and ownership as it does, given the French doctrine that, with 
respect to corporeal moveables, possession vaut titre.
39
 By virtue of this doctrine: 
 
[L]e simple possesseur d'un meuble est dans la même situation, en vertu de 
sa seule détention, que s'il avait, entre les mains, un titre juridique constitutif 




This is the result as long as the transfer is by one 'to whom the owner voluntarily 
ceded possession or detention', and as long as the acquirer is in good faith.
41
 Thus, 
one who acquires possession of a moveable in good faith will be able to defeat an 
action by the 'veritable propriétaire'
42
 to vindicate. For this reason, it is no doubt 
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appropriate to require that one who is to acquire in this way must first hold in such a 
manner as to give the objective impression of one holding as of right.
43
 
 How, though, does one achieve this impression? We have seen that the Code 
civil requires detention or enjoyment of the property. There is, however, a tendency 
in the literature to rely on the latter in defining the requirements for possession. We 
have seen that Planiol and Danos both base their definitions on use and enjoyment of 
the property. Similar definitions appear elsewhere,
44
 although Terré and Simler do 
refer also to 'maîtrise de la chose'.
45
 The emphasis is on active exercise of a right. We 
see the same in the definition in the Quebec civil code. This, however, is 
problematic, because the holding of a right is something that is not always expressed 
through active use. Parents putting outgrown baby clothes in the attic, to store them 
in anticipation of future offspring, are thereafter exercising no 'material acts of use 
and enjoyment' of the clothes at all. They may indeed never again do so: their 
expectation of future offspring may be disappointed. Likewise, if one accepts an 
unwanted gift solely to avoid causing offence, and the gift is immediately placed at 
the back of a cupboard to be forgotten, again one is making no use of the gift. 
Nonetheless, in both cases it would be surprising were it to be concluded that there 
was no possession. In both cases, there is complete control. In both cases, a right is 
being asserted, in that the parties involved are acting in such a way as to assume the 
existence of a right to control the use of the property. Perhaps the better view is to 
see use and enjoyment as merely factors indicative of an assertion of right. This 
would be more consistent with the definition in the Code civil, which gives détention 
and jouissance as alternatives. 
 
                                                                                                   
tendency in Scots law to refer to someone as 'true owner' of land whose ownership has been 
extinguished by the effect of s 3 of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979: see Scottish Law 
Commission, Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com no 222, 2010), paras 21.16-17. 
43
 de Folleville (n 40) paras 37-38. 
44
 See eg Carbonnier 1714-15; Jourdain 21; Terré & P Simler, para 155; Malaurie & Aynès, para 488. 
45
 Terré & Simler, para 159. 
64 
 
(3) Roman-Dutch and South African law 
 
In their account of possession, the Roman-Dutch writers followed the rules of Roman 
law as they understood them.
46
 For the physical element of possession, this meant the 
adoption of a criterion based on control of the property: 'actual holding of a thing'
47
 
for Grotius, 'keeping of a corporeal thing'
48
 for Voet and 'corporeal seizure'
49
 for 
Huber. Despite talk of 'bodily taking hold',
50
 it is clear that physical contact is not 
required. It is control that is the issue. Thus, 'a taking hold that is done with the eyes, 
as when I bid a thing which is to be delivered to me to be placed within my vision'
51
 
is effective despite the lack of physical contact. However it may be manifested, 
however, control is essential. As Voet says, it is not enough 'that a person should 
have seen a thing, or should know in what place it is'.
52
 
 The idea of possession as based on control has been accepted also in South 
African law. Thus, Silberberg and Schoeman define the physical element of 
possession as 'effective physical control'.
53
 Likewise, van der Merwe defines it as 
'effective physical control or custody'.
54




 Possession then requires control of the property. The application of this 
principle can be seen in Botha v Mazeka.
56
 That case concerned the sale of a number 
of heifers. The price was paid and the heifers were branded by the buyer, but they 
could not be removed until an appropriate permit was obtained. The question was 
whether delivery had taken place. The court held that branding was at best only 
ambivalent. It was equally consistent with the simple identification of the particular 
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heifers that were the subject of the contract of sale,
57
 but even if branding is 
unequivocally an assertion of right it does not give any greater control to the 
transferee. This was the view of such markings that was taken in Roman law.
58
 It was 
held further that driving the animals into a separate camp was not enough as the 
buyer had not obtained physical control over, or free access to, the animals. 
 It can be seen again here that it is control rather than contact that is the point. 
Thus, following Roman law, the placing of a guard on a woodstack is enough for 




[P]hysical prehension is not essential if the subject matter is placed in 
presence of the would-be possessor in such circumstances that he and he 




Indeed, even physical contact will not be enough if it does not give control: if this 
were not so, the physical contact would be merely symbolical. Thus, in Cape Tex 
Engineering Words (Pty) Ltd v SAB Lines (Pty) Ltd
61
 there was claim of possessory 
lien in respect of repairs to ship. Following completion of the work, the repairer 
attempted to maintain possession by having two employees on board at all times. The 
court held that, as the master of the ship did not in fact surrender control, the 
employees' presence was merely symbolic and, as such, insufficient. The employees, 
by their presence, could no more stop the ship's departure than they could if they had 
been standing on the dock. 
 Nor is it necessarily sufficient merely to be in a position to take control. Thus, 
in S v Magxwalisa,
62
 there was a charge of possession of explosives. The accused 
had been told where the explosives were, and were on their way to take possession. 
The argument that the giving of the knowledge was equivalent to traditio clavium 
was rejected. The accused were not exercising any actual control. Even though it has 
been said above that it is sufficient 'if the subject matter is placed in presence of the 
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 So control of the property is required. The next question, then is the kind and 
degree of control required. In Underwater Construction and Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Bell,
64
 there was a dispute over ownership of propeller blades taken from a wreck 
which was, in South African law, res nullius. Two propellers were actually taken 
away, and the other two were left lying beside the wreck, with the spot marked by a 
buoy. The court held that there was sufficient possession for occupatio as soon as the 
propeller blades were blasted loose from the wreck. This is the case here even 
although the actual control exercised appears fairly minimal. What is clear, though, is 
that an individual carrying out the acts carried out in this case is making an assertion 
of a right to the property. 
 The outcome was different in Reck v Mills.
65
 In that case, Mills and Reck had 
entered into an agreement to salvage pipework from a shipwreck, the pipes being of 
value for scrap. They had begun working on the ship. However, dissatisfied with 
progress, Reck then entered into an agreement with a third party to work on the boat 
and informed Mills accordingly. On appeal, it was held, reversing the decision of the 
court of first instance, that Mills had not done enough to be in possession, and so did 
not qualify for a possessory remedy against Reck. At first instance, the court had 
relied on texts of Voet and Grotius concerning occupatio in relation to animals. It is 
noted in those texts that one who actually captures a wild animal is preferred to one 
who merely wounds it, even if the latter wounded or pursued the animal first. 
However, the hunter who takes the animal may in such circumstances be liable to a 
penalty for hunting in an improper fashion. Given that no such penalty was available 
to him, the judge at first instance took the view that this translated to allowing 
possession to the first to pursue. Accordingly, the court at first instance allowed 
possessory protection on the basis that steps had been taken to acquire possession. 
This position seems difficult to justify, given that the settled position in South Africa 
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seems to be that actual capture of a wild animal is necessary to give ownership.
66
 
However, if a different conclusion was to be reached, it was necessary for the appeal 
court to distinguish this case from Underwater Construction and Salvage Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Bell. It has been suggested,
67
 though without considering the decision wrong on 
the facts, that the court in Reck v Mills placed too much focus on the need for 
constant physical control: as we shall see later, possession may be maintained even 
where the ability to exercise control is temporarily interrupted. Certainly, work was 
often interrupted by the weather, as it must be in such circumstances. Another ground 
for distinguishing the two cases may lie in the fact that Mills had not in fact 
succeeded in separating the pipes from this ship. No doubt he could, by acts affecting 
one part of the ship, possess the whole. However, this does not appear to be his 
intention. Given that he did not appear to have intended to possess the whole ship, he 
could not possess a part of it only. This argument was put forward by counsel for 
Reck. The court at first instance instead chose to take a view based on what the court 
considered to be a just result rather than basing its decision on possession. It appears, 
however, that the appeal court based its decision on this view, that an individual part 




 It appears, then, that in South Africa the physical element of possession is 
based on control of the property. This control need not be extensive, depending on 
the nature of the property, but it is suggested from Underwater Construction and 
Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v Bell that this control must at least be of a nature that reflects 




(a) Pre-codification. Views expressed in Germany before codification reflected the 
view that possession was acquired by one who was acting as owner of the property. 
Savigny suggested that what was required was control that was: 
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...such as to place the person who desires to obtain Possession in a position 
which shall enable him, and him only, to deal with the subject at pleasure; 




Pufendorf wrote to the same effect.
70
 Jhering, similarly, took the physical element to 
be the outward expression of the intention to hold as owner.
71
 In other words, the 
corpus reflects the animus.
72
  
 Windscheid gives a somewhat different formulation. He defines the physical 
element of possession as the requirement for a person to have the thing 'tatsächlich in 
seiner Gewalt'.
73
 He expands on this by explaining that this means 'tatsächliche 
Gewalt über die Sache in der Gesamtheit ihrer Beziehungen'.
74
 For Windscheid this 
means that there can only be one possession of a thing at any given time, though this 




(b) Modern law. It is this test of factual control (tatsächliche Gewalt) that has been 
adopted in the modern German law.
76
 However, it is not easy to give a precise 
formulation of the requirement that will fit all cases. While possession in some cases 
may be clear, such as things carried on the person or shut away such that others are 
deprived of access,
77
 other things are less clear. Certainly, actual physical handling 
does not appear to be necessary.
78
  
If there is no direct physical control being exercised over the thing, for 
example as with a woodpile in the open,
79
 recourse must be had to what Brehm and 
Berger term the 'soziale Anschauungen'.
80
 Another way of putting the same idea is to 
say with Wilhelm that the matter is determined, not by any individual’s own 
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knowledge or intentions, but by the general view of others (Durchschnittsurteil von 
jedermann).
81
 One must have the outward appearance of control.
82
 In other words, as 
appears to have been the case in Roman law, one must press into service the idea of a 
hypothetical objective onlooker, and take an objective view of the whole 
circumstance to determine whether the thing appears to be possessed. The idea here 
is of possession as a Publizitätsmittel,
83
 a means of giving publicity to rights in 
property. It may be, therefore, that it is necessary to reject the idea that it is enough 
that an item has been left in an individual’s sphere of control, as where a customer in 
a supermarket accidentally leaves a banknote on a shelf.
84
 It is true that, rather 
similarly to the Roman view discussed above, Savigny had indicated that the 
occupier of premises has sufficient corpus to possess an item within those premises 
(though not necessarily sufficient animus).
85
 However, there seems to be no actual 
exercise of control over the banknote by the occupiers of the supermarket, and it 
seems improbable that anyone seeing the note would assume that the occupiers were 
asserting any sort of claim to it.
86
 On the other hand, in the case of the woodpile, it is 
clear from its existence that someone has exercised control over its components, and 
the effort involved in its construction suggests that someone has an interest in it. It is 
true that, in this situation, interference by third parties cannot be excluded, but the 
exclusion of any such possibility does not appear to be required.
87
 This then suggests 
that, notwithstanding the terms of the BGB, it is not control alone that satisfies the 
physical element of possession. Instead, what is required is control of a kind that 
indicates to third parties that a right is being asserted. The reason for this, according 
to Wieling, is that possession is a social fact, eine soziale Tatsache, rather than being 
something having its origin in the intention of a legislator, and so its existence or 
otherwise is determined accordingly.
88
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(5) English law 
 
(a) The general position. Possession requires a particular physical relationship with 
the property as well as a particular state of mind, namely 'effective physical or 
manual control, or occupation, evidenced by some outward act'.
89
 This outward act is 
sometimes known as de facto possession.
90
 What then is required for this physical 
element? According to Pollock and Wright, the general position on the physical 
element is that: 
 
[A]ny of the usual outward marks of ownership may suffice, in the absence of 
manifest power in some one else, to denote as having possession the person 




Holmes, similarly, says that possession is 'a relation of manifested power coextensive 
with the intent'.
92
 For Pollock and Wright, this is present where:  
  
...a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he 




It is clear therefore that one with no control does not possess. Thus, say 
Pollock and Wright, if a box is delivered to someone but the key is retained, there is 
no acquisition of possession of the contents.
94
 This issue was considered in Stadium 
Finance Ltd v Robbins.
95
 In this case, the defendant had left a car with a dealer with a 
view to a sale, but without the key and with the car registration documents locked in 
the glove compartment. Without the defendant's consent, the dealer then agreed a 
sale to a third party. The question then arose whether the dealer was in possession for 
the purposes of section 1 of the Factors Act 1889. Having taken the view that there 
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was no possession of the car without the key or the registration documents, Wilmer J 
held that the registration book was not in the possession of the dealer.
96
 
 This control can be exercised indirectly, as for example where one receives 
delivery of a key to premises in which goods are kept.
97
 Pollock and Wright appear 




 The control required depends in part on the nature of the property. In The 
Tubantia,
99
 a case concerning competing claims to possession of a sunken ship, the 
requirement was defined as follows: 
 
A thing taken by a person of his own motion and for himself, and subject in 





A shipwreck is, of course, not susceptible to any great use at all, and so it was held 
sufficient to send divers down to carry out preliminary salvage work and to mark the 
position of the wreck with buoys attached to it. If an assertion of right is required, 
this is found in the work carried out and in the attachment of the buoys. 
Although Pollock and Wright refer in the passage quoted earlier to the 
'outward marks of ownership', the holding in fact need not be with the intent of an 
owner, if one is holding on a lesser basis. Thus, in Pharaoh Scaffolding v 
Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs,
101
 the hirer of scaffolding 
was held to have acquired possession of the scaffolding.
102
 It was held that 
possession for these purposes meant de facto control and exclusive use. Although the 
owners erected the scaffolding, and would make visits to the site to make alterations 
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and health and safety checks, this did not amount to control over the use to which the 
scaffolding was put. 
 This then is rather similar to the position of Roman, French, German and 
South African law. The physical element is the reflection of the mental element. No-
one will possess whose manner of holding is inconsistent with the assertion of a 
right. Thus, one whose friend passes to him the friend's bottle, so that he can take a 
drink from it, may be held not to possess the contents of the bottle: there is no 




(b) Exclusivity. A number of writers have said, both in English law and in other 
systems, that possession must be 'exclusive'.
104
 The point appears, though, more 
prominently in English accounts. Salmond, for example, describes exclusivity as 
being of 'the essence of possession'.
105
 Pollock and Wright say that 'physical 
possession is exclusive, or it is nothing'.
106
 More recently, Lord Hope of Craighead 
said in an English case that exclusivity 'is of the essence of possession'.
107
 It has been 
said that possession 'involves, by its very nature, a relationship of exclusivity 
between the possessor and the thing possessed'.
108
 It is not clear, however, that this 
means that exclusivity is a distinct requirement in the English law of possession. 
From context, it is clear that Pollock and Wright and Lord Hope mean no more than 
that English law has the same rule as Roman law, that there can be no more than one 
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person or group in possession at any one time.
109
 It does not mean, for example, that 
two or more people cannot possess together. A distinction falls to be made between 
shared control - where possession by multiple parties is possible
110
 - and a 
competition for control - where it is not. It is true that Gray and Gray's view 
(concerned with possession of land) is more strongly expressed: 
 
Possession, by its nature, implies exclusion: any claimant to possession 
necessarily reserves and retains the ability to exclude all others from the land 
occupied. Even the adjective 'exclusive' adds nothing to an understanding of 




However, given that they rely on Lord Hope's view, noted above, it may be that they 
mean no more than that there can be no valid competing claims of possession at any 
given time. 
In any case, the extent to which my control may be said to be exclusive must 
be a matter of degree: it would hardly be workable in practice for the possessor to be 
required to exclude all others from the property in all circumstances. Indeed, it does 
not appear to be required to exclude all possibility of interference by others.
112
 
Instead, only 'occupation...which is sufficient as a rule and for practical purposes to 
exclude strangers' is required, and not even that if there is no 'more effectual act in an 
adverse interest'.
113
 In effect, the position appears to be that, as long as the 
possessor's control of the property is not in fact subject to any interference, 
possession is retained. 
 
(c) Items on another's land. The English law on the physical element is 
complicated by a group of cases concerned with lost items found by one person on 
land belonging to another. This is an issue in English law because, as we saw in 
chapter 1, the first possessor of lost property in English law acquires rights to the 
property that may only be defeated by one with a prior right. 
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 In Bridges v Hawkesworth,
114
 the plaintiff was visiting the defendant's shop, 
where he found a parcel on the floor containing banknotes. The court held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the notes on the owner's failure to claim them. The basis for 
this was that: 
 
The notes never were in the custody of the defendant, nor within the 




The plaintiff was therefore the first to bring the notes under his control. 
 It appears that a distinction is made in these cases between items found in and 
items found on land. In the former case, the owner or occupier of the land is 
normally preferred, even though, Swadling argues, the object is 'ex hypothesi not 
already in the possession of the occupier of the land'.
116
 For example, in South 
Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman,
117
 rings were found by a workman embedded in 
the mud at the bottom of a pool he was engaged in draining. The court held in favour 
of the occupier of the land. In Elwes v Brigg Gas Co,
118
 an ancient boat was found 
buried in the land. The court held in favour of the landowner. In Waverley BC v 
Fletcher,
119
 a medieval gold brooch was found buried in a public park with the use of 
a metal detector. The court held that the local authority that owned the park was 
entitled to the brooch. These cases do not in fact appear to depend on possession. In 
Elwes and Waverley, the decisions were reached on the basis that a buried item is 
part of the land, and in Sharman express reliance was placed on Pollock and Wright's 
view that: 
 
The possession of land carries with it in general, by our law, possession of 
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Accordingly, Elwes, Waverley and Sharman may be disregarded in considering the 
general law of possession. 
 As far as lost items found above ground are concerned, the relevant law is 
now found in Parker v British Airways Board.
121
 In this case, a bracelet was found in 
an airport departure lounge by a passenger, the plaintiff. The defendants claimed to 
have had prior possession on the basis of their control of the premises. The plaintiff 
was preferred. Giving the lead judgment, Donaldson LJ held that the defendants had 
failed to show sufficiently the required 'manifest intention to exercise control'
122
 over 
items in the premises. That intention is, of course, made manifest through the actual 
acts of control that are carried out. Although some control was exercised over access 
to the departure lounge, this did not relate to any items that happened to be found 
there. The intention to exercise control is to be made manifest by acts of control such 
as restricting access, putting security measures in place and conducting searches for 
items. It was noted that the defendants had not done the last of these. The place 
where the item is found is therefore of importance. For example, said Donaldson LJ, 
in a public park no control at all is exercised over individuals' comings and goings. 
At the other end of the scale, in a bank vault there is a clear intention to exercise a 
high degree of control. In places where there are more modest restrictions on access, 
other factors will need to be considered. 
The issue has also arisen in the criminal law, where it appears that a less 
stringent test is adopted, owing to the need to show that the property belonged to 
someone before a competent charge of theft can be brought.
123
 Thus, in R v Rowe,
124
 
a quantity of iron was found at the bottom of a canal. In order to sustain a charge of 
larceny for taking the iron, it was held that the iron was in the possession of the canal 
company. The same approach was taken in Hibbert v McKiernan
125
 and R v 
Rostron,
126
 in both of which the accused appropriated lost golf balls found on a golf 
course. The balls had been abandoned by their owners, but were held to be in the 
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possession of the golf club even though they were not aware of the presence of 
specific balls. In the latter case it was expressly held that this was possession 'for the 
purposes of theft'.
127
 The decision in a private law dispute over possession might 
have been different on the same facts. Certainly, the occupiers of the golf courses in 
these cases do not appear to have been exercising the degree of control that the court 
in Parker indicates is required. Accordingly, as these cases appear to turn on a 
special rule of English criminal law, it is suggested that they are of limited use in 
considering general questions of possession. 
 
C. THE PHYSICAL ELEMENT IN THE LOSS OF POSSESSION 
 
(1) Roman law 
 
Once possession has been taken, it appears that less control is required for its 
maintenance.
128
 For Kaser, possession is retained as long as factual control is not 
definitely lost.
129
 An example would be where a purse becomes detached and falls 
from the tunic to which it was attached.
130
 Accordingly, even if one is not presently 
exercising control, one still possesses as long as a resumption of control is not 
impossible. Thus, Gaius says that we possess things we leave intending to return 
to.
131
 He says nothing about the likelihood that the items will still be there when we 
do return to them. Likewise, for Papinian, buried money continues to be possessed 
even if its location is forgotten,
132
 even though possession of such money could not 
be acquired initially until it was dug up.
133
 Things may continue to be possessed even 
during a protracted absence, as with 'summer and winter pastures, even though we 
desert them at given periods'.
134
 Paul adopts a distinction made by the younger 
Nerva: 
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The younger Nerva says that, leaving aside a slave, movable things are 
possessed by us only so long as they are in our keeping, that is, so long as we 
can, if we so choose, take physical control of them. For once an animal strays 
or a vase falls, so that it cannot be found, it immediately ceases to be in our 
possession, even though it is possessed by no one else; this differs from the 
case of something which is still in our keeping, though not immediately 
traceable; because the fact remains that it is still there, and all that is 




He begins, then, by making possession depend on whether the thing is 'in our 
keeping'. Presumably the vase that has fallen has done so outside 'our keeping'. On 
this basis, it is a little difficult to account for Papinian's view that a buried object 
whose location is forgotten is still possessed, even when it is on someone else's land, 
unless the point is that the buried item can in principle be recovered, if only its 
location can be remembered. If there is a problem with continued possession here, it 
is one of animus rather than corpus. Of course, a buried item is more difficult for 
anyone else to interfere with. An item easily accessible to others may be in a 
different position. 
 According to Nerva, then, if an item cannot be found, it is no longer 
possessed. If, however, it is possible to find it, it is still possessed, even if it can only 
be found by a diligent search, as long as it is still 'in our keeping'. If, however, 
something is lost beyond all reasonable recovery, it is certainly no longer possessed. 





(2) The French tradition 
 
As with Roman law, the maintenance of possession requires less than was required 
for its initial acquisition. All that is required, says Carbonnier, is that the possessor is 
able to resume control at will.
137
 If, however, the possessor is not in a position to be 
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able to carry out 'the physical acts which form possession'
138
 – in other words, he is 
unable to exercise control, as for example where the item is lost – possession will be 
lost. This does not mean that the property must be in constant use. After all, non-use 
is one of the prerogatives of ownership.
139
 However, it is said that possession animo 
solo is restricted to immoveables.
140
 Presumably this means that some degree of 
control must exist even where use is not at a given moment being exercised. Thus it 
appears that any lengthy absence will cause a loss of possession unless control is 
maintained in some other way. For example, possession of a car might be retained by 
retention of the key. Unfortunately, however, this issue appears to have been little 
considered in the French literature. 
 
(3) Roman-Dutch and South African law 
 
A stricter test exists for acquisition than for continuation of possession: 
 
[O]nce possession is acquired it will be retained as long as the possessor is 




Van der Merwe suggests that possession will be lost by:  
 
...mere loss of physical control, for example where a thing has been mislaid 
and cannot be found after a thorough search even if the thing has been lost 




However, the cases he cites in support of this position
143
 are concerned with whether 
property in such a position is to be considered lost for the purposes of interpreting a 
contract of insurance for the loss of property. It is not at all clear that these cases 
have any application to the question of possession. Certainly, the reasoning of the 
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court in each case does not expressly rely on the concept of possession. It is 
particularly problematic here to rely on an English case in this context, as van der 
Merwe does, for as we shall see below English law does not readily hold possession 
of an item to be lost merely because it has been mislaid. Nonetheless, this position is 
consistent with the authorities on Roman law referred to earlier. 
 Even if control is lost, possession will not be lost if the interruption is 
temporary. In one case, the rule was stated as follows:  
 
The fact that a person cannot for a period of time exercise control over a thing 
does not necessarily mean that he is not in possession of it. If I park my car at 
the cable station and take the cable car to the top of Table Mountain I do not 
lose possession of my parked car while I am up the mountain and thus 
physically unable for a period of time to exercise control over it. To be in 
possession of an object does not mean that I have to actually touch it or be 




This case concerned a charge of possession of an illegal drug. While he was 
imprisoned for a different offence, the accused sent a letter to his parents asking them 
to recover packages containing the drugs from their hiding places. Although the 
statutory definition of possession for the purposes of the offence was broader, the 
court held that even applying the general definition the appellant was in possession. 
One can possess even though one is not immediately able to resume physical control, 




We saw earlier in this chapter that possession depended to some extent on the 
impression that would be given to an objective bystander. We see something similar 
with the retention of possession. Thus, in the case of a car parked outside a 
building,
145
 a continued intention to possess can readily be inferred by the fact of the 
possessor having locked the car and taken the key with him. It is clear to all that 
someone is asserting a continuing right to the car. Similarly, Baur and Stürner give 
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the example of a plough left by a farmer lying overnight in a field.
146
 The context 
implies that someone is likely to return for the plough, in a way that perhaps would 
not be implied in other circumstances. 
It appears, therefore, that possession is not lost by virtue of the mere fact that 
the possessor is not at a given moment exercising direct physical control over the 
thing, if the facts would lead an objective bystander to expect that someone is 
continuing to assert a right to the property. For Savigny, even the possibility of 
someone else taking possession before one can resume control does not interrupt that 
earlier possession. After all, it can always be envisaged that someone may seize 
control. The issue for him is whether this is sufficiently probable to take it into 
account. For example, it is not probable that one's house will be broken into during a 
particular absence, so this possibility does not affect one's possession.
147
 The 
implication, however, is that possession will be lost if interference is sufficiently 
likely. 
In modern German law, possession is lost if 'tatsächliche Gewalt' (factual 
control) is lost.
148
 An exception is made, however, where the impediment is of a 
temporary nature,
149
 as long as the possessor retains the capability to resume 
control.
150
 As Joost points out, no-one can exercise control constantly over the things 
in his sphere of control.
151
 For one who goes on a journey or has a spell in hospital, 
possession is not lost,
152
 nor is it lost even where the possessor is imprisoned.
153
 
Clearly in these circumstances the possessor cannot resume exercise of that 
possession entirely at will. Nonetheless, these interruptions are temporary in their 
nature. Even a prison sentence will normally have an end date. On the other hand, 
lengthy absence would result in loss of possession. Joost gives as an example of this 
a thirty-year absence.
154
 Once absence has reached such a length, it must be seen as 
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indefinite rather than temporary, and would appear to a third party indistinguishable 
from abandonment. 
 
(5) English Law 
 
Possession is not lost just because the possessor is not presently exercising control: 
 
If I leave my car unlocked outside my host's house while I dine, I am not in 
physical control of it nor can I be expected to resist interference with it, yet I 






 considered above, suggests that possession is not lost 
merely because of temporary interruptions to the possessor's control: in that case, 
possession was held to continue even though salvage work on the sunken wreck was 
stopped regularly by weather conditions, including for the whole of the winter 1922-
23. Indeed, Pollock and Wright go further than that, and hold possession to continue 
even where control is entirely lost. Considering the case of a coin possessed by one 
person which is placed in another's pocket, they say: 
 
Probably in point of law the possession of the former possessor has up to that 
time continued...and continues (just as it does in the case of a thing lost in the 




This view, it has been suggested,
158
 is supported by the case of R v Thurborn,
159
 in 
which it was held that there was a good charge of larceny when an apparently lost 
note was picked up in the street with the intention to appropriate it. This, however, 
appears to be influenced by the particular requirements of the English law of larceny, 
and may not be applicable in jurisdictions outside the Common Law tradition. 
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 If temporary loss of control does not result in loss of possession, it would 
seem to follow from that that a threatened loss of control does not have that effect 
either. Holmes gives an example. Suppose that the possessor of a purse leaves it in 
his house in a remote location. The possessor is then imprisoned 100 miles away. 
The only person within twenty miles of the house is a burglar, who has seen the 
purse through a window and intends to break in and steal it. As Holmes says: 
 
The finder's power to reproduce his former physical relation is rather limited, 
yet I believe that no one would say that his possession was at an end until the 
burglar, by an overt act, had manifested his power and intent to exclude 




As long as there is no actual interference with the possession, the fact that 
interference is probable or even certain does not cause loss of possession. Only when 






As has been said, it is not possible here to give more than an outline of the law in the 
systems considered. However, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions. 
 For acquisition of the physical element of possession, it appears that all of the 
systems considered require some degree of direct or indirect physical control of the 
property. Mere physical presence or the power to take control will not normally be 
enough. There is little evidence, though, that this control must be of sufficient degree 
to exclude all others. What is more important is that the control must reflect the 
intention to possess, such that it would appear to an objective third party that a right 
to the property was being asserted. It appears, primarily from the English material 
but also to some extent from Roman and German law, that outward appearance of 
having exercised control may be relevant in the case of things found on land. 
 The retention of possession does not require continued control, although it 
appears that France may be more demanding on this point with corporeal moveables. 
Generally, possession does not appear to be lost unless the thing possessed is not 
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reasonably susceptible to recovery; in England it appears that possession may be 
retained even then. Temporary interruptions to the ability to resume control do not 
appear to be relevant. As far as the risk of interference is concerned, Savigny has 
suggested that this may be relevant. It does not, however, appear to be so in the 
Common Law. 
We shall see in the following two chapters the extent to which these views 
reflect the position in Scotland. 
84 
 




The general question, of what is required for the physical element of possession, is 
not without difficulty. Merely to define possession as requiring control, as we saw in 
chapter 2, is just the beginning of the difficulty. In part, the difficulty arises from the 
nature of possession as depending on a continuing state of facts, in particular the fact 
of control. Control is not easily defined in practice, for there may be more than one 
person with access to the property. Bentham identifies difficulties of this type: 
 
A street porter enters an inn, puts down his bundle upon the table, and goes 
out. One person puts his hand upon the bundle to examine it; another puts his 
to carry it away, saying it is mine. The innkeeper runs to claim it, in 
opposition to them both; the porter returns or does not return. Of these four 
men, which is in possession of the bundle? 
 In the house in which I dwell with my family is an escritoire, usually 
occupied by my clerk, and by what belongs to him: in this escritoire there is 
placed a locked box belonging to my son; in this box he has deposited a purse 
entrusted to him by a friend. In whose possession is the bag – in mine, in my 




The factual situation underlying one's possession may well be ambiguous. Added to 
this is the difficulty that possession differs from the normal position with rights in 
that it can be lost, and that without great difficulty, without the consent of the holder. 
Normally ownership, for example, can only be lost with the owner's consent.
2
 
Possession, by contrast, is lost simply by a contrary possession.
3
 In Bentham's first 
example, therefore, if possession is dependent on control, possession could quite 
easily pass back and forth among the four men depending on the facts at any given 
moment. 
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 There are, of course exceptions to this. Thus, if you make wine from my grapes without my 
agreement, you become owner by specificatio without my consent. However, such situations are 
exceptional. Certainly, ownership does not normally fluctuate in this manner. 
3
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 A related difficulty is that third parties, whose position may be affected by 
the outcome of the question of possession, may be unable to determine who 
possesses from the facts available. For example, in my workplace I have a number of 
books on shelves. Of these, none is acquired directly from my employer, but some 
were given to me by third parties because of my employment. Others were acquired 
by me either before or during my present employment from my own resources; 
nonetheless, they are all kept at my place of employment and are used for purposes 
relating to that employment. All of the books, however acquired, are held in the same 
way. On these facts, both my employer and I could each plausibly argue for our 
possession: I because I acquired them all myself without the involvement of my 
employer, my employer because they are kept in my employer's premises and used 
for the purposes of my employment. Suppose, further, that I lend one of these books 
to one of my students, who takes it home and forgets or neglects to return it. Now the 
student also may appear to possess. Of course, it does not follow from this that, as 
Paton appears to imply,
4
 that we do in fact all possess.
5
 The problem here is a general 
one in the law, that it is necessarily the case that any person considering a situation 
from the outside will have more or less limited information. This is why the law of 
evidence has presumptions and burdens of proof. No doubt a full investigation of the 
facts will make matters clearer. However, as we have seen in chapter 1, in possessory 
proceedings there is limited scope for such an investigation, given that such 
proceedings are not concerned with the actual right to possess. The best that the law 
can do is to provide a framework within which the issues can be analysed. The 
particular issue that Paton raises, of an item brought by a guest into premises 
occupied by their owner and another person, falls within the subject matter of section 
(3) of part D of this chapter. 
 Other difficulties may be suggested. Bentham's first example suggests that 
one of the difficulties with possession is that there may be more than one person in a 
particular physical relationship with the property, with the result that there may be 
more than one individual claiming to be in possession. It may therefore be that it will 
be necessary to demand that, before one can possess, one must show that one holds 
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exclusively, but what does that mean in practice? Does it merely mean that others are 
in fact excluded, or is it necessary to exclude the possibility of interference by 
others? If the former is the case, need there by absolute exclusion of others? Either 
way, how does this relate to the requirement for control? After all, control appears on 
its face to require some degree of exclusivity, if is to be control at all. 
 What does 'control' mean in any case? Are symbolic acts ever enough?
6
 Does 
it differ by type of property (eg according to the size of the property)?
7
 If I have only 
brief control of the property, do I possess?
8
 Do I possess a medical implant that has 
been placed in my body?
9
 Given the possibility of escape, how are animals 
possessed?
10
 Once I have begun to possess property, what level of control is needed 
to maintain my possession?
11
 
These problems will be considered in this and the following chapters, in light 
of the comparative and historical discussion in chapter 2. We begin by considering 
the approach taken by writers on Scots law. 
 
B. INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER EARLY WRITINGS 
 
Amongst pre-institutional writings on Scots law, there is very little direct discussion 
of the requirements for possession. Although the possessory remedies are accepted as 
relying on possession rather than title, the tendency is to consider the possessory 
remedies in detail without attempting to define possession itself. Certainly, there is 
no attempt to give a general account of possession, covering the different areas of the 







 give general accounts of the possessory remedies, but no general 
definition of possession, though in his notes to Hope's Minor Practicks,
15
 
                                   
6
 See chapter 6. 
7
 See part E of this chapter. 
8
 See chapter 5. 
9
 See part E of this chapter. 
10
 See chapter 7. 
11
 See chapter 4. 
12
 Practicks, 31 and 109. 
13
 Major Practicks, VI.15, VI.18; Minor Practicks, X.1-6. 
14
 Practicks 87-95 and 229-31. 
15





 defines possession of land as 'effective Detention'. This is in a context 
where he is linking possession strongly to ownership, with the implication that this is 
detention in the manner in which an owner detains. In other words, the physical 
element reflects the existence of an assertion of right which, as we have seen, is 
consistent with both the Ius Commune and Common Law positions. 
 During the period in which practicks were being written, up to the late 
seventeenth century, the only attempt at an orderly exposition of any area of Scots 
law is Craig's Jus Feudale. As far as can be determined, Craig is the first writer of 
Scots law who attempts to give a general definition of possession, although, given his 
subject matter, he understandably only considers possession of land. He defines 
possession in the following manner:  
 
...the holding and use of the immoveable possessed in the sense in which a 
man is said to possess his own home... Possession includes the putting of the 




In reaching this view, Craig relies on a derivation of the term possessio from a term 
relating to the placing of colonies, positio sedium. This derivation is, in fact, 
probably false.
18
 Nonetheless, it is important in that it gives an indication of the 
standard Craig considers to be required: the holding of the property in a manner 
reflecting the assertion of a right. However, if the final sentence quoted here is to be 
taken at face value, it may go too far. It surely cannot be required of a possessor that 
he exercise all possible uses of the property. To require that would be unrealistic. 
Perhaps Craig means, instead, to indicate that one may possess in many different 
ways. 
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 With the first systematic, general accounts of Scots private law, a new 
approach emerges. Although some aspects of possession are dealt with in further 
detail elsewhere in his Institutions, Stair provides a lengthy general account of 






 do likewise. 
 For Stair, the physical element of possession may take 'diverse' forms.
22
 
However, this is against a background of defining the possession of corporeal 
moveable property as requiring 'holding and detaining them for our proper use, and 
debarring others from them'.
23
 This appears to put forward a two stage test: one must 
hold and detain the property;
24
 and one must exclude others. However, this must be 
read in light of Stair's general view of possession. Using, as did Craig, the derivation 
of possessio from positio sedium, Stair holds the original role of possession to be the 
acquisition of ownership. For land, the role of possession is 'evidencing [the 
possessor's] affection and purpose to appropriate' the property,
25
 rather than merely 
being someone passing through and making casual use of the property. The same 
principle is applied in the case of corporeal moveables.
26
 The suggestion therefore 
would be that what is required to possess is such a degree of control and such a 
degree of exclusivity as to indicate an assertion of right. 
 Bankton and Erskine do not mention any exclusivity requirement, but their 
accounts are otherwise consistent with that of Stair. Bankton refers briefly to the 
requirement for 'detention'.
27
 Erskine requires the 'detention of a subject' by the 
possessor, who must 'hold it as his own right', in other words as if entitled to possess 
the property.
28
 This is in the context of the same etymology for possessio as that 
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adopted by Stair and Craig,
29
 again suggesting an association between possession 
and the assertion of a right. 
 It may therefore be said that, at least up to the second half of the eighteenth 
century, it was accepted that there existed such a thing as a general law of possession 
based, at least as far as the physical element was concerned, on some manner of 
physical control of the property. The requirements of the possessory remedies, 
delivery and other areas considered by Stair, Erskine and Bankton under the heading 
of possession were merely specific applications of that general law. It is likely that 
the same approach was also accepted as correct before Stair wrote for, as we saw in 
chapter 1, Ius Commune sources were in use in the Scottish courts long before he 
wrote. 
 However, the idea of a general law of possession is to some extent lost or 
discarded in the nineteenth century. Thus, in his Lectures, delivered as Professor of 
Scots Law at Edinburgh,
30
 Hume has no general discussion of possession, and does 
not consider the possessory remedies at all, although he does hint that acquisition of 
possession by delivery, at least, requires that the transferee give an outward 
impression of ownership: the property must be brought into the same state as 'the 
other parts of the acquirer's property of that sort'.
31
 
Bell, similarly, departs from the earlier approach. His Commentaries focus on 
certain areas of law, rather than providing a general account, and possession is no 
exception to this. While there is extensive treatment of delivery, there is little on 
other areas where possession is important. In particular, the possessory remedies are 
not considered at all. Even his more general Principles is structured along radically 
different lines from works of earlier institutional writers. It does contain a section on 
possession
32





 suggests a connection between the two. However, even 
this is a step away from Stair, Erskine and Bankton, who considered occupatio and 
delivery as part of their general accounts of possession. Within his title on possession 
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of corporeal moveables, Bell's focus differs. The existence of the possessory 
remedies is only hinted at by an observation that an owner cannot retake possession 
from someone who has dispossessed him, without the authority of the court, unless 
this is done immediately.
35
 There remains the shadow of an idea that there is a 
general concept of possession: occupatio and delivery are said to be cases where 
possession is acquired,
36
 and he seeks support for his views on delivery from Stair's 
general account of possession.
37
 However, the title on possession of corporeal 
moveables is mostly concerned with the presumption of ownership arising from it, 
and the related idea of collusive possession. Certainly, there is no true general 
account of possession in the Principles in the manner of Stair, and no attempt at a 
definition of possession. 
Bell's approach no doubt reflects the nineteenth century trend, of which he 
was part, to divide property law into the law of heritable property and the law of 
moveable property, and further to divide the former into heritable property and 
conveyancing.
38
 If the law is divided in this way, there is little scope for discussion 
of general principles applying to all types of property. Of particular importance for 
present purposes, there is no room for a general account of possession. However, this 
cannot be the whole story. For one thing, there is nothing in this division that 
prevents the inclusion of general accounts of possession as it affects particular types 
of property. As we have seen, Bell did include in his Principles a title on possession 
of corporeal moveables, yet found in it no place for spuilzie. For another thing, we 
have seen also that Hume gave in his lectures no general account of possession, even 
though he does give a general account of property law.
39
 It seems probable that at 
least part of the explanation for the absence of a general account of possession is the 
decline in importance of spuilzie in practice.
40
 If possessory remedies are not 
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considered in a general account of property law, then there is no obvious place for a 
general account of possession.  
 
C. LATER VIEWS 
 
Later writings on possession have not tended to explore the physical requirements of 
possession in detail. Often there is nothing beyond a formulation such as 'having or 
holding a thing, so that it is subject to the possessor's control',
41
 or 'an act of 
'detention of the body'',
42
 or 'physical holding or control of a thing'.
43
 The impression 
given is that few issues arise in the determination of control of the property. Indeed, 
Carr is content to dismiss the physical element of possession, at least as far as 
corporeal moveables are concerned, as 'a matter of little difficulty'.
44
 
 Some writers have attempted to define the requirement for control in terms of 
exclusivity. As we have seen, Stair approached the question in this way. Rankine 
(focussing of course on possession of land, but on this point consistent with other 
writers) defines the physical element of possession as requiring that the property be 
'under the possessor's control, with the power of excluding the interference of all 
others'.
45
 Reid, writing of possession generally rather than specifically with regard to 
moveable or heritable property requires 'in initial act of detention of the thing sought 
to be possessed' and also 'exclusive physical control'.
46
 
 None of these writers refers to the test that appears to have been developed 
elsewhere of holding in a manner indicating an assertion of right. TB Smith, 
however, has attempted a fuller definition applicable to corporeal moveables. For 
him, the physical element of possession: 
 
'involves an inquiry into the relation between the alleged possessor to [sic] 
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There is more here, then, than simply control. The alleged possessor's relationship 
with other persons is also of significance. The reference to others could perhaps be 
taken as a hint at the objective nature of possession that we have seen above. 
However, Smith appears here merely to mean that the possessor must be in a position 
to exclude others, for he quotes with approval Pollock and Wright's formulation that: 
 
'occupation...is effective which is sufficient as a rule and for practical 





Thus, for Smith, one possesses if one has established sufficient physical control to 
exclude others. In the passage from which the quote is taken, Pollock and Wright go 
on to observe that the level of required ability to exclude varies with circumstances: 
thus 'we do not lock up tea and candles in a safe; we should call a banker imprudent 
who used only the same caution as a private householder'.
49
 Curiously, however, 
although Smith adopts Pollock and Wright's view that possession involves the ability 
to exclude others, he omits to note that Pollock and Wright do not require this 'in the 
absence of a more effectual act in an adverse interest'.
50
 Smith therefore appears to 
require a higher level of exclusivity than Pollock and Wright. 
 Following Stair, therefore, Rankine, Smith and Reid all expand on the control 
requirement by requiring that this control be exclusive. The test as stated by these 
writers is then (i) that control of the property is obtained and (ii) this control is 
exclusive. Of course, these two requirements are not separate. As Carr points out, 
some degree of exclusivity is inherent in the very concept of control.
51
 However, it 
may be productive to examine them separately in the first instance. We will begin by 
considering the question of control generally, and then consider the case where that 
control is not exclusive. 
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(1) The need to take control 
 
As we have seen, the institutional writers defined the physical element of possession 
in terms of detention and holding. This has been interpreted by the modern writers on 
the Scots law of possession as meaning that, to possess, one must establish control 
over the property. The comparative and historical discussion has come to the same 
conclusion. As is suggested by the South African case Groenewald v Van der 
Merwe,
52
 discussed in chapter 2, acts strongly assertive of a right (in that case 
branding of livestock) will be insufficient to give possession if control is not in fact 
acquired thereby. Similarly, in Reck v Mills, the attachment of a buoy asserting a 
claim to machinery forming part of a wrecked ship did not constitute possession 
where that machinery was still attached to the ship. Likewise, German law requires 
control (Gewalt) over the property. English law has also stated the requirement in 
terms of control. 
 Actual definitions of control are, however, rare. By and large, both in Scots 
law and in the other systems considered in this and the previous chapter, the meaning 
of the term is left to emerge from specific cases or examples given. Thus we see that 
one may possess by holding an item in the hand. Equally, though, actual physical 
contact is not necessary - one may possess an item by having it under lock and key - 
and nor is it necessary to make use of the property. In one South African case, the 
requirement was said to be that the circumstances of the property is such that 'the 
would-be possessor...alone can deal with it at pleasure'.
53
 This, though, is surely 
imposing too high a test: as we shall see in this chapter, it is not necessary in Scots 
law to exclude entirely the possibility of any interference in order to acquire 
possession. Indeed, the position could hardly be otherwise, for interference is always 
at least a possibility. However, the ability to 'deal with' the property is surely at least 
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part of the test for control: in its ordinary meaning, the word implies the ability to 
direct what happens to the property. 
 However, left at this, the term 'control' provides too uncertain a test. A person 
may appear to be in a position to direct what happens to the property, but at the same 
time there may exist factors known or unknown that prevent the actual exercise of 
any such control. Alternatively, the law may sometimes wish to allow a person to 
possess without in fact having carried out any direct acts in relation to the property at 
all, as where a letter is put into my house through the letter box. We saw in chapter 2 
the importance of looking at the matter from the standpoint of an objective third 
party fully aware of the facts about my present relationship to the property. The 
suggestion was put forward that an individual satisfies the physical requirements for 
possession if his relationship to the property is such that it would appear to this 
objective bystander that the property has come within his control to the required 
extent: in the case of the letter delivered through my letterbox, the objective 
bystander does not know whether I have in fact carried out any acts over it, but it will 
certainly appear that the letter has been brought within my control.
54
 In particular, a 
distinction may be made between circumstances where, on the one hand, goods have 
come under a person's control, and, on the other, the goods have merely been made 
available to that person. If, in a pub, my drink has actually been placed on my table, 
it has come under my control, and I possess (assuming the mental element of 
possession is also present). If, by contrast, the drink has merely been left on the bar 
for me to collect, at this point it has only been made available to me. 
That this distinction is observed in Scots law is confirmed in Brown v 
Watson.
55
 Whether the decision is in fact correct on its facts is considered below, in 
section (3) of this part, but for present purposes we may note that it appears to turn 
on a distinction between property actually placed within a person's control and 
property merely made available for possession. In this case, a number of sheep were 
sold to a farmer. When they were brought to the buyer's farm, there was no-one 
available to take care of them and so the seller left them in an enclosure on the land. 
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 On the required extent of control, see section (5), below. The idea of an objective standard may be 
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Unknown to the seller, the buyer had at this point declared himself bankrupt and 
shortly afterwards petitioned for his own sequestration. The buyer then permitted the 
seller to remove the sheep. The court held that the sheep had not been delivered. 
 We may perhaps doubt whether the outcome would have been the same if it 
had been the seller whose estates had been sequestrated after the sheep were left on 
the buyer's land. Certainly, the court in Brown v Watson placed great weight on the 
fact of the buyer's insolvency, to the extent that they held that there had been no valid 
delivery even in the case of a number of cattle that had been delivered into the hands 
of the buyer's employees. The view was taken that, in the circumstances, it fell on the 
buyer personally to decide whether to accept delivery of the goods.
56
  
However, in drawing the distinction between control and the ability to take 
control, the decision in Brown v Watson appears consistent with principle. The same 
approach as in Brown v Watson has been taken in other cases where an insolvent 
buyer has either refused to accept delivery
57
 or has only accepted the goods for 
safekeeping expressly on behalf of the seller.
58
 Similarly, where goods have been 
rejected as not conforming to sample, but have been retained by the buyer pending 
arrangements for resale, there has been no delivery.
59
 In these cases, delivery has not 
occurred even though the goods have actually come within the buyer's sphere of 
control, on the basis that the mental element is absent. It seems very difficult, 
therefore, to argue that goods have been delivered when they have merely been made 
available to the transferee.  
If Brown v Watson is correct in drawing this distinction, then a subsequent 
case, Moore v Gledden,
60
 becomes problematic. In that case, there was a contract to 
carry out work on land belonging to a railway company. The contract provided that 
plant brought onto the land by the contractors was to belong to the railway company. 
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 This seems somewhat inconsistent with the general principle applied in the law of agency, that 
performance by a third party to an agent counts as performance to the principal, unless the third party 
had reason to believe that the agent did not have authority to receive performance: International 
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 Jowitt v Stead (1860) 22 D 1400. 
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 (1869) 7 M 1016. 
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The issue before the court was whether the plant was in the possession of the railway 
company.  
By a majority of six to one, the Inner House held that there had been 
constituted in favour of the railway company a valid pledge.
61
 This was the case even 
though the plant remained in the control of the contractors, and indeed the contract 
envisaged that the plant would 'remain under the care and custody...of, [sic] the 
contractors'.
62
 Steven appears justified in rejecting the view of the majority as giving 
effect to a 'paper possession'.
63
 No act of physical control was carried out by the 
railway company. Its only connection with the goods was that they happened to be 
on its land, being used in the normal course of business by the contractors. This 
indeed appears to be transfer by agreement alone, and so is only permissible if it 
meets the requirements of constitutum possessorium. The examples given by Lord 
Neaves, of situations where delivery is held to have occurred even though the goods 
remain in the transferor's custody, add nothing.
64
 These examples are the case of an 
article bought from a tradesman, but left with him for alterations to be made, and the 
case of a horse bought from a livery stabler but then left at livery with the seller.
65
 In 
these cases, there is a clear, new basis on which the transferor holds. The transferor 
holds on a different basis from that on which he held originally, and thus the 
requirements for delivery by constitutum possessorium are satisfied. In Moore v 
Gledden, on the other hand, the contractor continued to hold in exactly the same 
manner as before, and would have continued to do so on the work being completed, 
had insolvency not intervened. The decision of the majority must therefore be seen as 
highly doubtful. 
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 Although the contract was worded in terms of a transfer of ownership, the arrangement was clearly 
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example to the first (Commentaries, 1,181). Lord Neaves may have got his examples from Hume's 
lectures, having been a student in Hume's Scots law class at Edinburgh in the session 1820-1821: see 
the table of prominent former students at Hume, Lectures, VI,411. If this is the case, Lord Neaves 
would not be alone: judges of the Court of Session have on a number of occasions found it profitable 
to refer to Hume's lectures. On this, see G C H Paton's biography of Hume in the sixth volume of the 
Lectures, at VI,395-396. 
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 Brown v Watson appears similar to the South African case S v Magxwalisa,
66
 
discussed earlier, in that both involve the goods being merely made available to the 
transferee. Indeed, Brown is a stronger case for possession, given that the goods in 
Brown were in that case actually delivered onto the transferee's own land. In 
Magxwalisa, by contrast, the accused had merely been told where the goods were. 
 The conclusion, then, is that Scots law requires more than that the aspiring 
possessor merely be in the position to take control. Actual control must have been 
achieved. If possession is to fulfil the functions that it is intended to fulfil, this must 
be the position. For example, if it is thought desirable that possession should be 
protected, it would seem reasonable to require that this possession manifest itself in 
some clear way. The clearest way of doing this is to demonstrate control of the 
property, either by oneself or through another acting on one's behalf. Similarly, the 
policy requiring possession for the acquisition of real rights is undermined if there is 
no need for physical control, as is the presumption of ownership arising from 
possession. If control was not required, the result would be, as Stair says, that 
'possession would be very large and but imaginary',
67
 with the resulting uncertainty 
that that implies. 
 
(2) Deprivation of another's control 
 
It would appear also to follow from the requirement for control that acts depriving 
you of possession or control do not in themselves give me possession. Thus, if I 
cause you to drop an item in such a way that you lose possession, for example if it 
falls into deep water
68
 or it is spilled out onto the ground in such a way that it cannot 
be retrieved,
69
 I do not acquire possession by that act, even though you would appear 
to lose it.
70
 Similarly, there is a class of cases where there is a restriction on your use 
of the property arising incidentally from my actions. An example of this appears in 
                                   
66
 1984 (2) SA 310 (NPD). 
67
 Stair, Inst. 2,1,18. 
68
 As in the example given by Ulpian at D.41.2.13pr. 
69
 As in Millar v Laird of Killarnie (1541) Mor 14723. 
70





 In this case, two individuals were charged with theft by 
attaching clamping devices to a number of cars unlawfully parked on private land. 
The intention was that the clamp would only be removed when the owner of the car 
paid a fee. No doubt, of course, the law of theft and the law of possession do not 
necessarily depend on the same principles, though the Lord Justice-General describes 
the accused as having been 'charged with taking possession of the car'.
72
 The term 
'possession' is not necessarily used technically. All the same, both possession and 
theft involve some kind of appropriation of property,
73
 and so they are not entirely 
dissimilar in their requirements. A distinction is made in Black v Carmichael that 
appears to be relevant to the present discussion. While the clamping of the car was 
said to constitute theft, it would not be theft merely to close the gate to the land.
74
 
This is the case even though the owner's effective control over the car is not 
materially greater in the latter case, in that he cannot remove the car from the land. 
The distinction appears to be between acts giving direct control and acts which affect 
the property only incidentally. The same distinction must hold true for possession. 
After all, there are many acts that I may perform that may incidentally or temporarily 
disturb your control over your property. An example would be where I am driving 
the car in front of yours in a traffic jam. Your ability to move your car forward is 
impaired by my actions, but to hold my actions to disturb your possession would 
make possession too unstable to be of very much use as a legal concept. Of course, 
by acting in this way I am not asserting any kind of right to possess your car. As we 
shall see below, this may be a relevant factor in determining whether I acquire 
possession. Certainly, I do not possess just because I have deprived you of 
possession. 
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(3) Items in buildings and on land 
 
Particular issues arise where, in the absence of any direct physical control by me, an 
item is placed in a building or on land possessed by me. 
 
(a) Items in buildings and on land generally. It was suggested above that it may be 
possible to make a distinction between cases where, on the one hand, goods are kept 
within a building possessed by a particular individual and, on the other, items left on 
open land. This distinction is suggestive of the position developed in England in the 
line of cases from Bridges v Hawkesworth
75
 to Parker v British Airways Board.
76
 In 
Parker, English law adopted a test for possession of things on land or in premises 
that depended on the manifestation of an intention to control. This depends to a great 
extent on the nature of the subjects within which the item is found. This manifest 
intention will be fairly easy to show where the premises are locked. Where there is a 
sole occupant of locked premises, the control of and the intention to assert a right 
over the contents are so clear that they may readily be held to apply even to items of 
whose presence the occupier is unaware.  A Scots example may be found in Harris v 
Abbey National,
77
 in which a heritable creditor taking possession of the security 
subjects was held to possess items left within the property. Of course, animus may be 
absent in such a case, but the physical element seems clear. At the other end of the 
scale, there is insufficient control for possession where the goods are lying on land to 
which there is no restriction on access. We have seen from the discussion of Brown v 
Watson that Scots law appears to deny possession in those circumstances, and with 
good reason. Suppose that I have bought a valuable item and arranged for it to be 
delivered to my house. It would seem unreasonable for the seller to have been held to 
have fulfilled the bargain merely by leaving it lying unprotected in my driveway, or 
otherwise accessible, as for example if the item is left in a bin.
78
 This distinction may 
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also explain the view of Celsus,
79
 considered in chapter 2, that goods brought to my 
premises under my instructions were to be considered delivered to me, if he is 
understood to refer to items actually placed inside the building. 
 
(b) Buildings and land with limited access. It is with the middle group in the 
Parker test, premises and other land where there is limited access, that difficulties 
arise. For example, assuming animus, have goods been delivered if they have been 
left in a locked shed? The difficulty of this case is shown by consideration of the 
issue in a criminal context, in Cryans v Nixon.
80
 In that case, stolen goods were 
found in an unlocked shed belonging to the accused, to which others had access. The 
question was whether there should be applied the presumption of guilt arising from 
possession of recently stolen goods. All three of the judges held that it should not. 
However, for the Lord Justice-Clerk, this was because the circumstances were not 
sufficiently criminative, given that others had access to the shed. He accepted that the 
accused was in possession. Lord Mackintosh, on the other hand, was of the view that 
it could not 'fairly be said that the goods were found in the appellant's possession'.
81
 
Another example of land of this kind would be the public part of a shop. TB 
Smith,
82
 writing before the decision in Parker, urges the rejection of the approach 
taken in Bridges v Hawkesworth. He argues that the occupier of premises in which 
goods are left should always be held to possess, on the basis that that is where the 
owner is likely to look. However, this seems an irrelevant consideration in Scots law, 
where the finder of lost property acquires no rights solely by virtue of that finding,
83
 
and appropriation by that finder will constitute theft.
84
 The case he cites in support of 
his argument, Corporation of Glasgow v Northcote,
85
 adds little. In that case, an 
employee taxi driver found items left in his taxi. The sheriff-substitute and, on 
appeal, the sheriff preferred the employer. Curiously, in this case, the sheriff-
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substitute appeared to assume that a finder of property in Scots law has the same 
rights as a finder in English law. However, the decision was expressly on the basis 
that the driver was an employee, and in fact was bound by an express term in his 
contract of employment obliging him to hand lost property to his employer. It was 
not necessary in that case, therefore, to consider the present issue.  
 A more helpful authority for Smith's argument is the decision of the sheriff 
court in Hogg v Armstrong and Mowat.
86
 The facts in that case were identical, in 
effect, to those in Bridges v Hawkesworth, the customer of a shop having found a £5 
note on the floor of the shop. The sheriff held that the decision in Bridges 'really 
depended upon principles of general jurisprudence which are law in Scotland as well 
as in England'.
87
 This may very well be the case, as a question of possession. 
However, to get to this point the sheriff must make an error of law: 
 
The finder of lost goods is undoubtedly entitled, as a general rule, in the 
absence of special laws or police regulations, to keep them  against all except 
the true owner, upon the principle quod nullius est fit occupantis. The right to 
possession of an inanimate moveable is with the finder, though it rather 




It has already been noted that the finder of property acquires no right by that fact 
alone. As to the remainder of the quotation, it need hardly be said that, if 'the 
property is still with the owner', the principle quod nullius est fit occupantis can 
scarcely apply: ex hypothesi, the property is not a res nullius. Moreover, if the owner 
of the goods retains that right when the property is lost, it is not clear what is the 
nature of the right of the finder. Certainly, it cannot be ownership, for a right of 
ownership that is good against some but not others is not a right that can exist in 
Scots law: one either has a personal right, good against the other party or parties to 
an obligation, or one has a real right, good against everyone.
89
 The sheriff's meaning 
must, therefore, remain obscure. 
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 Notwithstanding these legal errors concerning the consequences of 
possession in lost property cases, however, on the question of possession these cases 
appear to reach a reasonable conclusion. The distinction drawn in Parker v British 
Airways appears sound and should be accepted by the Scottish courts. In other words, 
one should only be held to have satisfied the physical element of possession in such 
circumstances where the degree of control exercised over the land gives an objective 
impression of control of items that may happen to be on the land or in the premises. 
In practice, this will be likely to mean effective measures to exclude others and their 
property. Only if this is the case can the possessor of the land be said realistically to 
be exercising control.
90
 Alternatively, measures may be taken to secure direct control 
of property wandering onto the land. An example of this would be a snare set to 
catch wild animals.
91
 Leaving that possibility aside, however, it is clear that one 
acquires no control over property that has been left on bare, unprotected land, even if 
one possesses that land. At most, one is in a position to take control which, as we 
have seen, is not enough. Even less does one have control over an item buried under 
the land. The approach taken in such English cases as South Staffordshire Water Co v 
Sharman,
92
 Elwes v Brigg Gas Co
93
 and Waverley BC v Fletcher
94
 may be taken not 
to reflect the Scots law of possession.
95
  
Again, there would be insufficient control in the normal case where the public 
has access to the premises, unless the item is delivered outside opening hours to a 
place where it would be expected to be found first by the occupier of the premises, as 
where an envelope is pushed through a letter box. An item left where it would not be 
expected to be found, on the other hand, is not possessed at that point because an 
objective bystander would not take it to have been taken into the control of the 
occupier of the premises. 
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On the other hand, where an item is pushed through a letter box into a private 
house, there would be enough control. In such a case access is normally restricted to 
limited numbers of guests of the occupier, with the result that the objective bystander 
would take such property to be in the control of the occupier. If there are multiple 
occupiers of the house, any of them may in fact possess, and the question will depend 
on the facts of the case. Where the item is within an area exclusively occupied by an 
individual member of the household, an objective onlooker would be likely to take 
that individual to possess. Where the item is in a common area, each occupier is 
likely to appear to have a sufficient relationship to the property to satisfy the physical 
requirements of possession, in which case the outcome of the question will turn on 
animus. We can see this in Bell v Andrews
96
 and Henderson v Young.
97
 Both cases 
are concerned with the application of the landlord's hypothec to property belonging 
to residents other than the tenant,
98
 in the former case a piano belonging to the 
tenant's daughter and in the latter furnishings belonging to two lodgers. The cases 
appear to be decided on the basis that the tenant was not in possession of the items 
despite their presence in the leased premises. 
In cases following short of the level of control provided by locked premises, 
the outcome will depend on the particular facts of the case. One such case is Brown v 
Watson: given that the items delivered were animals, it may be assumed that the land 
was fenced off. Fencing around the land does give a little more control but, more 
importantly, it is likely to strengthen the impression of the objective onlooker that the 
occupier of the land has taken the item into his control, at least if the item is of a kind 
that one would expect a possessor might leave it in those circumstances. Still more 
will this be the case if the enclosure is locked, as it will be assumed that access is 
restricted to the occupier and those acting under his authority. On the other hand, if 
the item is not of a kind that it would be expected to be found left by the occupier in 
the circumstances that it is found, the impression of possession will be 
correspondingly weakened. An example would be a package 'delivered' by a courier 
by being left in the recipient's back garden. On the other hand, the animals in Brown 
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v Watson were left in circumstances in which they would be expected to be left: they 
were in an enclosure, and not merely left to wander. Accordingly, on the basis of this 
discussion, it would appear that, while it was correct to draw a distinction between 
items of which control had been given and items the control of which had merely 
been made available, the facts in Brown v Watson were such that the decision can 
only be justified as a question of animus. This, indeed, is suggested by the court's 
view that, in the circumstances of the buyer's insolvency, albeit not yet followed by 
formal sequestration, it lay on the buyer to decide whether to accept or reject the 
goods. 
The consideration here assumes, of course, that the item is not already in the 
possession of another person when it is brought into the premises. If a guest comes 
into my house, I do not thereby possess what he brings with him, nor do I possess an 
item which is brought into the house already possessed by a lodger or one of my 
children. Nor, if I have in fact exercised sufficient control for possession at some 
earlier stage, is that possession affected by the fact that my relationship with the 
property is now more ambiguous, in that it now lies in much the same relationship to 
any other resident of my house. We are concerned here with the case where property 
is dropped or left on my land or in my premises, and whether I begin to possess 
(assuming the necessary mental element) at that point. 
 
(4) Criminal law 
 
The Scots law of possession, then, adopts a test for the physical element of 
possession that is based on control. We see the same view being taken in criminal 
cases. Of course, as was discussed in chapter 1, the criminal law has distinct policy 
objectives and a distinct approach to statutory interpretation, which may mean that in 
individual cases a different definition of possession is adopted compared with that 
used in private law. However, any definition of possession is likely to depend on 
some idea of control, and so in considering the meaning of 'control' consideration of 
criminal authority may be of some use. 
105 
 
In fact, what we find when we look at criminal cases is that there are 
commonalities of approach. Thus, in Mingay v Mackinnon,
99
 prohibited drugs were 
found in the common area of a flat shared by the accused. The court held that this 
was insufficient to justify a finding that the accused was in possession of the drugs. 
Merely having access to the drugs was not enough. Similarly, in Lustmann v 
Stewart,
100
 a police raid on a commune on Islay found drugs in a shared area. Again, 
it was held that it was insufficient for a finding of possession that the drugs were 
available to any who wanted them among the accused, who were members of the 
commune. These cases are consistent with the approach taken in the previous 
section, where possession requires an objective appearance of control, and is less 
likely to be established in circumstances where others may have access to the goods.  
The requirement for control is again shown in Black v HM Advocate,
101
 in 
which unlawful explosives were found in a room occupied by the appellant's lodger. 
It was explained that a person possessed not merely because of mere knowledge of 
the substance, but only if there was actual control. This required: 
 
...acceptance of the substance into his premises or at least permission for or 




This case is then consistent with the decisions in Bell v Andrews and Henderson v 
Young, considered above, so far as they demonstrate that one does not possess just 
because an item is brought into one's house. If an item in the house is possessed by 
someone other than the householder, that continues to be so in the absence of some 
more direct involvement with the property. This is not to say, though, that the test is 
exactly the same in the criminal law as in private law: we may assume that Miss 
Andrews' piano was brought into her father's house with his 'permission...or 
connivance'. Nonetheless, he did not possess, but the idea of permission or 
connivance is one more readily connected to the mental element of possession than 
to the physical. In criminal law terms, if I give you permission to keep illegal items 
in my house, then I am at least art and part liable for the offence of possession of 
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those items, whether or not I would be held to possess otherwise.
103
 As far as the 
physical element of possession is concerned, Black is consistent with Bell and 
Henderson in holding that one does not possess property that is in one's house, in the 
absence of some more direct physical acts over the property. 
Of course, as we saw earlier with Cryans v Nixon,
104
 it is easy to figure more 
doubtful cases. It may be that in particular cases the availability of the item, coupled 
with the background facts, will be enough to allow the inference that an accused 
person has in fact exercised control over the item in the past, or that there exists the 
kind of 'permission or connivance' that Lord Cameron refers to. That indeed has been 
the outcome in a number of cases. Thus, where drugs are found openly in the living 
room of a house occupied by a cohabiting couple, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that each at the very least consented to their presence, and an objective 
bystander would certainly take both to have control. On these facts, the conviction of 
the accused was upheld in Hughes v Guild.
105
 The same is the case with a prisoner in 
a shared cell, who is aware of the presence of drugs underneath his own ashtray.
106
 In 
such circumstances, the inference of control on that prisoner's part is irresistible 
unless some alternative explanation is found for the presence of the drugs there. 
These cases, then, in the same way as the private law cases, depend on more than 
knowledge or availability. It is true that, in Allan v Milne,
107
 the Sheriff's view was 
based on findings that the accused knew that the drugs were present in their shared 
flat and that they had access to them if they wanted, but the Crown's argument on 
appeal was that these facts proved in the circumstances of the case that the drugs 
were a 'common pool', which is rather stronger and implies an actual rather than a 
potential relationship to the drugs. None of this alters the conclusion that availability 
in and of itself does not amount to possession. This conclusion is also justified by the 
argument, as far as criminal possession is concerned, that a person should not 
become criminally liable solely because of another person's acts. If two or more 
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persons share a flat, none of them can prevent one of the others bringing a prohibited 
substance into the flat and leaving it in a common area. 
  
(5) Level of control required 
 
Control, then, is required for the acquisition of possession. However, it is not every 
degree of control that will be sufficient. It has been suggested above, both in the 
comparative and historical discussion and in the discussion of Scottish writers, that 
what is required is control of such a kind as to amount to an assertion of right. The 
mental element is to a great extent revealed by the physical element. This should not, 
however, be understood to exclude any role for a separate mental element of 
possession. Many types of holding will be ambiguous, equally as capable of being 
interpreted as an assertion of right as it is of being interpreted as no such assertion. 
One may appear objectively to be holding with the relevant animus possidendi, but in 
fact not be so holding. For example, in a legal system where hirers are said not to be 
possessors, one holding on the basis of a hire agreement may nonetheless appear to 
an outsider to hold in the manner of an owner. Likewise, Erskine says
108
 that one 
holding entirely on another's behalf, as a depositary or steward, is not a possessor. 
Again, such a person may appear to an objective bystander to hold in the manner of 
an owner. However, it is lack of animus that prevents such a person possessing. The 
physical element with which we are concerned appears to be present in such a case, 
and will benefit the person on whose behalf the property is being held, assuming that 
there is nothing in the manner of holding the property that indicates that the holder 
asserts no right to possess. 
 We may see the role of this assertion of right in Johnston v Sprott.
109
 In this 
case, an employer (Douglas) owed money to an employee (Johnston). As security for 
further advances, there was an attempt to pledge items to the employee that he used 
in the course of his employment. A creditor of the employer, Sprott, attempted to 
poind these items. The court held that there was no valid pledge here. This appears 
not to have been for want of animus: there was no reason to doubt the good faith of 
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the parties or that there was a genuine attempt to create a pledge. Of course, it was 
intended to give a preferential position to the employee for payment of the debt, but 
that is the case with any security right. Instead, the pledge failed because of the 
manner in which the goods were held. The court accepted the argument put forward 
on behalf of Sprott that: 
 
[N]o outward or visible change took place in the circumstances of his 
management or possession...For aught the lieges could discover, Johnston 





In other words, it is necessary to hold in such a manner as to demonstrate the holder's 
assertion of a right to possess. One who holds goods ostensibly in the course of 
employment makes no such assertion. He will appear to an objective onlooker to 
hold on behalf of his employer. 
 The same principle was applied in Pattison's Tr v Liston.
111
 In this case, there 
was an attempt to convey the contents of a house to the party with custody of the key 
to the house. This was held to be ineffective for delivery of these items. Again, the 
problem was not lack of animus, for there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of 
the transaction. Instead, the problem lay in the fact that the party holding the key did 
so as the transferor's agent. It can hardly be the law that an employee cannot have the 
animus to possess something just because the employee first held it in the course of 
employment. If that was the law, what of the waitress entitled to retain cash received 
in tips? The result would be that there could be no valid delivery of the cash to the 
waitress when the tips were divided up between staff. That would be an absurd 
result. It appears, then, that it is not the case that the employment relationship 
necessarily prevents an acquisition of possession by the employee on the basis of 
excluding the formation of the necessary animus. Instead, the manner of holding 
must indicate that that animus exists, and that manner of holding will generally (but 
not always) be absent when the employee has taken custody of the item in the course 
of employment. 
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 Therefore, for all that the modern Scots writers are content to define the 
physical element of possession in terms of control, it appears that there is more to the 
matter than appears from that. In common with the writers of other jurisdictions 
considered, what appears to be required in Scots law is not merely control, but 
control in such a manner as to indicate an assertion of a right to possess the property. 
It may be that this can be achieved even in the absence of complete control, 
depending on the right that is being asserted. For example, in Black v Carmichael,
112
 
as we have seen, two individuals were convicted of theft for clamping cars parked on 
private ground by their owners in the face of notices warning of this and indicating 
that payment would be required for the removal of the clamps. Presumably it may be 
taken that the accused were, on behalf of their employer, asserting a right to possess 
the cars in security for payment of the parking charge.
113
 It is true that their control 
over the cars was limited by the fact that, without the keys, they could not drive the 
cars away, but then nor could the cars' owners drive them away until the clamps were 
removed. The advantage of the situation appears to be on the clampers' side, as the 
cars in their clamped state are of little use to the owners but, because of that fact, of 
considerable help to the clampers in securing payment. If the accused in Black v 
Carmichael are taken to have acquired possession for their employer, it would follow 
from this that it would be a spuilzie by the owners of the cars if they removed the 
clamps themselves, unless this was done immediately.
114
 Given that the decision in 
Black v Carmichael represented a development in the law, this would seem an 
appropriate outcome. A court could well have decided that the accused were entitled 
to act as they did. The view has been taken that one does not possess a thing just 
because it is on one's land. Accordingly, given that a lien will only come into 
existence where the creditor has possession, or at least custody,
115
 it appears unlikely 
that a lien could have been shown: even if the clamping was enough to give 
possession, a lien could only exist to authorise the clamping if the creditor already 
had possession or custody. Presumably a decision in favour of the accused would 
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have been based on the car owners' deemed consent to the clamping of their cars. 
This would be consistent with authority making it a defence to spuilzie that the 
dispossessed party had previously given agreement to the dispossession.
116
 An 
English clamping case was subsequently decided on the basis of consent to the 
clamping.
117
 Of course, that was not the view that was taken in Black v Carmichael, 
but that could not have been known in advance with certainty. In cases of doubt as to 
the parties' rights, it is appropriate to leave the determination of those rights to the 
court, rather than permitting individuals to provide themselves with justice at their 
own hand. However, whatever may have been the basis on which the accused's 
employers believed themselves entitled to clamp the car, clearly in doing so they 
were asserting a right to retain the car, in the manner of one entitled to exercise a 
lien. Accordingly, they can be said to have taken possession through the acts of the 
accused. Certainly, they could not make use of the property, but there is no need for a 
creditor to be able to make use of the property retained as security. All that is 
necessary is that the debtor is excluded from it, and this was achieved in Black v 
Carmichael. 
This 'assertion of right' requirement may also be taken to explain the 
distinction noted above between direct acts of control, giving possession, and acts 
only incidentally affecting the property, with no possessory consequences. The 
example of the latter in Black v Carmichael was the closing of a gate to the land. By 
doing this, I do not assert any right to retain the car. I merely assert the right to 




On the basis of the discussion in this part, we can say that the physical element 
requires, first, that the intending possessor acquire control (either personally or 
through another acting on his behalf) and, second, that that control be of such a 
nature that an objective bystander would consider that person taking control to be 
asserting a right to the property. By 'control' is meant here such a relationship to the 
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property at a given moment that an objective bystander would consider that person to 
have taken control or that the property had been brought within that person's control.  
As possession may be acquired through another, it can be no objection that 
the assertion of right is in fact being made by the person taking direct control on 
behalf of another: in this case, the person with actual custody of the property will not 
possess, for want of animus. All that is needed is that an objective bystander can see 
that a right is being asserted. 
A person does not acquire sufficient control for the purposes of possession 
just because an item comes into premises or onto land that is possessed by that 
person. The item may already be possessed by another person, such as a guest or a 
resident. Equally, I do not control items placed or lost on my land unless the nature 
of that land is itself enough to give me control. However, where there are direct acts 
carried out in relation to the property, fairly minimal acts of control may be enough, 
such as a prisoner placing his ashtray on top of an item, as long as those acts are 
sufficient in the circumstances to constitute an assertion of right. 
 
E. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CONTROL 
 
While we may talk of the physical element of possession as involving control of the 
property, it is self-evident that some items are harder to control than others. Unless 
some things are to be beyond possession altogether, then one of two things must 
happen: either the law adopts such a minimal test for control that the same standard 
may apply to all property; or the test must be adjusted depending on the type of 
property concerned. The former option appears unworkable in practice, however. 
The physical nature of different types of property differs so wildly, and there are so 
many ways of using different types of property, that it seems unavoidable that the 
requirements will depend on the specific circumstances of the individual case. It may 
be that one can possess a car by holding the key, but that can hardly be an option for 
property that does not require a key. 
 Accordingly, it appears that, in assessing the level of control required, one 
must take into account the nature of the property and the extent to which it is 
112 
 
susceptible to control. This does indeed seem to be the law, as Hume observes in his 
account of the requirements for delivery: 
 
[T]he thing must be brought into the same state of custody, safety and 
command, with the other parts of the acquirer's property of that sort - regard 
being always had to the nature and description of the subject in question, and 




The requirements thus vary accordingly as the level of control varies. One may also 
note that, if the analysis above is correct, and what is required to possess is control 
indicating an assertion of right, the level of control required will vary depending on 
how the property is normally used by persons with such rights. 
The most obvious category of items that are difficult to control is that in 
which the items are large or otherwise unwieldy. This will be considered first. 
However, an item may also be difficult to control because of its very small size. 
Again, it may be difficult to control an item – a piece of machinery, for example – 
because some essential component is missing. Alternatively, the difficulty may be 
external, as where weather conditions restrict control. Finally, difficulty may arise 
where the item is within the body. The purpose here is to consider whether, and if so 




(1) Large or unwieldy items 
 
The view has been expressed that the level of control required will be influenced by 
the nature of the property, and in particular how difficult to control it is. If less was 
not required many items would by that fact be excluded from possession. As has 
been said by van der Merwe for South Africa: 
 
'A fairly extensive measure of control is required for movables which can be 
handled, like a watch, a book or a jacket. In the case of movables which 
cannot be handled easily, like wild animals, a stack of wood, a threshing 
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machine or a shipwreck, literal physical handling of the article is not always 




Paul says the same for Roman law, holding that things of too great weight to be 
moved may be delivered by agreement expressed in their presence.
121
 
 This view, as expressed, is however problematic. Nothing is of such great 
weight that it cannot be moved,
122
 even if the operation may be difficult. Nor is it 
clear what van der Merwe means by distinguishing between items capable or 
incapable of being 'handled'. By 'handled' he cannot mean merely 'touched with the 
hand', because by definition this may be done to any item of corporeal property. It 
does not appear either that he can mean 'held in the hand', because some wild animals 
are small enough to be held in the hand. What is distinctive about live animals is that 
their nature makes them difficult to control rather than difficult to handle: they act 
under their own volition, and may try to escape. Perhaps, then, he means merely to 
refer to the difficulties of control of certain types of item. Some items cannot easily 
be brought under direct physical control, meaning control obtained through direct 
physical contact. In the case of a stack of wood, a threshing machine or a shipwreck, 
to stay with van der Merwe’s examples, this is because of their bulk. In the case of a 
stack of wood, while I may touch it, it is difficult to see how that touch can of itself 
increase my control of it. For example, it does not increase my ability to exclude 
others. If I am in a position to exclude others, that is because of factors other than my 
direct physical contact. The same must apply to the phrase 'not always possible'. This 
must be taken to mean merely that it is difficult to exercise control through direct 
physical contact.  
 Van der Merwe’s view, therefore, appears inaptly phrased. Perhaps it can be 
summarised as follows: where property is of such a nature that it cannot be brought 
under control by physical handling alone, physical handling is not required. 
However, even put like this, it is not clear that it adds much. We have seen nothing to 
indicate that even very portable items need to be handled to be possessed. Indeed, the 
position is quite to the contrary: it is control, not physical contact, that is the issue. It 
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appears, then, that van der Merwe must be taken to mean that, where an item’s bulk 
(or some other characteristic) means that it is capable of coming under complete 
control, less control will be required to establish possession. 
Even this, however, does not necessarily correctly reflect the law. If what is 
required is that the possessor hold in the manner of someone holding a right to 
possess, the precise requirement will vary depending on the situation. The use that 
one would expect an owner to make would be no more than what was reasonable in 
the circumstances, and it follows from this that only such use as is reasonable will be 
required. All the same, it is perhaps simplistic to say merely that, the more difficult 
the item is to control, the less control is required to possess it. Certainly, a watch may 
be possessed by holding it in the hand. One does not hold a stack of wood in the 
hand, but all that this tells us is that the watch and the stack of wood are different in 
nature. They are used in different ways. It has been suggested above that what the 
law requires, instead, is sufficient acts to qualify as an assertion of right. This will 
depend on what an objective bystander would consider necessary. In some cases, 
quite extensive acts may be required to satisfy this test. With a ship, for example, 
merely being present on the ship is unlikely to be enough in the absence of other 
factors. After all, that is equally consistent with being a passenger. Thus, the acts 
required to possess a ship may in fact be extensive, even if they in fact give less 
control over the ship than one can have over a watch. The guards left on the ship in 
Cape Tex Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v SAB Lines (Pty) Ltd,
123
 in staying on board 
day and night, performed more extensive actions than would be required for 
possession of a small, portable item, but nonetheless did not control and so did not 
acquire possession for their employers. It is suggested, therefore, that the true 
position is that such acts are necessary for the physical element of possession as 
suffice to give the outward impression of an assertion of right. 
 
(2) Very small items 
 
An item may also be difficult to control because it is very small. The question has 
arisen in cases on possession of controlled drugs whether it is possible to possess an 
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item that is too small to be usable. In R v Worsell,
124
 it was held that possession of a 
tube containing a quantity of heroin that was too small to be seen by the naked eye, 
and which could not be poured out or measured, was not possession of the drug. In 
effect, the court said, the tube was empty. 
 The same approach was taken in R v Carver,
125
 concerning a quantity of 
cannabis too small to be seen by the naked eye. That case was decided on the ground 
that the quantity present was too small to be usable. Carver, however, was overruled 
in R v Boyesen.
126
 In that case, following the Scottish case Keane v Gallacher,
127
 the 
House of Lords rejected the usability criterion as reading words into the statute. The 
statute talks only of possession. 
One may note the likelihood that one in possession of a prohibited substance 
will attempt to dispose of it on the approach of the police. The argument would then 
be that, from the point of view of enforcement of the criminal law, not to hold 
possession to exist in such cases would be undesirable. This argument has found 




 The application of possession to very small, or indeed microscopic, items has 
been criticised. Earle argues as follows: 
 
It is submitted that before accepting that the possession of minute traces of a 
drug can constitute possession for the purposes of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971, courts might bear in mind one inevitable consequence of such an 
approach. Once a substance has been used in a room, it is possible that 
minute traces might remain in the dust of the room indefinitely, and it would 
consequently be impossible for the person occupying the room ever to 
abandon possession of that drug. This manifestly absurd result can only be 
avoided by espousing a common sense view of what constitutes possession of 
a drug; the test of what is visible to the naked eye would appear to be as good 
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It is not, however, clear that this result is 'manifestly absurd' as Earle states. A search 
sufficiently careful to reveal traces of the drug in these circumstances would be likely 
only to occur if suspicion had fallen on the occupier of the room. If traces of drugs 
were found, that would be evidence of possession at some point in the past. In the 
absence of any provision for negative prescription of criminal liability, it could 
hardly be wrong in law to convict of possession of a substance based on evidence of 
past possession, assuming of course that such evidence was sufficient to satisfy the 
required standard of proof. There can be no question of abandonment of possession 
excusing a person from criminal liability, except as a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion.
130
 Accordingly, whether the occupier of the room is presently in 
possession of the drug traces is irrelevant. The question is more relevant in the case 
of a new occupier of the room. Could a new occupier possess the traces, assuming 
the necessary knowledge of the traces and the intention to possess them? If the traces 
amount to a sufficient quantity that a person could exercise control over them, there 
seems to be no reason why possession should not be held to have been established. 
After all, even very small amounts may be added together to form something more 
substantial. However, if the quantity is so minimal that it is, in the words of the court 
in Keane v Gallacher, 'so minute that in the light of common sense it amounts to 
nothing',
131
 the outcome would be different. In such a case, possession would not 
seem to be acquired, because regardless of his intention the new occupier has no 
control over the traces. The case suggested by Earle, where the traces are so small 
that it is impossible for a new occupier to get rid of them, would be one such case. If 
I cannot abandon control, then I hardly seem to have control at all in the first place. 
 This should not be taken to suggest that very small items can in no 
circumstances be possessed. This would be a most undesirable result, and not merely 
for the criminal law. Suppose, for example, that a scientist employed in a laboratory 
has isolated in a container a particular type of microscopic organism. If the organism 
is not possessed, it remains ownerless, and so the scientist’s employer would appear 
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to have no remedy if the organism is taken by another or damaged by another’s fault. 
The point then is not that very small items may not be possessed, but that special 
measures may be necessary before they may be said to be under sufficient control 
that possession may be said to be established. Although the cases here are concerned 
with criminal possession, they appear to reach a reasonable result for possession 
generally: the small size of an item is only relevant to the question of possession 
insofar as that affects the ability to control the item. 
 
(3) Lack of necessary components 
 
May I possess an item when I do not have the necessary components to make it 
work? The question was raised in Girdwood & Co v Pollock, Gilmour & Co.
132
 A 
part of a spinning machine was delivered to a purchaser. The question arose as to 
whether there could be valid delivery here in the sense of giving possession, and 
therefore ownership, to the transferee. Unfortunately for present purposes, it was not 
necessary to express a concluded view on the matter as it was found proved that the 
item had been reconveyed to the seller. However, in principle it does not seem that it 
can be the law that the lack of necessary components can, in and of itself, be a bar to 
possession. Otherwise, it would be impossible to possess a broken-down car or a 
shipwreck. It may also be noted that, if the physical element of possession requires 
an assertion of right to possess, this is not necessarily an assertion of a right to use. 
For example, a pledgee possesses but does not have a right to use.
133
 The facts of 
Black v Carmichael,
134
 discussed above, may give another example of a possessor 
who lacks the ability to use the property. Thus, it cannot be that it is necessarily an 
obstacle to possession that the holder is not able to use the property. What matters is 
that the holder appears, from an objective point of view, to be holding in a manner 
constituting an assertion of right. Whether this test is met will depend on the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case, and it may be therefore that the lack of an 
essential component will be a relevant factor in some cases. 
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 As an example, we may consider the decision in Stadium Finance Ltd v 
Robbins.
135
 Although the case is English, the statutory provision with which it is 
concerned
136
 applies in Scotland, and so if the same issue arose in a Scottish case it is 
likely that this case would be considered. The provision in question provides inter 
alia that, where a mercantile agent is in possession of goods, any conveyance of 
those goods in the ordinary course of business will be valid as if authorised by the 
owner. In this case, the owner of a car had left it with a car dealer under a tentative 
arrangement to find a buyer. The owner had, however, retained the key to the car. 
The question was whether the car dealer was in possession of the car. The majority 
of the court held that the dealer was in possession of the car, even though it could not 
be moved easily without the key. Although Willmer J dissented on this point, this 
was on the ground that the retention of the key indicated the owner's intention to 
control the sale, and so the dealer was not acting in 'the ordinary course of business' 
by selling the car.  
From the perspective of the general law of possession, the problem with cases 
under the Factors Acts is that the 'possessor' is acting as an agent, and so has no 
business asserting any kind of right at all to the property.
137
 We must therefore 
conclude that, if the decision is correct, the meaning of 'possession' for the purposes 
of the Factors Acts is a specialised one. Certainly, looked at from the perspective of 
that general law of possession, there appears to be little to justify a finding of 
possession. The owner of the car had retained the key, and in those circumstances the 
agent looks from an objective standpoint like, at most, a custodier, unless there are 
other facts not disclosed in the report of the case, such as a price sticker put on the 
car, this being an assertion of a right to sell the car. On the facts given, the agents in 
Stadium Finance do not appear to be exerting any more control or asserting any more 
right over the car than I am over the car which a visitor to my house has parked in 
my driveway, at least until they took the decision to break into the locked glove 
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compartment of the car to recover the car registration documents. That would appear 
to constitute the necessary assertion of right. 
The matter, then, is one of objective impression, in which the absence of a 
necessary component plays a part but which is not conclusive. In both Black v 
Carmichael and Stadium Finance Ltd v Robbins there was a car on land belonging to 
a party other than the owner, and in both cases the occupier of the land lacked the 
key to the car. However, in the former case, clear acts were carried out that 
constituted an unambiguous assertion of a right to exclude the owner from use of the 
car, and so the occupier of the land possessed on the view stated here. In the latter 
case, on the other hand, the lack of the key was part of a general impression of lack 
of control on the part of agent, which excludes possession: given that the principal 
retained the key, and was able to drive the car away, the position was much the same 
as if the principal had merely parked his car on the agent's premises. 
 
(4) External factors 
 
Suppose that the difficulty with my possession is that the item is difficult to control 
due to external factors, such as the weather. We are not concerned here with 
supervening events occurring after possession has been acquired: that would be an 
issue of retention and loss of possession, considered later. What we are concerned 
with is issues existing at the time of taking possession. 
 An example of this is possession of shipwrecks. Weather conditions will 
impose certain restrictions on the control that can be exercised. The discussion above 
would suggest that what is required is what is reasonable in the circumstances. There 
appears to be no direct authority in Scots law on the point, at least as regards 
corporeal moveable property. However, in English law the principle has been 
accepted. For example, The Tubantia
138
 concerned possession of a wreck under 
water. It was held to be sufficient to carry out acts such as the sending of divers, 
cutting a hole in the wreck, and attaching a buoy. As far as actual control of the 
wreck was concerned, these were fairly minimal acts, especially given that weather 
conditions severely restricted the days on which work was possible. The court 
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referred to the Scottish case Lord Advocate v Young
139
 for the principle that 
possession only requires such use as is reasonably possible. That case concerned 
prescriptive possession of land, specifically foreshore, but the principle seems 
equally applicable. The point was made that the possessor of foreshore in its natural 
state will periodically be excluded from the land by the tide, but that this will not 
prevent that person establishing possession. 
 
(5) Items in the body 
 
A person may have things inside his body: a medical implant, for example. In one of 
a series of articles of humorous intent in the South African Law Journal,
140
 this 
question is considered. The article is in the form of a report of a fictional case 
concerning a piece of shrapnel lodged in the body of a former soldier, and asks 
whether he is in possession of the shrapnel in contravention of a provision of the 
criminal law regarding possession of ammunition. The article does not explore the 
requirements for possession, but concludes that the accused did possess. It was not 
required that any actual use be made of the property. 
 It is strongly arguable that an individual does not possess items within his 
body, on the basis of lack of control. A medical implant cannot be removed by the 
carrier without fairly drastic acts to bring this about. This is the case even with more 
accessible additions, such as dental fillings. In effect, such implants have become 
part of the body, and so, it may be supposed, they can only properly be said to be 
possessed if the human body itself is possessed by the individual occupying it.
141
 To 
be possessed separately from the human body, they would need to be removed from 
it. 
An item that has been swallowed may perhaps be recovered by inducing 
vomiting, at least for a limited time after swallowing, but this again seems a 
sufficiently serious step as to imply that the item is not presently in the possession of 
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the person carrying the item in his body unless, again, the body as a whole is capable 
of being possessed by its occupant.
142
 Something that has been swallowed cannot be 
considered to have become part of the body, on the basis that the requirements for 
accession have not been met,
143
 at least unless and until it has been absorbed by the 
body, and so it cannot be considered to be possessed as part of the body as a whole. 
Suppose that the substance is illegal, and has been swallowed unwittingly by an 
individual. If that individual then becomes aware of the nature of the substance, is he 
then obliged to attempt to bring up the contents of his stomach or face prosecution? 
This seems rather an imposition on a person who has come into this situation 
innocently. Furthermore, the individual who has swallowed the item has no control 
over the physical processes governing whether the item is even recoverable in this 
manner. It appears that the item is quite out of his control. 
 In cases of possession of drugs, there is a further issue, that of chemical 
change. As it passes through the body, the drug will undergo processes that will 
change its character. It was for this reason that the convictions in Hambleton v 
Callinan
144
 were quashed. Although traces of drugs were found in urine samples, 
these traces had undergone such chemical change that they could no longer be 
described as being that drug. The accused were therefore not at the time of giving the 
samples in possession of the drug. 
 Earle suggests that: 
 
There will clearly be a time following consumption but before excretion or 
metabolic change when the drug will be present in its original chemical form 





For reasons already given, it is at least arguable that an individual is not in 
possession of things within his body. Moreover, the accused does not control the 
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metabolic change to which Earle refers, and so it is entirely fortuitous whether the 
drug can be recovered in its original form. In any case, as was pointed out in 
Hambleton v Callinan,
146
 in a prosecution for unlawful possession, it is not necessary 
to rely on present possession. The traces in the urine samples could be used just as 




We see in this part that the requirements for control will vary according to 
circumstances. There may be obstacles in the particular case to control of the 
property and, where the property cannot otherwise be said to be controlled at all, 
those obstacles must be overcome, as with very small items or items in the body. 
Subject to that, however, the acts required will be those that are reasonable in the 





(1) The need for exclusivity 
 
In this chapter, we have seen that, as does Stair, Rankine, Smith and Reid all define 
possession as requiring an element of exclusivity. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Bentham and Paton have observed the problems that arise when more than 
one person has access to the property, or more than one person attempts to exercise 
control of the property. We saw in chapter 2 that the same point appears in other 
systems, especially England. 
It is necessary, however, to begin by making three distinctions. The first 
distinction is that between, on the one hand, interference that is actually occurring 
and, on the other, potential interference.  
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The second distinction is between, on the one hand, interference by right or 
with the consent of the possessor and, on the other, interference without such right or 
consent.  
The third distinction is between exclusivity at the time of taking possession 
and exclusivity subsequent to that. Do the requirements differ? The requirement for 
exclusivity after the taking of possession will be considered as part of the question of 
continuation and loss of the physical element of possession.
147
 We are concerned 
here with exclusivity at the time of taking possession. That leaves us with three 
situations to consider: actual interference with neither right nor the consent of the 
possessor; actual interference with either right or consent; and potential interference. 
We begin with the case of potential interference. 
 
(2) Potential interference 
 
(a) Potential interference generally. It would be inconvenient if potential 
interference by a third party prevented the acquisition of possession. Take for 
example the case where a child picks up a banknote lying on the ground. Even if the 
banknote is picked up in the presence of another who is well able to overpower the 
child, if that person does nothing to interfere then it is going too far to hold that 
person's presence to exclude the acquisition of possession.
148
 
Cases suggests that the presence of some person who is in a position to 
interfere with the possession of the property will not, in and of itself, prevent the 
acquisition of that possession. Thus, in Mitchell's Trs v Gladstone,
149
 there was a 
conveyance of household furnishings in the matrimonial home by the husband to a 
third party, who then conveyed to the wife's marriage trustees. There was held to be 
good delivery to the trustees through the wife's possession on their behalf. Similarly, 
in Adam v Adam's Tr,
150
 it was held that household furnishings, owned by the wife 
and brought into the matrimonial home on marriage, had not been 'lent or entrusted' 
to the husband in term of section 1(4) of the Married Women's Property Act 1881. 
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These cases imply that items within the household may nonetheless be separately 
possessed, even though it may be supposed that the household furnishings were used 
equally by both spouses. 
 In Ross & Duncan v Baxter & Co,
151
 a firm of shipbuilders arranged for an 
engine to be fitted to a ship by a firm of engineers. The shipbuilders brought the ship 
to a public harbour for this purpose. The Inner House held that, in the circumstances, 
the acts carried out by the engineers were not sufficient to give them a lien, for two 
reasons. The first was that an employee of the shipbuilders remained on board at all 
times in order to maintain their control of the ship. Although this was also the case in 
Cooper v Barr and Shearer,
152
 discussed in chapter 4, Lord Shand distinguished that 
case on the basis that the position of the employee in the present case was 'somewhat 
more than that of a mere watchman'.
153
 His purpose was not merely to keep an eye 
on things, but to maintain his employers' natural possession. Secondly, this 
conclusion was supported by a provision in the contract between the parties that the 
ship was 'to be throughout in charge of the shipbuilders', ie under their control. There 
is therefore an element of lack of animus on the part of the engineers. Clearly, 
though, to maintain the ship in their own charge, the shipbuilders needed to maintain 
some kind of presence during the repair work, and the role of their employee must be 
interpreted in light of the contractual term. What the case does not decide, though, is 
that a repairer may not satisfy the physical requirements of possession in the 
presence of someone who may interfere. The decision in Ross & Duncan v Baxter & 
Co turned on its own special circumstances that the shipbuilders were continuing to 
carry out acts that were, on the facts of the case, sufficient for the maintenance by 
them of natural possession. 
 
(b) Traditio clavium. This issue of potential interference arises in the case of the 
delivery of keys. We saw in chapter 2 the idea that possession of goods may be given 
by delivery of the key of the place in which the goods are kept, and we have seen 
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also in this chapter the idea of possession of items kept under lock and key. Delivery 
of this kind is known as traditio clavium. What, then, if the transferor has a duplicate 
key, or has some other means of getting at the goods? It appears that, in South 
Africa, the existence of a duplicate key prevents the operation of traditio clavium.
154
 
The same is true for Germany.
155
 On the other hand, for England Pollock and Wright 
hold that: 
 
[I]f a vendor has delivered the key to the purchaser with the expressed intent 
that the purchaser may at any time get at the goods, the purchaser will have 





Thus, in Ancona v Rogers,
157
 in which an individual had been given possession of 
goods in another's house by being given the key to the locked room in which they 
were kept, it was observed
158
 that the householder could have resumed possession by 
use of a duplicate key. Evidently the existence of the duplicate key would not, 
therefore, have prevented delivery in the first place. 
 It is not clear what approach Scots law takes to this matter. Stair does not 
consider the matter directly, but what he says about the possession of things under 
lock and key cannot easily be read to allow the holding of duplicate keys by other 
parties. He refers to possession of items by: 
 




Hume is also unreceptive to the idea: 
 
[T]he delivery of the key must have been made however with the purpose of 




                                   
154
 Van der Merwe, Law of Things, para 58; Silberberg & Schoeman 182. 
155
 McGuire, 'Transfer of Movables in Germany' 57. 
156
 Pollock & Wright, Possession 68. 
157
 (1876) LR 1 Ex D 285. 
158
 (1876) LR 1 Ex D 285, 291 (Mellish J). 
159
 Stair, Inst. 2,1,11. 
160
 Hume, Lectures, III,251. 
126 
 
It must be said, though, that the context of this is comparison with cases where the 
key is given for a limited purpose, rather than with cases where the transferor retains 
the ability to get access to the goods. 
 Among earlier Scots writers, only Bell has considered the matter directly: 
 
It will not prevent this kind of delivery from having effect, that the seller has 
a double or master key by which he may open the door, or that he may get 
access by some indirect and unusual means, or that there is a door of 





Much of this is certainly unobjectionable. If the other party needs 'indirect or unusual 
means' to get access to the goods, that in itself implies that a transfer of control has 
taken place. The same is true where clandestine methods are needed. The question is 
more difficult in the simple case of duplicate or master keys. 
There are unfortunately few cases on possession where others have access to 
the item possessed. In Taylor v Ranken,
162
 an individual was held to possess items in 
containers even though others had access to those containers. The pursuers were the 
executors of T, who had died while living with the defenders, who were the widow 
of T's deceased son and her second husband. On T's death, it was held that T was 
presumed owner of the contents of certain chests on the basis of his possession, as 
having the key. It was not relevant that the male defender 'had frequent access, by 
opening the chests, and putting any thing therein he pleased'. This tends to imply that 
one may possess items in a locked repository, even though there is someone else who 
may also exercise access. 
A bill of lading fulfils a similar role to a key in this regard,
163
 so it may be 
instructive to consider the position with duplicate bills of lading. In Meyerstein v 
Barber,
164
 the House of Lords held that the delivery of one of a set of three bills was 
enough for delivery of the goods, even though one holding any of the three could 
have obtained the goods from the carrier. 
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If, then, I give you the key to the repository where the goods are kept, is that 
good delivery even if I retain a duplicate key? I may well wish to do so, if that 
repository is in or is part of my premises, for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
transfer of possession. I may need access for maintenance purposes, for example. A 
similar case would be a lease of premises and their contents. It would be a surprising 
conclusion if it were to be held that a tenant of a furnished flat did not acquire 
possession of the contents simply because the landlord had retained a spare key.
165
 It 
is suggested, therefore, that Bell's view is correct, and that the existence of a 
duplicate or master key should not prevent the effectiveness of traditio clavium. To 
conclude otherwise would in any case be inconsistent with the view taken above, that 
it is no bar to the acquisition of possession merely that another person might 
potentially interfere with that possession. 
 
(3) Actual interference with consent or right 
 
(a) The general issue. It cannot reasonably be an obstacle that others make use of 
property in my possession with my consent, for by doing so the individual making 
such use acknowledges my possession. If anything, the fact that I am allowing others 
to use the property underlines my assertion of a right to possess the property. Thus, 
in Roman law any access taken to the property by consent will not interrupt 
possession,
166
 possession only coming to an end if the third party actually 
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 This follows also from the quotation from Javolenus 
given in chapter 2,
168
 concerning money placed in my presence. At the moment that 
my debtor places the money on a table in my room, I am not excluding him from it. 
Indeed, at that moment he is the one of us that can more readily take physical 
control. 
 Even where another interferes with my possession by right, it seems clear that 
this will not prevent me establishing possession. We saw in chapter 2 that, in 
Pharaoh Scaffolding v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs,
169
 
the hirer of scaffolding was held to have acquired possession of the scaffolding 
notwithstanding that, in the hire agreement, the owners reserved certain rights to 
inspect the scaffolding. In a Scottish case on similar facts, R & M Scaffolding Ltd v 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise,
170
 the same conclusion was reached. 
Similarly, we saw earlier, in Cooper v Barr and Shearer,
171
 that a ship was still 
possessed by the repairers notwithstanding that, because it was in a public dock, it 
was under the authority of the harbourmaster. Indeed, this was the case even though 
the ship was moved under the instructions of the harbourmaster.  
 
(b) Shared possession. However much exclusivity may be required, this does not 
prevent more than one person possessing in common. This is permissible, as long as 
no individual co-possessor holds in a manner inconsistent with shared control.
172
  
For Reid, co-possession is restricted to the case of 'pro indiviso holders of the 
same right to possession'.
173
 It is not, however, immediately apparent why such a 
restriction should exist. Take, for example, the case of a married couple, co-habiting 
in a house in which some items were provided by one spouse or the other, and some 
acquired by both together. It may be long forgotten which items fall into which 
category. It is true that, subject to certain exceptions, the spouses will be presumed to 
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 That, of course, is only a presumption, and may be rebutted, 
though not easily, given that the presumption is not rebutted merely by the fact of 
one of the spouses having acquired the item separately from the other.
175
 However, 
such rebuttal may require consideration of disputed evidence, with the result that in 
practice the rebuttal of the presumption may be no easy matter: it is likely that any 
couple married for even a few years will have a number of items the manner of 
acquisition of which is forgotten. Given that both spouses use and benefit from these 
items in the same way, and given the uncertainty as to ownership, there seems to be 
no reason why both spouses should not benefit from the same possessory protection. 
After all, possession is not a matter of what rights people actually have, for if the 
right to possess is clear then there is no need for possessory remedies. Where, 
though, it is not clear who has the right to possess, but two parties use the property in 
the same manner as each other, it is reasonable for the law to hold both to possess so 




 This situation has been considered in South Africa, and it has been held that 
more than one person may co-possess even on the basis of different rights. Thus, in 
Rosenbuch v Rosenbuch,
177
 property was removed from the matrimonial home by a 
wife on her separation from her husband. It was held that the husband was entitled to 
a spoliation order, without enquiry into the question of which of the two was in fact 
the owner of the property that had been removed. 
 There is some reason to believe that this is also the position in Scots law. 
Maxwel v Maxwels
178
 was an action for spuilzie of goods possessed by the pursuer 
while she lived in her father's house. The goods were in a chest to which the pursuer 
had the key. It was held that the having of the keys was sufficient for possession 
except if the question had arisen with the pursuer's parents. It does not appear from 
the report of the case what the rights of the pursuer and her father were, but there is 
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no reason to assume that they were the same. The decision nonetheless appears to 
imply that the father also possessed. 
 Main v Leask
179
 is another example. In this case, there was an arrangement 
whereby the profits of a fishing venture were to be shared between the owners of the 
boat, the owners of the nets and the crew. The boat was lost in a collision caused by 
the negligence of the defenders. In an action for damages for loss of profits arising 
from this, the defenders argued that only the owners of the boat were entitled to 
damages. In the Inner House, however, Lord Ardwall, with whom the other judges 
concurred, gave the legal position as being that: 
 
[I]f anyone is directly interested in the property of goods, houses or ships, he 





It has been argued that cases of this kind are based on possession.
181
 If that is correct, 
this case suggests that it is possible for parties to co-possess on the basis of different 
rights. 
 Reid v Houston
182
 concerned the forfeiture of property used in the 
commission of an offence and which was in the possession or control of the offender 
at the time of apprehension.
183
 The property in question was a car used in an attempt 
to commit theft by housebreaking. The car belonged to appellant's cohabitee, but the 
sheriff was persuaded that he had free use of the car. Accordingly, the appellant was 
held to possess, even though he shared his possession with another with a superior 
right. 
 On the basis of these cases, it appears arguable that more than one person 
may possess together, even where different rights underlie their respective holdings. 
Of course, if I use along with someone who has a superior right to the property, that 
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may give grounds for holding that I use only by that person's licence. However, 
possessory protection is not about determining or protecting the rights people have. 
Rather, it is concerned with maintaining the existing position pending such 
determination. Accordingly, where two or more people exercise shared use on an 
ostensibly equal footing, it would seem contrary to that policy to make the 
consequences of dispossession depend on rights that may be unknown to the 
dispossessor, and may be uncertain even between the parties sharing use of the 
property. 
 
(c) Multiple users. Reference to Bennet Pringle (Pty) Ltd v Adelaide Municipality
184
 
suggests that South African law may go further, and allow multiple parties 
independently to possess the same property. That case concerns possession of land, 
in this case an abattoir, but there seems to be no reason why the principle should not 
apply to corporeal moveables. In this case, an abattoir had been leased to a tenant, 
who was a butcher. In a possessory question, the landlord contended that the tenant 
was not a possessor, on the ground that other butchers had keys to the premises and 
used them without supervision by the lessees. To this argument, the court's response 
was that: 
 
It does not therefore now lie in the mouth of the respondent to say that, 
because other such persons continued to use the abattoir to slaughter animals, 




It appears to be enough that the lessee 'did exercise rights or carry out activities 
consistent with the transfer to him of occupation and control of the premises'.
186
 That 
this was so, even though others had access, suggests that more than one person may 
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 It is more uncertain whether the decision in Bennet Pringle (Pty) Ltd is 
correct for Scots law, and whether two or more persons may independently possess 
the same property. It is suggested, however, that this is the correct position. After all, 
as we have seen, if another makes use of my property, that does not necessarily affect 
my possession unless the other person's use is antagonistic to my continued 
possession. If that other person's use is itself sufficient for possession, it is not 
immediately apparent why that should make any difference to my possession if the 
use does not interfere with my use. Take, for example, the case of a furnished flat 
with several bedrooms. The flat is leased to a group of friends, each of whom 
occupies his own bedroom, but who also use communally certain areas of the flat 
(the kitchen and bathroom, for example). There can, it must be supposed, be no 
doubt that these friends possess in common the furnishings in these common areas. 
Those who say that shared possession cannot arise on the basis of separate rights 
would presumably say that the tenants co-possess because they share a lease. 
However, suppose instead that the bedrooms are let as individual bedsits, on separate 
leases, to tenants who are strangers to one another, but still with shared use of the 
common areas. The tenants' use of the furnishings in the common areas is scarcely 
distinguishable from that in the first example. Certainly, to an objective observer 
they may appear actually identical, especially if in the second example the tenants 
actively co-operate in the management of the common areas (by setting cleaning 
rotas, for example). Accordingly, there seems to be no proper basis for holding 
possession of the furnishings to exist in one case and not the other. 
 
(4) Actual interference without consent or right 
 
The final case to be considered is that which arises where there is actual interference 
with the attempt to take possession. Where there is contention over this, to the extent 
that I am not able to establish control, I will not acquire possession. Thus, says Paul: 
 
[S]everal persons cannot possess the same thing exclusively; for it is contrary 





] it...For it is no more possible that the same possession should 
be in two persons than that you should be held to stand on the same spot on 




This of course assumes that it is necessary to exclude all others in order to possess. 
We have seen above that Paul's view may require qualification with regard to shared 
possession. However, for present purposes, we may accept the principle that, if two 
or more persons all attempt to possess, they will none of them be successful unless 
and until one of them establishes sufficient control. Likewise, Pollock and Wright 
say: 
 
If two men have laid hands on the same horse or the same sheep, each 
meaning to use it for his own purposes and exclude the other, there is not any 




Unfortunately, except for consideration of the acquisition of ownership of wild 
animals by occupatio,
191
 there is no Scottish authority on this point. However, it 
would appear to follow from the principles of possession considered here that, where 
there is a present competition for control, no individual has as yet acquired control. 
Accordingly, in such a case, no possession has been acquired. 
  
(5) Conclusion  
 
From the comparative and historical material, it appears that there is no requirement 
for exclusivity if by that is meant the actual ability to exclude interference with the 
property. It is suggested here that the position is the same in Scots law, if nothing 
else because the alternative is unsustainable in practice. An example will illustrate. 
Suppose that a man visits a supermarket in his car. He places the items he wishes to 
buy in a trolley, and takes the trolley to the checkout. These items are scanned and 
placed back in the trolley. He pays and then returns to the car, loads the shopping 
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into the car boot and drives off. It is only at the point of driving off that his control is 
exclusive in the sense that, until he drives away, he cannot prevent someone stronger 
or faster, or just someone who takes advantage of a moment's inattention, taking an 
item from the trolley or, when the items are in the boot, opening the boot and making 
off with them. Until this point, although he has been exercising some control over the 
items, this control has not been of sufficient degree to allow him to pass TB Smith's 
test of ability to exclude others.
192
 If exclusivity is required, that is problematic, for it 
would require the conclusion that one could not possess until there was some 
obstacle to interference by others. On the other hand, from the moment he leaves the 
till with the shopping, the hypothetical shopper is making an utterly explicit assertion 
of right. On that basis, it would appear to be enough that others are in fact excluded.  
 It is going too far to consider exclusivity of control to be a separate criterion 
for possession. Instead, it is part of the test of control. The holding must be in fact 
exclusive, and then only to the extent that this is required to reach the level of control 
expected of one holding as owner (or pledgee, etc.), even though there may in fact be 
someone in the position of being able to end that control. It is not necessary to 
exclude all possibility of interference. There is no reason why, for example, an owner 
should exclude all from the property. This appears, then to be required: such 
exclusivity as is consistent with the existence of the right that is being asserted. This 
allows the possessor to continue to possess notwithstanding interference with the 
property by those with the right or permission to do so, as long as the possessor is 
nonetheless able to exercise the required degree of control of the property. My 
acquisition of possession is only impeded by want of exclusivity where that required 
degree of control cannot in fact be asserted against others acting in a manner 




On the basis of the discussion in this chapter, it can be suggested that the physical 
element of possession of corporeal moveable property is satisfied when a person two 
criteria are met. First, the intending possessor ('P') must have acquired control of the 
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property. This control may be either by P himself or through another acting on P's 
behalf. Second, that control must be of such a nature that, in the circumstances, an 
objective bystander would consider P to be asserting a right to the property. In a case 
of civil possession, that assertion of right would of course be made by the person 
acting on P's behalf. It is accepted that the objective bystander would not necessarily 
know whether the person carrying out the acts was intending to possess himself or 
was merely holding for someone else. To determine that it would be necessary to 
examine the mental states of the parties. In other words, this would be a question of 
animus rather than corpus. In any case, all the bystander needs to know is that a right 
is being asserted, from which he may take it that the property is possessed by 
someone. Thus, in the example given in part A, of the book lent to the student, the 
acts carried out by the student are sufficient to show that someone is asserting a right 
to the book. Who that person is - either me or my employer - will be determined by a 
consideration of animus. 
 The two requirements are thus (i) control and (ii) an assertion of right. What 
is required for control will vary according to the circumstances. The nature of the 
property to be possessed will be relevant, for example. However, two factors can be 
identified in determining whether a person has control.  
First, a person will only have control if he is controlling the use made of the 
property to the extent appropriate to the right being asserted, and so the level of 
control needed may vary according to that right. Thus, for example, a person 
asserting a lien over a car may only need to immobilise it, while one asserting 
ownership may actually have to have a power of use. However, acts incidentally 
affecting control of the property, such as locking the gate to the land on which a car 
is sitting, will be insufficient in the absence of some act more clearly assertive of a 
right to possess.  
Second, a person only has control if no other person is in fact carrying out 
any acts with the property that are inconsistent with the right being asserted by the 
former. Thus, in the first of Bentham's examples given in part A of this chapter, of 
two or more people putting their hands on a parcel to claim possession, none of 
individuals appears at that point to have sufficient control for possession. However, it 
is irrelevant that an individual may be able to interfere with the acquisition of 
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control, if he does not in fact do so. It must be stressed that, while this exclusivity is 
necessary, it is not sufficient. Thus, one in a position to exclude others from an item 
does not possess if he does not in fact control that item. Examples of this are items 
buried under land possessed by an individual and items within his body. 
 Finally, to allow for the acquisition of possession in circumstances where a 
person has carried out no acts directly with the property but it has been dropped or 
left in premises or on land controlled by him, a person may be said to have control if 
he would be taken by an objective bystander to have control. Thus, in Bentham's 
second example, of the box placed in the clerk's escritoire, there is sufficient here to 
hold the clerk to have satisfied the physical requirement of possession. The matter 
would therefore resolve itself into one of animus. If the required intention is present, 
the clerk's employer will possess through the clerk's holding. More generally, it will 
often be the case in practice that it cannot be shown at exactly what point, and 
through which acts, the present holder took possession. Nonetheless, it would seem 
reasonable to infer from the present acts being carried out by that person that 
possession has been acquired. 
 Of course, once the requirements here have been satisfied, it does not follow 
that the possessor needs to continue holding the property in this manner. We are 
concerned in this chapter with the moment of acquisition of possession. Once 
possession has been acquired, it will continue until the facts justify holding that it has 
been lost.
193
 Thus, for example, where more than one person occupies a house, each 
may appear to have sufficient control to have possession. However, if in fact the item 
was brought into the house in the possession of one of the occupants only, it will 
continue to be in that person's possession only unless some factor arises that changes 
that. Likewise, while it may be that keeping a car on a large area of ground may be 
insufficient in itself to satisfy the physical requirements of possession (in the absence 
of the key) on the part of the possessor of the ground, that will not matter if the car 
was put there by the possessor of the ground having been seized for unlawful 
parking. The act of lifting the car onto a larger vehicle and removing it will be 
sufficient in itself. 
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 It must be borne in mind that, in all of this, the question of animus must also 
be considered before a person may be said to possess. One who appears to an 
objective bystander to possess may in fact not possess, for example because he holds 
on another's behalf. Again, the physical relationship between the item and a number 
of potential possessions may be sufficiently ambiguous that only consideration of 
animus will resolve matters. An example of this will be where there are multiple 
occupants of premises containing an item the possession of which is unclear. 
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How is the physical element of possession lost? It is not intended here to consider all 
cases in which possession may be lost, for example where the intention to possess is 
lost or someone else takes possession. We are concerned here with what is required 
for the possessor to maintain the physical element of possession. 
 The comparative and historical discussion suggests a number of possibly 
relevant factors. The first of these is the level of physical control that is currently 
being exercised. It has been said that less physical control is required to maintain 
possession than is required to become a possessor in the first place, but this appears 
to mean that one need not maintain direct physical control at all times. Clearly one 
who is exercising such control possesses at that moment, but what is the effect of an 
interruption in that direct control? To what extent is a temporary absence relevant to 
the question of continued control? 
 The second factor that may be relevant to this question is the possessor's 
ability, following a temporary absence, to resume control. A difficulty here may arise 
because of some physical inability to resume control. Alternatively, it may arise 
because the location of the item is forgotten, or because it has become lost. This 
factor may be considered in two parts: first, the case where there is some difficulty 
with the item itself preventing the resumption of control, as where the property is lost 
or in some way inaccessible; second, the case where control over the property is 
possible, but the possessor is subject to some practical restraint. The standard 
example of the second arises where the possessor is imprisoned. 
 The third factor that may be relevant is the likelihood that another may 
interfere in the continued control.  
 The relevance of each of these factors will be considered in turn. It should be 
noted here, however, that we are not concerned with the whole question of how 
possession is retained and lost. That would require consideration of the mental 
element of possession that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nor are we concerned 
directly with questions of loss of possession through dispossession by another. The 
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issue presently under consideration is what degree of physical control must the 
possessor show in order to continue to possess and, therefore, in what circumstances 
possession will be lost on the basis of loss of corpus. 
 
B. THE POTENTIALLY RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
(1) Absence  
 
There is nothing in the comparative and historical material to suggest that possession 
may be lost merely by virtue of the fact that the possessor is not presently exercising 
direct control over the property or making actual use of the property. Indeed, such a 
rule would hardly be feasible in practice: I can hardly be expected to carry around all 
of my possessions wherever I go. I will inevitably be absent at times. 







 all accept that, possession having been 
acquired, one may then continue to possess animo solo while absent. As TB Smith 
observes,
4
 this suggests a more limited role for corpus after possession has been 
acquired, corpus then being overshadowed by animus. This is certainly suggested by 
the use of the term animo solo: this implies that the mental element alone continues. 
However, it is perhaps not necessary to go as far as Smith in order to be able to 
accept the position that less is required for the physical element of possession after 
possession has been taken. After all, animus too can hardly be constantly exercised. 
If I acquire possession of an item, at that moment I have the specific intention to 
possess that item. I can hardly maintain such a specific intention throughout the 
whole period of my possession. There will be times when I am not directing my 
mind towards the item. I may even have forgotten that I have it. Still, it would be 
inconvenient to have a rule for loss of possession that was too quick to hold 
possession to be lost simply on the basis of forgetfulness. The difficulty is then much 
the same for both corpus and animus: while the law may demand that an intending 
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possessor show clear control of the property and demonstrate a clear and present 
intention to possess,
5
 to require the possessor to continue to exhibit these throughout 
the period of possession would be quite unworkable in practice. Accordingly, some 
lower standard must be adopted for the continuation of possession. 
So much for animus; detailed consideration of animus is, of course, beyond 
the scope of the present work, but it seems that this must be the case. As we have 
seen from Stair, Erskine and Bankton, it is certainly the case for corpus. What, then, 
is the consequence of this? If possession may continue in the absence of present acts 
of possession, then continuation of possession may be inferred from previous acts of 
possession. 
We can see this in Reid v Houston,
6
 a criminal case, but one which appears 
consistent with this general principle. In this case, the appellant had been convicted 
of theft by housebreaking. At the time of the offence, there was provision
7
 for the 
convicting court to order the forfeiture of property, used in committing an offence, 
which was in the possession or control of the offender at the time the offender was 
apprehended. The property in question in this case was a car intended for use in the 
removal of the goods. The car in fact belonged to the appellant's cohabitee, but the 
sheriff was persuaded that he had free use of the car, and so the sheriff ordered that 
the car be forfeited. On appeal, it was argued that the sheriff had misdirected himself 
by considering possession at the time of the offence rather than possession at the 
time of apprehension, as required by the statute. This argument was, however, 
rejected. The court held that, given the finding that the appellant was in possession at 
the time of the offence, and in the absence of any evidence of a change of 
circumstances, the sheriff was entitled to hold possession to continue to the date of 
apprehension. 
The writer of the commentary on the decision
8
 criticises the respondent's 
apparent attempt to argue for a presumption of continued possession in cases of this 
kind, noting that there is nothing in the statute giving authority for this. It is not clear, 
though that this criticism is justified. Granted that the statute does not say that there 
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is a presumption, but we must take into account the fact that the meaning of 
'possession' is a matter of general law, unless some special statutory meaning was 
intended. As we have seen, gaps between periods of actual use of the property are 
inevitable. Given that, it is difficult to see how any special statutory meaning of 
possession could work differently from the general law, unless the intention was that 
the forfeiture provision should only apply to property in the direct physical custody 
of the accused at the time of apprehension. In Reid v Houston, this would presumably 
mean apprehension while actually driving the car. This interpretation has not been 
accepted, as shown in Reid itself. As we have also seen, as a matter of the general 
law, once possession has been acquired, it is said to continue until some 
circumstance indicates that it has been lost. In the absence of any evidence of any 
such circumstance, it is difficult to see how any court could avoid the conclusion 
that, on the facts proved in Reid, the appellant continued to possess up to the point of 
apprehension. 
 Similar issues arose in Ross's Dairies Ltd v Glasgow Corporation.
9
 This 
again was a statutory use of the term 'possession', but in this case too the court 
applied the general rule. In terms of section 247(2) of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1947 as it then stood, arrears of rates could be recovered through the 
poinding of goods 'in the lawful possession' of the ratepayer. The ratepayer in this 
case was the tenant of premises. The landlord opposed the poinding on the basis that 
possession of the goods, which were the landlord's property, had been abandoned 
when the tenant left the country a month before the poinding, leaving debts behind. 
The sheriff-substitute and, on appeal, the sheriff concluded that possession was not 
lost by mere absence. In reaching this decision, the sheriff-substitute relied on the 
view of Stair, noted above, that possession continued in the absence of further 
possessory acts. It is interesting to note that both the sheriff-substitute and the sheriff 
talk of a presumption of continued possession; indeed, in the former case, the use of 
the term 'presumption' is a direct reference to Stair's account.
10
 Contrary to the 
commentary on Reid v Houston, therefore, it appears that there is a basis for talking 
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of a presumption of continued possession, that basis being found in the general law 
of possession. 
 One curious point in Ross's Dairies was that, following the tenant's departure, 
the subjects were occupied unlawfully by an individual identified only as 'a Chinese 
gentleman'. On its face, this fact at least arguably interrupted the tenant's possession 
of the goods within the premises, at least if the Chinese gentleman had been in 
occupation without the consent of the tenant. Perhaps surprisingly, however, neither 
the sheriff-substitute nor the sheriff placed any weight on this circumstance. This is 
unfortunate because it is a fact that appears to demand an explanation if it is not to be 
held to interrupt possession. Evidently, however, for whatever reason, the court did 
not consider the Chinese gentleman's presence to be a relevant factor, and so it is a 
fact that can be disregarded for the present purpose of determining the significance of 
a failure to exercise possessory acts for an extended period of time. 
 We may also note that the presumption of possession that was operated in 
Ross's Dairies appears to have been a strong one. The landlord's solicitor sought to 
portray the tenant in argument as having 'fled the country'. Indeed, when a tenant 
leaves the country for an extended period during the currency of the lease, leaving 
behind substantial debts, such suspicions can scarcely fail to arise. Nonetheless, the 
sheriff took the view that there was insufficient evidence to establish the tenant's 
intentions, speculating that the tenant could, for all that was known, have left the 
country for the benefit of his health. 
 Such a view of the facts was no doubt open to the court in Ross's Dairies. 
However, it is suggested that there must be limits. There will come a time where, in 
the circumstances, the length of time between possessory acts has been such that 
possession will appear to an objective onlooker to have been abandoned. Of course, 
the possessor may be taken to know whether he intends still to possess, but that 
knowledge is restricted to him. Unfairness could arise if this private knowledge is 
allowed to affect the legal position of third parties. This, however, is predominantly a 
question of animus. As far as corpus is concerned, all that appears to be required is 
sufficient acts to reflect that continued animus. This is a very low standard to meet, 




(2) Ability to resume control where there is an obstacle to control of the thing 
itself  
 
Clearly it is not necessary to continue in direct and active control of the property at 
all times in order to continue to possess. We have seen that, in Roman law, and in the 
other systems considered, the continuation of possession was however affected by 
the question of how readily such control could be resumed. From the discussion 
earlier, several cases may be distinguished. The first of these arises where the 
location of the property is not presently known, but the property is 'still in our 
keeping',
11
 and which may be found with a diligent search. Something lost within the 
possessor's own home would typically fall within this case. 
 Secondly, where something is lost outwith our keeping, which cannot be 
found, possession is said to be lost. This is the younger Nerva's case of the straying 
animal or the falling vase. To this, as we have seen, van der Merwe adds for South 
African law things lost even within the possessor's orbit of control. By contrast, 
English law appears to allow possession to continue in such a case, even where 
possession is lost outside the possessor's orbit of control. As we have seen, though, 
this may be explained as influenced by the requirements for the crime of larceny. 
 Thirdly, there is the case where the location of the property is known, but it is 
inaccessible. This is Ulpian's example of items lost at the bottom of the Tiber in a 
shipwreck.
12
 Possession is lost because the items are lost beyond all reasonable 
recovery, even though the general location of the shipwreck is presumably known. 
Of course, even here recovery is possible. Divers could be sent down, or the river 
could be dammed or diverted to expose the river bed, but the need to go to such 
lengths demonstrates in itself the loss of control. No doubt such strenuous search 
efforts are more likely with, for example, valuable property, but it does not seem that 
the likelihood of a search can make any difference: possession, as we have seen, is 
based on control and, until the search is carried out, the degree of control is the same. 
 To these may be added a fourth case, namely property lost outside the 
possessor's keeping, but which may be found. For example, I drop something in the 
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street, but am able to retrace my steps and find it again, was my possession 
interrupted? Ulpian's example of the items lost in the shipwreck may suggest that 
possession is not lost in this case: if the reason possession was lost in the shipwreck 
case was the inaccessibility of the items, that implies that items similarly lost, but 
which are accessible, will continue to be possessed. Of course, it may be that my 
possession in this example is affected by the likelihood that someone else will get to 
the lost item before I do, but that issue is considered below. It appears that the loss of 
the item will not result in the loss of possession in and of itself, on the basis of the 
discussion so far. 
 Except for the English authority referred to above, then, the principle seems 
to be that loss of possession, whether the goods are within or outwith the possessor's 
keeping, depends on whether the possessor may readily resume direct physical 
control. In Roman law, at least, it is not a problem that the location of the property is 
not immediately known, as long as it may be found through a search.
13
 Merely 
temporary interruptions in the ability to resume control do not interrupt possession. 
 Scots law appears to take the same approach. As Erskine says, possession can 
only continue while exercise of possession 'can be reassumed by the possessor at 
pleasure'.
14
 The particular example he gives is property which has been taken 
possession of by another. However, read broadly Erskine's view appears to exclude 
from possession property lost within our keeping that cannot be found. For example, 
a wedding ring lost down the plughole of the kitchen sink is still in the sphere of 
control of the occupier of the house, but if its location is not known then even a 
diligent search is unlikely to find it. The conclusion would therefore be that the ring 
is no longer possessed. Equally, Erskine's test leads to the conclusion that something 
lost outside the possessor's keeping, as where an item is dropped in the street, is still 
possessed if it can readily be found again, subject only to the discussion below 
concerning the possibility of third party interference. Bell appears to accept the idea 
that a temporary interruption of control will not interrupt possession.
15
 The example 
he gives is of goods kept in an area that is locked overnight, where the key is held by 
someone else. 
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 We may see Erskine's principle in the facts of Millar v Laird of Killarnie.
16
 In 
this case, the pursuer had been winnowing grain on the defender's land. Individuals 
acting on the defender's behalf interrupted this process such that the grain was spilled 
onto the ground, whereby a quantity of it was ruined and could not be recovered. The 
pursuer raised an action for spuilzie, arguing that these actions constituted 
dispossession of the grain. In the event, although the court held that these actions 
constituted a wrong in law, only a minority of the court held that this was a 
spuilzie.
17
 The majority view, however, seems difficult to understand on the basis of 
the discussion above, and in particular Erskine's view that possession ends when it 
can no longer be exercised at pleasure. The better view, it is suggested, is that of the 
minority, that the pursuer in Millar was dispossessed of such grain as could not be 
recovered. This is on the basis that he was not then capable of resuming control of 
that grain. An analogy may be made with Ulpian's shipwreck case. In the same way, 
if I spill your wine on the floor, you cease to possess, even though the wine's location 
is known, because you cannot resume control of the spilled wine. In a different 
context,
18
 Gaius holds items that have been spilled out to be in the same position as 
items that have been destroyed,
19
 and with good cause, for the position is the same 
for all practical purposes. In the same way, your wine that I have spilled is beyond 
your control just as much as it would be if I was detaining it from you. Indeed, the 
spilled wine is even more beyond your control, because if I am detaining the wine 
there is some prospect of recovering it from me. 
 It is interesting to note, though, that Stair does not include loss of ability to 
resume control in his consideration of loss of possession. Instead, he considers only 
interference by third parties and voluntary abandonment by the possessor, the latter 
being either by simply giving up possession or alternatively by conveying the 
property to another.
20
 Carr considers that Stair's view is therefore that 'possession 
animo solo [can] be broken only by contrary actions'.
21
 He also attributes to Reid the 
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 Indeed, the passage of Reid that is referred to by Carr
23
 considers only 
third party interference and voluntary abandonment. However, it is by no means 
apparent that the correct inference to draw is that these writers intend to exclude loss 
of ability to exercise control as a ground for loss of possession. As a matter of logic, 
the exclusion of one thing does not follow from the inclusion of another, unless they 
are inconsistent. Of course, we need more than formal logic to interpret a legal text, 
and if all other writers had been silent on the point we would perhaps have been 
compelled to accept that there was no such rule as the one considered here, unless 
some ground could be found for it in the general principles of possession. However, 
as we have seen, Erskine considers the rule to exist, as do the Roman jurists and also 
writers in other systems. There is nothing in Stair's account that is inconsistent with 
the Roman rule, and if Stair had intended to depart from the Roman rule it was open 
to him to do so expressly. We saw in chapter 1 that Stair's account of possession 
depends strongly on Roman law, so there is all the more reason for him to have 
departed from Roman law expressly had he wished to do so. Clearly he felt that the 
Roman texts were to be relied on in this connection, and it would have been expected 
therefore that anyone considering the point discussed in this section would have 
made use of them. In the circumstances, the better view of Stair's account is that he 
simply did not choose to address this issue. We must remember that a book, like 
Stair's Institutions, that attempts to give a relatively concise account of the whole of 
Scots private law cannot be expected to consider every point comprehensively. It is 
simply not permissible to infer Stair's view on a point from the mere fact that he 
failed to consider it. The same may be said for Reid's account. It is suggested, 
therefore, that Erskine's view on this point should be accepted as representing the 
law, in the absence of any contrary authority. In any case, as Carr observes, Erskine's 
approach may be said to 'reflect the factual element of possession more closely.'
24
 It 
is one thing to say that the possessor need not exercise physical control at all times: 
that is an inevitable concession to the practicalities of the matter. It is quite another to 
hold possession to continue when the possessor is in no position to exercise any 
control at all. If that is the position, there seems to be scarcely any point in requiring 
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any physical element for possession at all. It is suggested here that, possession being 
based on a physical relationship, at least some semblance of a physical relationship 
must persist throughout the period of possession. After all, if the purpose of 
possessory remedies is to protect one apparently exercising a right over the property, 
they do not appear to have any application to the case where no-one is exercising any 
such apparent right over the thing because it is in no-one's control. 
 
(3) Ability to resume control where the possessor is under some restraint  
 
The situations considered so far in this section are concerned with the position of the 
goods themselves. Are the goods in such a position that I can resume control? 
However, it may be that I am not able to resume control, not because the goods are 
not recoverable, but because I myself am in no position to do so. Carr gives the 
following example: 
 
Crispin owns and possesses a castle in Perthshire. After completing 
University, Crispin decides to go to South America for a 'gap year'. For the 
first six months Crispin is safe and happy building an orphanage. 
Unfortunately, he is then taken hostage by Marxist Rebels. They inform him 
that he will be held until 2018 when he will be executed to celebrate Marx's 
bicentenary. Crispin is duly held until 2018, and is then executed. Meanwhile, 
the secluded location of Crispin's castle has meant no-one has set foot on the 





In Carr's view, Crispin continued to possess for the first six months, on the basis that 
he could resume control at will. This is despite the long distance he is from the 
castle. This, however, must be correct, for otherwise one would lose possession any 
time one went on holiday away from home. 
 The subsequent period, however, Carr considers more problematic, based on 
what has been argued above to be a misreading of Stair's account. On Erskine's view, 
he notes that possession would be lost due to Crispin's deprivation of liberty, as a 
result of which he is unable to resume direct physical control. 
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 We must remember, however, that possession need not be exercised by the 
possessor himself. We saw above that, in the South African case S v Singiswa,
26
 an 
individual was held to be in possession of drugs at his home, even though he was 
imprisoned, because he was able to exercise control through his parents. Although 
concerned with possession of heritage, the Scottish case Beggs v Kilmarnock & 
Loudon District Council
27
 appears to be in point with S v Singiswa. 
 In Beggs, the pursuer had become tenant of a council house in April 1990. In 
July 1991, he was taken into custody and subsequently sentenced to six years' 
imprisonment. He subsequently, while still imprisoned, sought to exercise the right 
to buy the council house given by section 61 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987. 
The local authority refused to allow this, on the basis that the pursuer had not 
occupied the house for the required two years.
28
 The pursuer argued that one could 
continue to occupy property even while temporarily absent, provided one still 
intended to return, and also provided there continued to be physical signs of 
occupation. This latter requirement counsel for the pursuer termed the 'corpus 
possessionis', terminology taken from the English case Brown v Brash,
29
 concerning 
abandonment of possession by a tenant in similar circumstances to those in Beggs. 
The terminology used appears to suggest that, although the 1987 Act talks of 
occupation rather than possession, the court took the two to be synonymous for these 
purposes. The court accepted the pursuer's argument, based on the fact that the 
pursuer's parents had stayed in the house from time to time during his imprisonment. 
 The court's reasoning in Beggs appears to accept that possession will not be 
lost where the possessor is absent, as long as there are physical signs of the intention 
to return. Of course, in Beggs the possessor was continuing to exercise control, albeit 
by proxy. The court in Brown went further in its reasoning, making an analogy with a 
possessor leaving property behind while going on holiday. Indeed, as far as the 
ability to resume control is concerned, one on holiday may be in a position very little 
different from one serving a short prison sentence. A person on holiday overseas may 
find that disruption to transport means that he is entirely unable to return home to 
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resume control of the property. Even without such disruption, in Carr's example 
quoted above a journey from South America to rural Perthshire is no small matter. 
 Matters may be different with a longer prison sentence. The possessory 
remedies are interim remedies only, intended to preserve the existing state of 
possession until the question of right can be considered. One who is serving a long 
prison sentence, however, may come home to a possessory situation that is long 
settled. Possessory remedies hardly seem appropriate to recover property from 
someone who has enjoyed it peaceably for a number of years, but the availability of 
such a remedy in these circumstances would be the consequence if a prisoner were 
held to continue to possess without further acts. 
 The analogy with the holidaymaker suggests a broader analogy with the 
general issue of continued possession during absence, discussed above. As we saw, 
all that is required is that the possessor exercise sufficient acts to demonstrate the 
continued animus possidendi. This is not a high standard to meet. However, the point 
to be made here is that, from the point of view of a third party, the two cases will be 
difficult to distinguish. For example, suppose that you have a bicycle in your 
possession that I believe to be mine. I come across it chained to some railings outside 
your house. From these facts, I have no idea whether you left it there because you 
have gone in holiday or whether you have left it there because you have been 
imprisoned. If you lose possession in the one case but not in the other, the 
consequences for me of my taking possession of the bicycle will depend on facts 
outside my knowledge. This seems unsatisfactory. It is suggested, therefore, that 
cases of this kind should be treated in the same way as cases of absence generally. In 
other words, possession in cases of this kind will be lost by virtue of the absence only 
where circumstances are such as to suggest to an objective bystander abandonment 
of possession, regardless of whether the possessor has in fact abandoned possession. 
 
(4) Likelihood of interference  
 
The final factor to be considered is the likelihood of interference. As we have seen, 
Savigny suggested that the relevance of this factor is determined by whether the 
interference is sufficiently likely to require to be taken into account. It has been 
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suggested, however, by Common Law writers that the likelihood of interference is 
irrelevant. Even if interference is likely, or indeed even if it is virtually certain, 







 all speak in terms of possession being lost by 
third party interference. This appears on the face of it to imply that possession will 





 talk of possession being lost if an item is thrown away in a place where it is 
likely to be picked up, but for both this appears to be because such an act implies the 
abandonment of animus possidendi: as Stair says, this is an example of 'evident 
declaratory acts or circumstances from which abandonment may be presumed'.
35
 
However, interference is always a possibility. If exclusivity is required, as an 
issue of practicality this can only mean that others are in fact excluded.
36
 Even if a 
thief comes into my house in my absence, it would be going too far to ascribe to him 
possession of the individual objects in the house merely because I cannot at that 
moment exclude him from taking them. His presence is temporary, and once he is 
gone anything he did not take will be in much the condition that it was before, at 
least as far as control is concerned.  
This appears to imply that, even if interference with the possessor's control of 
the property is foreseeable, that will not of itself prevent the establishment of 
possession. In Cooper v Barr and Shearer,
37
 a ship repairer asserted a lien over a 
ship. The ship had initially been on the repairer's own premises, and it was accepted 
that the repairer had had sufficient possession for a lien at that time. However, later 
on, but while the repairs were still ongoing, the ship was moved for the repairer's 
convenience into the public dock. It was held in the Inner House, with apparent 
reluctance, that the lien ended at this point,
38
 the Lord President relying on a passage 
of Bell's Principles to the effect that the lien: 
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...is effectual for repairs made on a vessel in a home port. But ship-carpenters 
repairing a ship in an open harbour or roadstead have not the possession 




Once the ship had been released into the public dock, the position was as in the latter 
of Bell's examples. Bell's view here is open to criticism, and was not accepted by the 
court in Ross & Duncan v Baxter & Co,
40
 although as we saw in chapter 3 no lien 
was held to have been established in that case. The view was taken there that the 
location of the ship was just one factor to be considered. This must be correct: while 
it may be easier to establish possession of items in one's own premises, given the 
higher degree of control that that implies, there seems to be no reason in principle 
why one may not satisfy the physical element of possession where an item is in a 
public place. 
 However, even accepting Bell's view, it is not clear that the Inner House 
decision in Cooper v Barr and Shearer necessarily follows from it. The Lord 
President's view does not distinguish sufficiently the acquisition of possession from 
its retention. It may or may not be that repairs made in a public dock represent 
insufficient acts to give possession, but it does not follow from that that such acts are 
insufficient to retain possession. 
 There was, however, a second basis for the decision. Throughout the carrying 
out of the repair work, employees of the shipowner were present for security 
purposes and, once the ship had been moved out into the public dock, to supervise 
any movements of the ship within the dock. Furthermore, once the ship was in the 
public dock, it came under the authority of the harbourmaster, who could (and indeed 
did) instruct that the ship be moved within the public dock. The ship, therefore, it 
was held by the Lord President and Lord Deas, was no longer in the custody of the 
repairer once it had entered the public dock. Instead, the ship was 'under the orders of 
her master and the harbour-master'.
41
 
 This decision was, however, reversed by the House of Lords on the basis that 
the ship was moved into the public dock solely for the convenience of the repairer, 
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who did not thereby lose possession. Repairs were still continuing. Unfortunately, no 
authority is cited by the judges in the House of Lords, except for a single reference to 
an English textbook. However, the decision seems correct in principle. It does not 
appear relevant that the ship was under the authority of the harbourmaster, because 
the same was true of all ships in the harbour. Accordingly, to hold that possession 
had been lost on the basis of that authority would be to hold the same for any ship in 
the harbour. In the same way, I do not lose possession of my car just because, while I 
am driving, my control is subject to directions given by the police and other 
authorised persons. We see this in Ross v Earl of Nidsdale.
42
 Although that case is 
concerned with possession of land, it illustrates the general point.  In that case, the 
pursuer was excluded from the subjects on account of their being occupied by a 
military garrison. On their departure, the defender took up occupation. In an action 
for intrusion, the pursuer successfully argued that he had not lost possession, as he 
had not left voluntarily, but only 'in obedience of a public order'. The acts of the 
public authority, therefore, were not a barrier to continued possession. That being the 
case, it would seem difficult to argue that merely potential acts of a public authority 
interfere with possession. Again, the presence of the shipowner's employees did not 
affect the repairer's possession, as they were not exercising control over the ship, any 
more than were the repairer's employees in the South African case Cape Tex 
Engineering Words (Pty) Ltd v SAB Lines (Pty) Ltd,
43
 discussed in chapter 2. It is 
suggested here that the position of the Common Law writers should be accepted as 
correct for Scots law, and that the mere likelihood of interference with possession 
should not result in the loss of possession. The contrary position would create 
difficulties in practice. Illustration may be found in a different area of law, the law of 
delict. In Hughes v Lord Advocate,
44
 a group of workmen were working on cables 
beneath a public road, access to which was taken by means of a manhole. The 
workmen went on a tea break, leaving the open manhole covered by a tent 
surrounded by four paraffin warning lamps. Two boys took one of the lamps and 
entered the tent. This was said to be foreseeable, even though the workmen were 
away for only fifteen minutes. Indeed, this does not seem to have been disputed: the 
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point of dispute was whether the accident that did occur (an explosion of the lamp) 
was of a type that was foreseeable. Of course, this is a different area of law, in which 
different standards may apply. Nonetheless, it makes the point that one may almost 
always foresee interference with the property where it is not actually under direct 
present control. If foreseeable interference ended possession, possession could hardly 
exist without constant and direct physical control. As we have seen, any such 




Based on the foregoing discussion, it is suggested that the law on loss of possession 
by loss of corpus may be summarised as follows. 
 First, possession is not lost by mere absence, unless the nature and duration of 
the absence is such that, in the circumstances, loss of animus may be inferred. This is 
the case even where the absence is caused by some external factor preventing the 
possessor's return, and even where the animus is not in fact lost. 
 Second, possession is not affected by the likelihood of another's interference 
in that possession. It is only actual interference with that possession that will affect it. 
 Third, possession will be lost if the item is lost beyond recovery by normal 
searching. This will be the case even if the item is lost within the possessor's own 
sphere of control. Equally, possession will still be lost even if the item is recoverable 
by extraordinary means. 
 In all other cases, possession will be retained unless and until another person 
interferes with the possession or animus possidendi is lost. 
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If I have only momentary control of an item, do I meet the requirements for the 
physical element of possession? The suggestion would be that someone who only 
comes into momentary contact with an object has exercised no real degree of control 
over that object. This is an issue to which very little consideration has been given, 
either in cases or in juristic literature. The issue does not seem to have attracted the 
attention of the Roman jurists or those of the ius commune. Nonetheless, the issue is 
a real one, particularly where the criminal law penalises possession of a prohibited 
item. Does merely momentary control justify the application of the prescribed 
penalty? The issue may also arise in the context of delivery, where the transferee is 
only given control momentarily. In one American case, considered below, the issue 
arose in the context of occupatio, where there were competing claimants to the 
property. It does not appear to have come under consideration in relation to the 
possessory remedies, but it conceivably could: if what I have done is sufficient to 
give me possession, then as we have seen I remain in possession until possession is 
lost. 
 Using a sporting analogy, Kocourek makes a distinction in the following 
terms: 
 
The player who strikes a ball in motion does not detain the ball, but the player 





Kocourek appears to be saying that the player who catches the ball has done enough 
to possess, because he has exercised control ('detention', as Kocourek puts it), even 
though only very briefly. The batter, on the other hand, has exercised no control. 
 It is far from clear that Kocourek's example convinces, if he is taken to mean 
that very brief contact will necessarily be insufficient for possession. The batter in a 
baseball game is not hitting the ball aimlessly, or at least not if he is an expert. He is 
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attempting to direct the ball. Of course, the batter in a baseball game, or the batsman 
in a game of cricket, is not trying to play the ball to a teammate. In a game of 
football, on the other hand, the ball is played between teammates. A skilled player 
may direct the ball to a teammate with a single touch. As long as these passes find 
players in the same team, normal sporting usage would be to say that that team had 
possession, even though individual players had had no greater contact than does a 
batter in baseball. Of course, this is not possession in the legal sense, the players 
lacking the necessary animus for such possession. Nonetheless, the sporting usage 
seems to be based on the idea of physical control of the ball, an idea it shares with 
the legal meaning of possession. Likewise, suppose that a hunter shoots a bird in the 
air, which then falls dead at his feet. He has had in fact no direct physical contact 
with the bird at all, and his interaction with it has lasted only as long as it took for the 
pellets to pass through the bird's body. Nonetheless, it would not seem unreasonable 
to hold the hunter to have acquired possession (and therefore ownership, if the bird is 
ownerless).
2
 Rather than being obliged to discount very brief periods of contact, the 
better view would appear to be that it is not the duration of the contact that is 
decisive in and of itself. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the true question is 
whether enough has been done to establish sufficient control to qualify as a 
possessor. 
 The remainder of this chapter will consider the specific contexts in which this 
issue has arisen. The structure adopted here differs from that in other chapters in that 
the criminal law is treated separately. The reason for this is that most of the cases in 
which the momentary control issue arises are criminal cases, of sufficient numbers 
that it conceivable that a distinctive approach to the matter has been developed. In 
order to determine whether this is the case, it is necessary to consider them 
separately. This contrasts with the other chapters, where the proportion of criminal 
cases is lower. 
 The non-criminal consideration of the issue falls into two categories: the 
transfer or constitution of real rights by delivery and acquisition of ownership by 
occupatio. The latter of these has only been directly considered, so far as can be 
detected, in a single American case. The uniqueness of this case demands separate 
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consideration, so it is reserved for last. No case has been found where a question of 




Hume appears to be the only one of the early Scottish writers to have given attention 
to this issue, in his case in the context of delivery of corporeal moveable property: 
 
[I]t is not sufficient to have a mere transient or momentary possession, 
although by corporeal touch of the article, if it is taken for the occasion 
only...Thus the purchaser of a carriage does not vest the property by getting 
into it for an instant in the coach-builder's yard, and closing the door on him. 
The property of a horse does not pass by virtue of laying hold of the halter, or 




Hume does not appear here to exclude entirely the possibility that a brief contact may 
be enough. What he is talking about is contact made 'for the occasion only', where 
'no other or farther change ensue'. In other words, he is considering the situation 
where the momentary control is taken for the purposes of a fictitious delivery, 
intended presumably to protect the transferee against the transferor's creditors. A 
genuine attempt to change possession, even if involving only brief control, will be 
sufficient as long as it is sufficient to demonstrate the transferee's intention to take 
possession. 
 Three cases illustrate this point. In Taylor v Jack,
4
 an individual obtained the 
money necessary to obtain liberation from imprisonment for debt by selling his 
horses to another. For the purposes of delivery, the buyer briefly took hold of the 
horses' ears and then left the horses in the custody of the seller. When a creditor of 
the seller subsequently attempted to poind the horses, it was held that the buyer's 
actions had been insufficient to constitute delivery. 
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 Stiven v Cowan
5
 was decided in the same way. In this case, there was 
similarly an attempt to make delivery from one party to another followed by a return 
of the goods shortly afterwards. In this case, an individual (W) had acquired a lease 
of a mill with the assistance of the defenders as cautioners for a loan of part of the 
purchase price. Intending to give the defenders security for this potential liability, W 
granted an assignation of the lease to the defenders on 28th April 1873. On 2nd May, 
W closed the premises and delivered the key to the defenders' solicitor to hold on 
their behalf. The following day, a Saturday, W, the solicitor and one of the defenders 
attended the premises. The defender who was present then formally required W to 
deliver possession. The key was then handed over to the defender. A notarial 
instrument was drawn up detailing these events. Later that day, the defenders granted 
a sub-lease to W, to whom the keys were returned on the evening of 4th May. 
Business resumed as normal on Monday 5th May. This elaborate procedure was 
designed to operate as a delivery of the moveables within the mill. Nonetheless, on 
W's subsequent sequestration, it was held insufficient. 
We may compare Eadie v Young.
6
 This case concerned a conveyance of 
horses and carts. As with Taylor v Jack, the purpose of the sale was to relieve the 
seller's indebtedness. The transferee only briefly took control before giving custody 
back to the transferor. The court held that there was a valid delivery here. 
How can we distinguish these cases? In all of them, the transferee had only 
brief contact with the property before returning it to the transferor. In Eadie v Young 
and Taylor v Jack, the transaction had the same purpose: not to allow the transferee 
to have the property, but to relieve the transferor's indebtedness.
7
 Indeed, it is 
expressly stated in the report of Eadie v Young that the transferee had no present use 
for the horses and carts. In Stiven v Cowan, the intention was the similar one of 
giving a creditor security for a debt owed by the transferor. This was recognised by 
the court as a legitimate purpose. 
We may note that, in Taylor v Jack, the court did not in fact reach its decision 
on the basis of insufficient acts for possession by the transferee. Rather, the ground 
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for the decision was that the transaction was collusive, rather than a genuine sale. 
Again, in Stiven v Cowan, the difficulty was not that there had been insufficient acts 
for a delivery, but that the transaction was 'simulate'. There was no genuine intention 
for possession to be given to the defenders. It was noted that no rent was paid to the 
defenders as landlords in the apparent sub-lease. These are therefore cases of the type 
mentioned by Hume, where the momentary control 'is taken for the occasion only', 
where there is no 'farther change' in the condition of the property. It is certainly true 
that, where there is an apparent sale but the property but the transferor is allowed to 
retain the property, the suspicion is bound to arise that the sale is not a genuine one, 
unless other circumstances exist that explain the fact. 
The most obvious form of 'farther change' will be the property moving into 
the permanent natural possession of the transferee, with the transferor retaining no 
further relationship with the property, but there are other possibilities. There were 
two further circumstances demonstrating the genuineness of the transaction. In the 
first place, the carts were marked with the transferee's name. As Hume puts it in his 
commentary at the end of his report of the case, this constituted an 'open and 
unqualified assertion of [the transferee's] jus dominii in these articles, and put all the 
lieges on their guard in that respect'.
8
 This is consistent with the position taken in 
chapter 3 that the physical element of possession is constituted by acts constituting 
an assertion of right to the property. As we shall see in chapter 6, however, it does 
not appear that marking the goods in this way is sufficient in itself for delivery. 
Instead, it is to be seen more as an indication of the genuineness of the transaction. 
The second point of distinction between Taylor v Jack and Eadie v Young is 
that, in the former, there was no apparent basis for handing the property back to the 
transferor. By contrast, in Eadie v Young, the basis on which the property was 
handed back to the transferor was a genuine hire agreement. In fact, this 
circumstance would perhaps have been enough on its own for a valid delivery by 
constitutum possessorium,
9
 which means, of course, that there would have been 
sufficient for delivery without even the brief control that was exercised by the buyer. 
Indeed, Gordon considers the case as an example of constitutum possessorium, 
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without reference to the fact that the buyer did briefly take actual control.
10
 In the 
case of Stiven v Cowan, there was an attempt to create an apparent basis for the 
handing back of the property, in the form of the sub-lease, but the failure to demand 
payment of rent showed this not to be a genuine sub-lease. 
If, indeed, there was sufficient in Eadie v Young for delivery by constitutum 
possessorium, even without the brief contact that the transferee had, then that brief 
contact added nothing. Accordingly, it is difficult to judge from this case whether 
momentary control will be sufficient for possession. Likewise, in Taylor v Jack, the 
basis of the decision was not that there had been insufficient physical acts for 
delivery, but that the transaction was a collusive arrangement rather than a genuine 
sale. Even leaving aside the physical requirements of possession, the transferee had 
no animus possidendi. Again, therefore, it is difficult to infer from this case any 
general principle regarding the physical acts required for possession. 
If the physical element of possession is based on control, then as long as a 
person may be said to be in control there seems no reason to deny the effectiveness 
of that control to give possession, even if the control has been brief. If, as has been 
suggested, the physical element of possession is intended to give an objective 
impression of possession to third parties, it must be judged as it appears to third 
parties. The view taken cannot be coloured by subsequent events. An individual 
chancing upon the apparent sale in Taylor v Jack would see the buyer appear to 
assert a right to the horses. In the context, no other interpretation would be possible 
on the outward facts and, if the sale had been genuine, delivery would have been held 
to have occurred at that moment. It would only be when the seller was allowed to 
take the horses away, rather than leaving them with the buyer, that this hypothetical 
onlooker would suspect that the transaction was not genuine and the parties did not 
in fact have the necessary intention to give possession to the apparent buyer. 
However, this suspicion would equally arise if the horse was returned an hour or a 
day later. Nonetheless, it can hardly be contended that one does not possess until one 
has controlled the property sufficiently long to eliminate any suspicion that the 
transaction is a sham. It may be noted here that, in Stiven v Cowan, the period for 
which W handed over control of the key was longer, lasting for two days, but this 
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was nonetheless held to be a sham. The issue is not directly therefore the length of 
time for which the transferee holds the property so much as what that circumstance 
tells us about the parties' intentions. In appropriate circumstances, very brief control 
may be sufficient. For example, in Gauld v Middleton,
11
 it was held sufficient for a 
gift of a newborn calf by a farmer to an employee for the employee to take the calf 
briefly in his arms before returning it to its mother. In this case, there were 
intelligible and legitimate reasons for doing this: the farmer was also making a gift of 
care of the calf, which it would have been impossible to take advantage of in any 
other way. Equally, had the employee decided not to accept this second gift, he 
would presumably not have been prevented from walking away with the calf. This 
case is therefore unlike Stiven v Cowan and Taylor v Jack, where the 'delivery' was 
merely a collusive device. 
This leads to the conclusion that one will satisfy the physical element of 
possession as soon as one has sufficient control to meet the test proposed in chapter 
3. Some further examples may assist. Suppose that I am buying an ice cream cone 
from an ice cream van. As I take hold of the cone, a gust of wind blows it from my 
hand (without fault on anyone's part) and it is spoiled on the ground. Who bears the 
loss of this event? In this case, risk passes on delivery,
12
 which means in this context 
a voluntary transfer of possession.
13
 It seems clear in this case that I bear the risk as 
soon as I take the cone in my hand. At this point, the seller has fulfilled all of his 
obligations, and the transaction is at an end. In any case, the seller can scarcely be 
said still to possess once the cone has left his hand and is in mine. This is the case 
even if the gust of wind occurs a fraction of a second after I take the cone in my 
hand. During that fraction of a second I appeared to any objective bystander to have 
taken possession. On the other hand, if the cone is dropped while it is the process of 
being handed over, I do not have that level of control. Likewise, if an item I am 
buying is taken from me just after I take it in my hand, it would seem unreasonable 
to deny me an action for spuilzie against the person taking the property. This is 
especially so on the assumption that the seller has at this point fulfilled his 
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obligations, and so I have no remedy against him for failure to deliver the goods to 
me. Again, suppose that I intend to acquire ownership of an item of ownerless 
property by occupatio. If the property is both small and inanimate, no bystander 
would expect more of me than merely to pick it up. If it happens that, as I pick it up, 
I am intentionally or accidentally pushed, with the result that I drop the thing, is my 
control then ineffective to give possession, even though it would have been sufficient 
but for the push? This final point is considered further in part D, below. 
 




Most reported cases of this kind arise in the criminal law, in the context of offences 
of possession of prohibited items. With the criminal cases, there is an additional 
complication that the cases are concerned with statutes, such as the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971, applying to the United Kingdom in general. Given relative populations, it 
is always likely that the bulk of such cases will be English in origin. Where such a 
case is concerned with the definition of possession for the purposes of the relevant 
legislation, it is likely that an English court will draw on the general English law of 
possession.
14
 Such cases will then be cited before the Scottish courts.
15
 No doubt it is 
desirable for UK-wide statutes to have the same meaning in both Scotland and 
England, though where the statute draws on a concept of the general law, such as 
possession, it is not obvious why that meaning need be the one existing in English 
law. However that may be, though, it does mean that criminal cases require to be 
used with greater caution when considering what they can tell us about possession 
generally. Even where a statutory offence is concerned, it has always been open to 
the Scottish courts to decline to follow an English House of Lords appeal on the 
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 This was justified in Dalgleish v Glasgow Corporation
17
 on the basis 
that the High Court of Justiciary was the final court of appeal in criminal matters, so 
the House of Lords was not a higher court in this context, capable of binding it.
18
 
Even were that not so, the different contexts of Scots and English law may 
reasonably lead to a UK statute being interpreted differently in the two 
jurisdictions,
19
 as for example where the statute relies on a concept of general law, 
such as possession.  This is not to deny that English cases can be of use, but it does 
mean that it is necessary to consider the Scots cases in this wider context. English 
cases will need to be considered. 
 
(2) Scottish cases concerning statutory offences 
 
The only Scottish case directly on the issue appears to be Mackay v Hogg.
20
 In this 
case, the police appeared at a house occupied by a woman by the name of Burn. The 
purpose of the visit was to search for proscribed drugs. The appellant was found 
asleep on a couch in the living room, with his clothes on a chair next to the couch. A 
search of the chair and the clothes revealed nothing untoward. The cushion of the 
chair was then left on end to indicate that it had been searched. The search then 
continued. Subsequently, a quantity of illegal drugs was found on the seat cover, in 
circumstances suggesting that the appellant had moved the drugs there from some 
unknown place in the room. The court held that, in the context of the facts proved, 
there was insufficient here to justify a finding of possession. Stress was placed on the 
fact of the appellant having had the drugs in his hand for at most one or two seconds. 
It is not clear that Mackay v Hogg justifies the view that acquittal is inevitable 
in any case where the accused holds the prohibited item for a brief period only. 
Suppose that X takes hold of a package that he knows to contain an illegal drug, and 
which he has paid for, at the same moment that the police make an abrupt entrance. 
X panics and throws the package away. He may only have had hold of the package 
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for a second or two. Nonetheless, the circumstances are such as to appear to demand 
a conviction for possession of the drug. It would seem strange if X could improve his 
position by discarding the drug, given that his decision to do so was entirely induced 
by the entrance of the police. Mackay v Hogg does not appear to commit the courts to 
such a decision, and the case is therefore consistent with the 'assertion of right' theory 
of corpus. 
Another Scottish case, Croal v HM Advocate,
21
 may appear to be relevant 
here. The case was concerned with possession of proscribed drugs, the accused 
having been found in a cupboard in a common stair of a tenement building. Drugs 
had been found stored in the cupboard in a packet. As police officers were watching 
the cupboard, the accused could only have had momentary control of the packet 
before his apprehension. Nonetheless, it was held that there was 'no difference in 
principle between contact which was prolonged and that which was fleeting'.
22
 In 
fact, however, the packet that had contained the drugs had been replaced by the 
police with a dummy packet. Accordingly, the issue was whether the accused's brief 
control of the dummy packet could be used as evidence of previous possession of the 
real drugs. The issue, therefore, was not directly whether brief contact was sufficient 
for possession. Nonetheless, it was not disputed by the accused that possession of the 
dummy packet implied possession of the original packet. Accordingly, the statement 
that there was no difference in principle between prolonged and fleeting contact may 
be taken to have broader significance, as it appears to amount to a finding that the 
accused did possess the dummy packet. This is consistent with the view expressed in 
the previous paragraph. 
 
(3) Non-Scottish cases concerning statutory offences 
 
There are several English cases on this issue. Although the general English law is not 
necessarily the same as the general Scots law on a given point, these cases must be 
considered on the basis that they arise under statutes applying both to Scotland and to 
England. The English case R v Taylor
23
 has some similarity to Mackay v Hogg. 
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Taylor was concerned with possession of a prohibited firearm, contrary to section 
5(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. In this case, the evidence was that Taylor had noticed 
the firearm in a friend's bag while visiting the friend's flat, had taken it out briefly 
from curiosity to look at it, and then had returned it. The court held these facts to be 
insufficient for possession.  
In chapter 3, the suggestion was put forward that possession depended on 
holding in such a manner as to indicate the assertion of a right to possess. The 
decision in Taylor appears to be consistent with this: it is clear from the court's 
reasoning that the decision turned on Taylor's intentions. By putting the gun back 
immediately, and having nothing more to do with it, he had demonstrated that he 
lacked the necessary intention to exercise any control over the firearm beyond 
putting it back. The case therefore provides no authority for the view that a 
momentary holding may in no circumstances constitute possession. If, instead, the 
accused had taken the same length of time to fire the gun, it is difficult to believe that 
the outcome would not have been different. 
The English case R v Wright,
24
 however, may be seen as going further. In 
Wright, the appellant had been travelling in a car with three other men. On seeing 
that the car was being followed by a police car, one of his companions gave him a tin 
and asked him to throw it out of the window. The appellant did so, having the tin in 
his hands for only a few seconds. The tin contained a quantity of cannabis resin. The 
appellant's conviction for possession of the drug was quashed on appeal. However, 
the trial judge's direction to the jury that one could possess, despite having custody 
only briefly, was not challenged in the appeal. Instead, the decision turned on the 
requirement for knowledge of what was in the tin and the intention to possess. It was 
held that the jury ought to have been directed to acquit if they believed the 
appellant's story that he did not know what was in the tin. Had the jury been properly 
directed, however, it would have been open to them to convict notwithstanding the 
brief period of control. If the holding must be such as to assert a right to the property, 
then that is found in the act of disposal of the container. To dispose of a thing is to 
assert a right to dispose of it. Of course, in Wright, the appellant held entirely on 
another's behalf, ie on behalf of the companion who gave him the tin for disposal. As 
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possession in private law requires that the possessor hold for his own benefit,
25
 the 
appellant in Wright would not possess for private law purposes. It appears that the 
test for animus in the criminal law of possession of unlawful drugs is a less strict one, 
being merely 'knowledge of the existence of the substance and of its general 
nature'.
26
 This lesser test is implicit in Wright. However, the problem is in any case 
with animus rather than corpus. Even if the physical element of possession requires 
acts assertive of a right, those acts need not be carried out by the possessor himself, 
or else civil possession would be impossible. 
Arguments based on the assertion of right theory appear to have been 
successful in a number of cases in the USA from the Prohibition period. These cases 
concern the unlawful possession of alcohol. It has been held that one whose friend 
passes to him a bottle, so that he can take a drink from it, is not in possession of the 
contents of the bottle. The basis for this is that there is no assertion of right to the 
liquid that is not drunk.
27
 However, there can surely be no clearer assertion of right to 
a thing than its consumption. As far as concerns the liquid that has been drunk, 
possession seems clear, at least at the moment of consumption.
28
 An acquittal in such 
a case may reflect a feeling on the part of the court that the accused has not acted in a 
way that is particularly morally objectionable. However, unless the mere presence of 
an item is harmful, which is not the case with drugs or alcohol, it is difficult to see 
why a legislature would prohibit possession of a substance other than that its use was 
thought to be undesirable. Given that, it is difficult to see any justification for a 
difference of treatment between one who takes the banned substance from a friend 
for immediate use, then handing it back, and one who takes a portion for later use. 
Certainly, it would be open to a court to reject any such distinction. 
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Another English case, Hobson v Impett,
29
 is similar to Mackay v Hogg and to R v 
Wright. In Hobson, it was held on appeal that helping a thief to load stolen goods 
into a car did not justify conviction for receiving stolen goods, even though the 
appellant knew that the goods were stolen. Bovey refers to this case as 'consistent 
with' Mackay v Hogg.
30
 It must be noted, however, that the conviction was not 
quashed for lack of possession. Indeed, the appeal court was fully satisfied that 
conviction was appropriate on the facts proved. The difficulty was that the offence 
with which the case was concerned was one of receiving stolen property,
31
 rather 
than merely possessing it. The view of the lower court, that the accused had 
sufficient control over the goods to possess them, was not criticised in the appeal 
court. However, it was held that one could not receive stolen property where, as here, 
it was still in the possession of another, unless co-possession could be shown. One 
who merely helps another to move an item does not possess. 
If this were the law in the equivalent Scots offence of reset, it would be most 
unfortunate. In fact, however, it seems that one who has the goods even for a brief 
moment may properly be convicted of reset.
32
 Alison refers to an unreported case 
where fleeing thieves rushed into a lodger's room and hurriedly deposited the stolen 
goods on her bed. The lodger covered the goods up and immediately jumped from 
the window, whereupon she was apprehended. It was held that these facts were 
sufficient to justify the lodger's conviction for reset.
33
 Conviction does indeed seem 
entirely justified, given that the lodger was intending to conceal the stolen goods just 
as much as if she had taken longer over the matter. The fact that she hurried over the 
concealment merely means that the concealment was less likely to be successful, but 
criminal acts are hardly to be excused on the basis that they were incompetently 
carried out. One who knowingly handles stolen goods impedes the legitimate aims of 
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the criminal law, regardless of the duration of the handling. This leads again to the 
conclusion that, assuming a minimal level of control may be demonstrated, the 
duration of that control should only be considered relevant for the purposes of the 
criminal law insofar as it sheds light on the intention with which that control was 
exercised. 
 




The most in-depth consideration of this issue came in the Californian case Popov v 
Hayashi
34
 and the literature inspired by it. The case is notable for being what must be 
almost unique: a case on occupatio that is not concerned with animals.
35
 Its difficulty 
was such that the court sought the opinion of a panel of professors of property law.  
 
(2) Facts of the case 
 
In Popov v Hayashi, P and H were both spectators at a baseball game. It had been 
anticipated that a particular player would break an existing record for home runs 
during this game. P and H, as well as others in the stadium, were keen to catch the 
record-breaking ball, as it was anticipated that the ball would have a considerable 
resale value, perhaps in excess of $1,000,000. Both P and H had come equipped with 
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baseball gloves to assist them in catching the ball if it should come their way. It was 
accepted in the court proceedings that, when the ball was hit into the crowd, it was 
open to acquisition by the first to take possession. 
 In fact, the record was broken, and the baseball came into the area where P 
and H were standing. P caught the ball in his glove, where it remained for about 0.6 
seconds according to the evidence of video footage. However, at this point P was 
violently assaulted by other spectators who also wanted the ball. During the struggle, 
the ball fell from P's glove, and was picked up by H. The parties disputed who had 
acquired ownership. 
 
(3) The decision 
 
It was agreed by both parties that the ball was ownerless when it entered the crowd. 
Accordingly, ownership would be acquired by the first to take possession. The court 
accepted that the appropriate test was 'complete control', based in part on the 'custom 
and practice' of baseball, it being apparently the case that the view among baseball 
fans that this level of control was required.
36
 No doubt the decision on this point 
could be defended on the basis of reflecting a general rule that possession of things 
that are easier to control requires a higher level of control. On this view, more 
complete control of the baseball would be required for possession because its small 
size makes it easier to control, compared with less portable property. As we have 
seen in chapter 3, this is a common view of the matter. Indeed, the court did proceed 
in part on this basis. Where the court's view becomes problematic is in allowing 'the 
custom and practice of each industry' to influence matters. Given that the custom and 
practice of a given industry will be known only to initiates of that industry, this is 
unacceptably vague, especially given that occupatio creates real rights, thus affecting 
third parties. This is not a case of contracts being interpreted according to industry 
practices which, while it may create difficulties in proving the practices in question, 
at least only affects those who are in the relevant industry. Where a custom 
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potentially affects third parties, that is a good reason for denying legal effect to the 
custom unless it is generally known.
37
 
 On the evidence before the court, the judge felt unable to conclude that P 
would have kept control of the ball but for the actions of the mob.
38
 Accordingly, the 
court was unable to hold P to have acquired ownership. The expected outcome would 
then be that H would be held to have acquired ownership. However, the court took 
the view that to award ownership to H would be in some sense to approve the 
criminal actions of the other spectators, by allowing them to influence the outcome. 
Accordingly, a different solution was sought. Happily for the court, it found itself 
able to take the view that, as a 'court sitting in equity', it had 'the authority to fashion 
rules and remedies designed to achieve fundamental aims'. Accordingly, the court 
adopted the following rule: 
 
Where an actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve 
possession of a piece of abandoned personal property and the effort is 
interrupted by the unlawful acts of others, the actor  has a legally cognizable 
pre-possessory interest in the property. That pre-possessory interest 
constitutes a qualified right to possession which can support a cause of action 
for conversion. 
 
It is not clear what the nature of this 'pre-possessory interest' is.
39
 Apparently it is a 
right to possess, but takes us very little of the way forward. One would expect that 
this right would either be enforceable against H, in which case P would get the ball, 
or it would not be, in which case victory would go to H. Instead, the court took the 
view that, both parties having 'a superior claim to the ball as against all the world', 
the ball should be divided between them.
40
 This outcome, described by one 
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commentator as representing an 'unabashed disregard of custom and common law 
precedent',
41
 was viewed by the court as the fairest outcome. In reaching this view, 
the judge was influenced by an article by Helmholz.
42
 Helmholz, however, is 
concerned with a quite different situation, namely the finding of lost or mislaid 
property, and in particular the difficult distinction between lost property, to which the 
finder is entitled, and mislaid property, which is given to the owner of the place in 
which the property is found. Holding that this distinction is artificial and is applied in 
a manner that is inconsistent and unpredictable, Helmholz argues that it would be 
more appropriate to divide the property between them. These considerations do not 
apply to the baseball in Popov, which was neither lost nor mislaid,
43
 but which was 
ownerless property free to the first possessor. 
 
(4) Popov and Scots law 
 
In Popov, the judge took the view that: 
 
An award of the ball to Mr Popov would be unfair to Mr Hayashi. It would be 
premised on the assumption that Mr Popov would have caught the ball. That 
assumption is not supported by the facts. An award of the ball to Mr Hayashi 
would unfairly penalize Mr Popov. It would be based on the assumption that 
Mr Popov would have dropped the ball. That conclusion is also unsupported 
by the facts. 
 
This seems rather a dereliction of the court's duty to determine the facts. This duty 
does not cease merely because the job becomes difficult. Part of the court's job is to 
determine the facts. If a fact cannot be proved to the required standard, then it is 
regarded as not being proved and it is left out of account. If, after this process is 
complete, the party bearing the burden of proof has not proved sufficient facts to win 
the case, then he loses the case. This outcome is only unfair to P if he did in fact have 
enough control, a fact which ex hypothesi is unknowable. We do not, therefore, know 
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whether an outcome in favour of P would be unfair to H or vice versa. No doubt it 
would be possible to approach uncertain facts on a basis of 'splitting the difference', 
but this would be a radically different approach from the conventional one in both 
Civilian and Common Law traditions, and so ought to be introduced only after 
lengthy debate rather than judicial fiat. If, therefore, a similar issue came before a 
Scots court, it is recommended that the court not follow Popov in dividing the 
property between the parties. 
 The same must go for the concept of the 'pre-possessory interest'. Even were 
it possible to construct a basis for this in Scots law – after all, in Helmholz's article 
he notes that the 'equitable division' approach was used in Roman law in certain 
circumstances
44
 – it would create an unacceptable level of uncertainty. This 
uncertainty exists both in the nature of the pre-possessory interest and what must be 
done to acquire one, and also in who has one given the uncertainty of the facts. For 
all that is known, in Popov there were others in the scrum who had committed no 
illegal act, and who had also made sufficient attempt to get the ball to qualify for a 
pre-possessory interest and, therefore, a share of the ball. Cieslik observes that:  
 
Because of the velocity at which a baseball travels, arguably a fan will rarely 
catch a foul ball without someone else stopping its momentum first...now it is 
likely that anyone who puts his hands on a baseball will initiate a lawsuit, 




This is hardly a satisfactory outcome. 
 There remains to be considered the test for possession that was adopted by 
the court in Popov. It has already been suggested above that the court's approach 
involves an unacceptable level of uncertainty in allowing individual groups of people 
to set their own test. However, even accepting the test adopted in this case is 
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problematic for, notwithstanding the views of certain writers,
46
 the decision does 
nothing to reduce the risk of violence. One writer has observed that: 
 
Essentially, one million dollars was being thrown into the crowd that day, and 
reasonable people did what reasonable people do - they put their life and limb 
in jeopardy for the chance of becoming a millionaire. Thus, anyone who 




The suggestion that the other spectators in Popov v Hayashi acted reasonably, which 
is apparently offered in all seriousness, may strike many as remarkable. Nonetheless, 
if such conduct is to be expected, it seems to demand the award of ownership by 
occupatio on the basis of as lenient a test of possession as possible. The decision in 
Popov does not do this and, as a consequence, offers incentives to violence: if it is 
open to A to get some right in the ball even after B has caught it, it is to A's benefit to 
see B dispossessed. No doubt some way could be found to deny any right to a 
forcible dispossessor, but this would perhaps be an exception easier to formulate than 
to apply in practice: the court in Popov noted that it was impossible to identify which 
members of the crowd had intended an assault on P, and which were merely carried 
with the crowd's momentum. Moreover, as Adomeit points out,
48
 it does not address 
the possibility of an arrangement between two or more spectators to divide the job: 
one or more will attack the initial catcher, and the remainder will attempt to get the 
ball. 
 The view taken here, therefore, is that in the circumstances of Popov a person 
should be held to satisfy the requirements for the physical element of possession as 
soon as he has established sufficient control to demonstrate that he claims the ball. 
This would require that it be possible to say that the ball has been caught: otherwise, 
the ball could not be said to be controlled at all. If the ball immediately bounces from 
the catcher's hand, it has not been caught and is not controlled.
49
 On the facts of 
Popov, this test would give possession and therefore ownership to P, especially given 
that violence was required to remove the ball from P's hand. It is accepted that this 
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approach comes at some cost to certainty. After all, as Stoklas points out,
50
 it will be 
rare that the events are caught on camera. However, at least this approach ensures 
that the dispute will be resolved in a civilised manner. If the choice is between a 
society in which disputes are resolved with difficulty but peacefully, and one in 
which they are resolved swiftly through violence, the former is the only rational 
choice. The decision in Popov promotes the undesirable aspects of both choices, by 
introducing uncertainty to the resolution of disputes and also by encouraging 
violence. A decision in favour of H would have promoted the second of the choices, 
encouraging violence but at least promoting certainty by giving ownership to the 
individual who emerged as clear winner from the struggle. It must be said, though, 
that the same demand for certainty that favours the final possessor over the initial 
taker must equally be balanced by an acceptance that it cannot be certain that that 
final possessor was not himself a party to the assault on the initial taker. 
Accordingly, even if a rule is adopted that prevents acquisition by a violent taker, the 
effectiveness of that rule in practice cannot be guaranteed. Stoklas suggests
51
 that a 
rule of the kind proposed here would not have the effect of discouraging violence, as 
it is human nature to attempt to seize control of that which appears open to seizure: 
 
In the Popov case, stating that a fan 'should have...the opportunity to try to 
complete his catch unimpeded by unlawful activity' will not cause fans to sit 




If the rule is reinforced by proper security arrangements, however, it may indeed 




It may be seen that, where an individual has only had direct control of the property 
for a brief moment, there may be difficulty in demonstrating that he has had 
sufficient control to be held to be in possession. However, there is insufficient in any 
of the areas looked at to conclude that this represents an insuperable obstacle to the 
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establishment of possession. The hypothesis put forward earlier therefore appears 
justified. The length of time one has had control for is only one factor to be 
considered. Certainly, in the criminal law and in any case where there is a 
competition to acquire possession there appears to be good reason to require very 
little in this regard. In the former case, the aims of the law may be frustrated if one is 
not held to possess who has clearly intended to exercise control and has acted on that 
intention. In the latter case, the risk of violence as in Popov v Hayashi appears to 
demand an early award of ownership. Any other solution encourages continued 
contentiousness. In the case of delivery, it is true, a momentary delivery followed by 
return may not be given effect to, but the problem there is not so much the 
momentary control but the suggestion that the delivery is not genuinely intended. As 
a question of principle, it is suggested that, where the control exercised has been such 
as to indicate a clear assertion of right, possession should not be denied solely on the 
basis that that control was momentary.
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6 ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION THROUGH SYMBOLICAL ACTS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER 
 
We have seen in chapter 2 what, as a general proposition, is required for the physical 
element of possession of corporeal moveable property. Specifically, we have seen 
that a certain degree of control is required before the property may be said to be 
possessed. However, it cannot be doubted that this will sometimes prove 
inconvenient. This is particularly likely to be the case with the common law 
requirement for delivery in the transfer of ownership of corporeal moveables. Where 
delivery is required, then until the goods are in my possession I am, of course, 
vulnerable to the transferor's insolvency or a conveyance to a third party.
1
 
Sometimes, however, it is necessary to leave the goods with the transferor for a time: 
if alterations have to be made, for example. Alternatively, it may merely be found 
convenient to do this. If possession is required in particular circumstances for the 
constitution or transfer of a real right, then it is likely that an attempt will be made to 
argue that possession is held by a party other than the one appearing to possess, if the 
alternative is that the property will be caught up in the insolvent estate of that party. 
 One way in which this may be attempted is the delivery of a symbol 
representing the property, in the place of the property itself, or through other acts that 
in some way symbolise a change of possession. For present purposes, symbolical 
acquisition of possession may be defined as involving a symbolical act as a substitute 
for actual physical control of the property. In the Scots authorities, as we shall see, 
the possibilities that have been considered involve a transferor retaining physical 
custody of goods but the goods being identified symbolically as the transferee's, 
either by the giving of a sample, the recording of the transfer in a document (with the 
document then being a symbol of the goods), or the marking of the goods. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether Scots law accepts such 
methods as effective for the acquisition of possession. It must be said from the 
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 This assumes that the third party is in good faith. If the third party is in bad faith, the conveyance to 
that party will be voidable as an 'offside goal': Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483; 
Marshall v Hynd (1828) 6 S 384. If the third party is in good faith, the conveyance will be beyond 




outset, however, that the consideration that has previously been given to this issue 
has been exclusively, or almost exclusively, directed at delivery for the purposes of 
transfer of ownership or (to a lesser extent) the creation of a right of pledge. There 
has been no attempt to consider how discussion of symbolical acquisition of 
possession fits into the law of possession generally. To some extent, this is 
understandable: one who dispossesses me of a mere symbol has dispossessed me of 
something of no intrinsic value; the property the symbol represents is unaffected. 
Even if the symbol is valuable in and of itself, it is clearly possessed and so can be 
recovered on that basis. However, one can conceive of situations where questions of 
possession by symbolical means would become relevant outside of the context of 
transfer of ownership by delivery. For example, suppose that there is an agreement to 
sell a cow. Some attempt at symbolical delivery to the transferee is made, perhaps by 
the transferee branding the cow, but actual custody of the cow is retained by the 
seller until payment is made. In the interim, the cow becomes pregnant and gives 
birth to a calf. It then emerges that the transferor was not the owner of the cow. 
Assuming bona fide belief in ownership, the possessor of the cow will be entitled to 
the calf as a fruit of the cow,
2
 but who is the possessor of the cow? The answer to 
this question will turn on the effectiveness of the symbolical delivery in giving the 
transferee possession. Again, is someone in possession of a substance whose 
possession is prohibited by the criminal law where only symbolical acts have been 
carried out, such as marking the substance as belonging to a particular individual? 
Some consideration must also, therefore, be given to whether the conclusions to be 
reached on symbolical delivery hold true likewise for the acquisition of possession 
generally. 
 It will become apparent below that the term 'symbolical delivery' has on 
occasion been used fairly broadly. The first task is to determine the meaning of the 
term. For present purposes, possession is said to have been acquired symbolically 
where it has been acquired by symbolical means alone, without any physical 
relationship with the property, either direct or indirect. In other words, the symbolical 
acts operate as a substitute for the normal requirement for physical control. This does 
                                   
2
 On the right of a possessor in good faith to the fruits of the property, see chapter 1. Stair, Inst. 2,1,24 
makes it clear that this applies equally to fruits of corporeal moveable property (such as the young of 
animals) as to the fruits of heritable property. 
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not include any case where the 'symbol' gives of itself actual control, either to the 
holder of the symbol or through another person. We are not concerned with any case 
where the acts carried out would be sufficient for constitutum possessorium if the 
symbolical element were removed. Nor is symbolical acquisition of possession to be 
taken to include any case where the law allows a symbol to be given as a substitute 
for possession. In particular, it is necessary to exclude several areas where confusion 
may arise on this point. These areas will be considered in the following section, so 
that the remainder of the chapter may consider, on a basis of clarity as to the meaning 
of the term, whether symbolical delivery is accepted in Scots law. 
 It should be stressed also that we are concerned here only with the means of 
acquiring possession. Possession can only be acquired through symbolical acts to the 
same extent that the consequences of this are the same as with possession acquired 
by conventional means. The result of a successful symbolical acquisition of 
possession will be that the acquirer will possess either naturally or civilly, depending 
on whether custody or natural possession is retained by another, with all the 
consequences entailed thereby. An example of an acquisition of civil possession by 
symbolical means would be the case of a transferor retaining goods but marking 
them with the transferee's mark, because possession would then be held by the 
transferee through the transferor's act. An example of natural possession would be 
animals branded with the acquirer's mark but left to roam, because in this case 
possession would have been acquired by the acquirer's own act.
3
 This assumes, of 
course, that these are valid methods of acquiring possession, which remains to be 
seen. 
 
B. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT CHAPTER 
 
Symbolical acquisition of possession has been defined as possession taken by 
symbolical means rather than through actual physical control, whether by the 
possessor himself or through an agent. As we shall see in this section, there are 
several cases where there may in some sense be said to have acquired possession 
symbolically, but which do not in fact fit within the present definition. This will 
                                   
3
 This latter example will be considered, in light of the discussion in this chapter, in chapter 7. 
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either be because the 'symbolical' acts are in fact sufficient to give actual control of 
the property, or because the symbol is in fact being allowed as a substitute for 
possession itself. Alternatively, it may be that a particular rule allows symbolical 
acquisition of possession for some special purpose. We are not concerned here with 
such matters. We are concerned only with the question of whether, as a general point 
in the law of possession, the requirements of the physical element of possession may 
be satisfied by symbolical means. As we shall see, the definition of symbolical 
acquisition of possession that is adopted here is narrower than is sometimes found. 
Certain cases that have been said to involve symbolical delivery are excluded under 
the present definition. We begin, therefore, by considering the nature of these 
exclusions. We shall then be in a position to consider the general question. 
  
(1) Delivery of keys 
 
One of the main examples of alleged symbolical acquisition of possession is that 
which is acquired by the delivery of keys. The situation is that the goods to be 
transferred are stored in some locked repository, such as a warehouse. Instead of 
removing the goods from the repository for delivery directly into the hands of the 
transferee, the transferor hands the key to the transferee. This was a competent form 
of delivery in Roman law, known as traditio clavium.
4
 As we shall see, this form of 
delivery has also been accepted in Scots law. The same idea could find modern 
application also in the case of delivery of a car key as sufficient delivery of a car.
5
 
On one analysis of the traditio clavium, the key is taken to be a mere symbol of the 
goods transferred. As Pothier puts it, this is delivery of 'non la chose même, mais 
quelque chose qui la représente'.
6
 
 We are concerned then with the argument that the delivery of a key has 
significance beyond the mere giving of control, that it in some sense represents the 
goods. If the key is merely a symbol representing the goods, then it is delivery of the 
key that is the issue. Control of the goods is, at best, secondary.  
                                   
4
 Gaius, D.41.1.9.6; Paul, D.41.2.1.21. 
5
 This appears to be sufficient for possession in French law: Cashin Ritaine, 'Transfer of Movables in 
France' 54. 
6
 Pothier, Propriété, para 200 ('not the thing itself, but something that represents it'). 
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As Savigny points out, a key may be a symbol. The example he gives is the 
delivery of the keys to a city to the sovereign on his entrance.
7
 Such delivery does 
not suffice to give the sovereign actual control of the city, but merely symbolises that 
control. There is, however, a more common use for a key, namely to open a lock: in 
other words, to give access to the property that is protected by the lock.
8
 
It is perhaps this double meaning that leads one text to describe traditio 
clavium as a 'symbolical delivery' in which 'the transferor supplies the transferee with 
the means which will enable the latter to deal with the property'.
9
 This seems to 
confuse the key's role as a symbol with its role in giving actual control, for the key 
does, in normal circumstances, give actual control of goods kept locked away, at 
least if it is the only key.
10
 If the key gives the transferee sufficient control for 
possession, the key ceases to be a mere symbol. Confusion of the same kind may be 
seen in Pufendorf, where he holds that possession requires: 
 
...physical contact with a thing, or that symbol of it, or an instrument of 
custody, according as the nature of the thing allows, and with the effect that 




For Scots law, Bankton appears to be referring to traditio clavium when he talks of: 
 
...symbolical delivery of moveables, when, in place of the things themselves, 
a symbol is delivered; but, if the deliverer continues in possession, the 
property, or other real right, does not pass to the receiver...but, if together 
with the symbol, power and liberty is given to the receiver to take possession, 




For all of these views, the problem is this: if what has been delivered is merely a 
symbol, how can it put the property under the transferee's power? Likewise, if the 
                                   
7
 Savigny, Possession 157-58. This occurs, for example, when the monarch visits Edinburgh: 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/RoyalEventsandCeremonies/HolyroodWeek/HolyroodWeek.aspx. 
8
 Savigny, Possession 157-158. 
9
 Silberberg & Schoeman 181. 
10
 Bell (Commentaries, 1,186-187) allows this as valid delivery even where there is another key 
allowing the transferor to continue to take access to the goods. For the position in English law see 
Gough v Everard (1863) 159 ER 1, and also Pettit, 'Personal Property', para 1254; Salmond on 
Jurisprudence 287; Pollock & Wright, Possession 60-70, especially 68-69, where the same view is 
taken as Bell of the issue of duplicate keys. See chapter 2 for discussion.  
11
 Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 4,9,7. 
12
 Bankton, Inst. 2,1,22. 
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thing with which the transferee has physical contact gives actual power of the goods, 
then its delivery is symbolic only in the sense that any act of possession is symbolic: 
namely, that it represents the mental inclination to take possession. Bell observes that 
traditio clavium: 
 
...differs from symbolical delivery in this, that a symbol is properly nothing 
more than the sign of the thing transferred – the image by which it is 
represented to the senses; whereas the delivery of the key gives to the buyer 





As Savigny points out, if symbolical acquisition of possession just means possession 
by means other than direct physical control, then such possession is very common 
indeed.
14
 Certainly, this is true for land, where control of one part of a larger area of 
land is taken to represent control of the whole of the land.
15
 This will be less often 
true for corporeal moveables, which may be portable enough to be held in the hand, 
but will often be true in the case of bulkier moveables. In fact, looked at in this way, 
a key will often give its holder more effective control of the property to which it 
gives access than will actual presence. 
If the 'symbol' gives actual control sufficient for possession, to call it a 
symbol adds nothing but confusion, for it implies that traditio clavium is an 
exception to the general principle rather than a specific application of it. For Scots 
law, Hume is clear on this: the delivery of a key is not symbolic, as it gives actual 
control of the goods.
16
 Carey Miller observes that this emphasis on requiring that the 
transferee actually acquire possession is what is behind 'the tendency to identify what 
could be seen as symbolical delivery as actual delivery'.
17
 It is only if the delivery of 
the key is held sufficient even where there is insufficient control for possession that it 




                                   
13
 Bell, Commentaries, 1,186. See also Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables, para 11.09. 
14
 Savigny, Possession 143. 
15
 Stair, Inst. 2,1,13. 
16
 Hume, Lectures, III,250-251. 
17
 DL Carey Miller, 'Derivative Acquisition of Moveables' in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law 
Tradition in Scotland (Stair Society 1995) 148. 
18
 Nicholas 119; Buckland 227; Pollock & Wright, Possession 62-68. 
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(2) Bills of lading 
 
Much the same could be said of bills of lading. It is accepted that delivery of a bill of 
lading is effective to give the transferee possession of goods on board a ship.
19
 
Delivery of the bill, then, is delivery of the goods themselves, involving as it does the 
acquisition of (civil) possession by the transferee. When the goods reach their 
destination, they will be yielded up to the holder of the bill. Other documents 
fulfilling similar functions, such as delivery warrants, are accepted as operating in 
the same way, as far as delivery is concerned.
20
 
 This is commonly said to be a form of symbolical delivery,
21
 and it is true 
that, in a sense, the bill of lading is a symbol of the goods. However, as we have 
seen, a key may also be seen as a symbol. The question, therefore, is whether a bill of 
lading is a symbol in a more complete sense than that is a key. 
 Carey Miller rejects the view that a bill of lading is a mere symbol: 
 
From the manner in which a bill of lading operates, it would appear that the 
better view is that the transfer of ownership by bill of lading is not an instance 
of symbolical delivery properly speaking. A bill of lading is not handed over 
as a symbol of the goods, in the sense of the giving and receiving of a token 




Instead, in Carey Miller's view, the bill of lading operates as a negotiable document 
of title.
23
 It is not immediately clear, however, what is meant by this term. Gow, for 
example, first identifies bills of lading as documents of title, by referring to the 
                                   
19
 A Rodger, 'Pledge of Bills of Lading in Scots Law' 1971 JR 193, 202. Given that the goods are in 
the custody of another, this means that the transferee acquires civil possession. 
20
 GL Gretton, 'Pledge, Bills of Lading, Trusts and Property Law' 1990 JR 23, 27. 
21
 Reid, Property, para 621; Gordon, Traditio 215; Smith, Short Commentary 539; JJ Gow, The 
Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland (W Green 1964) 107; R Brown, Treatise on the Sale of 
Goods, with Special Reference to the Law of Scotland (2nd edn, W Green 1911) 180; Scottish Law 
Commission, Corporeal Moveables: Passing of Risk and Ownership (Memorandum 25, 1976), para 
64; Gretton (n 20) 28 and 29; Price & Pierce Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1910 SC 1095, 1114 (Lord 
Johnston); G Ragland, 'The Uniform Sales Act in Kentucky' (1928) 17 Kentucky Law Journal 43, 44; 
F Bobbitt, 'The Concept of 'Possession' in Constructive Adverse Possession in Texas' (1927) 6 Texas 
Law Review 1, 6; WC Rodgers, 'Symbolical Delivery' (1899) 49 Central Law Journal 324, 326. See 
also F Tudsberry, 'Symbolical Deliveries by Documents' (1915) 31 LQR 84, criticising the view that 
delivery of a bill of lading is delivery of the goods themselves, but taking for granted that, if effective 
in that way, this can properly be called a symbolical delivery. 
22
 Corporeal Moveables 172.  
23
 ibid 172-73. See also Steven, Pledge and Lien, para 6-30, describing this as the 'better view'. 
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transfer of 'a document of title other than a bill of lading',
24
 before shortly 
afterwards
25
 contrasting bills of lading with documents of title. At the very least, on 
Gow's view, bills of lading are special forms of documents of title. Merely to define 
bills of lading as documents of title, therefore, does little to indicate the special 
nature of bills of lading. Brown, following the usage of the Factors Acts,
26
 defines 
documents of title as documents which are: 
 
...intended, by means of indorsation, to operate constructive delivery of the 
goods represented by the document by the document without requiring 




This certainly describes a bill of lading, subject to the qualification that some bills of 
lading may be transferred by delivery without indorsation, as we may see from 
consideration of how the bill operates. The shipper hands the goods over to the 
carrier for shipping. At this point, the shipper's natural possession ends and the 
shipper begins to possess civilly through the carrier. In exchange for the goods, a bill 
of lading is issued to the shipper. This does not change the character of the shipper's 
possession: he still possesses civilly through the carrier, not because there is any 
magic in the bill of lading, but because the carrier holds the goods on his behalf as 
holder of the bill. The shipper may then put someone else in the same position by 
delivering the bill to that other person. That person then possesses the goods, but 
again this is not because there is any magic in the bill itself. The person with the bill 
possesses the goods civilly through the carrier.
28
 This is because the carrier is bound 
to give the goods up to the person who holds the bill of lading, because the 
contractual rights under the bill are transferred along with the bill itself.
29
 Delivery of 
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 Gow (n 21) 105. 
25
 ibid 106-107. 
26
 Considered below. 
27
 Brown (n 21) 177. See also JJ Gow, 'Humpty Dumpty and the Whole Court: The Enigma of Inglis v 
Robertson and Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70' 1961 SLT (News) 105. 
28
 Bogle v Dunmore & Co (1787) Mor 14216. 
29
 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, s 2(1). This provision replaced the Bills of Lading Act 1855, s 
1, which made this transfer of contractual rights dependent on a transfer of ownership. See the joint 
report of the Law Commissions of Scotland and England on Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (Law Com No 196/Scot Law Com No 130, 1991), Part II. As Clive points out, the 1855 
Act was unnecessary in Scotland, the matter being adequately dealt with by holding the acquirer of the 
bill to have a ius quaesitum tertio arising from the original contract of carriage: EM Clive, 'Jus 
Quaesitum Tertio and Carriage of Goods by Sea' in DL Carey Miller & D W Meyers (eds), 
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the bill of lading thus gives actual (civil) possession to the transferee. It is analogous 
to the traditio clavium,
30
 and indeed the ship has been referred to, in an English case, 
as a floating warehouse to which the bill of lading is the key.
31
 It would perhaps be 
more accurate to say that this is the same as any other situation where goods are held 
by a third party custodier. In such a case, delivery may be achieved by the giving of 
notice to the custodier, who then holds for the transferee.
32
 It is true that, the case of 
a bill of lading, there is no need to give notice to the carrier, but this may be 
explained on the basis that such notice would not have been possible in the age in 
which bills of lading were developed. Unless such has been excluded by the contract 
of carriage, there can surely be no doubt that such notice properly given to the carrier 
while the goods were in transit would be effective to deliver possession of the goods, 
even without a transfer of a bill of lading. Moreover, the reason why notice to a 
custodier is enough for delivery is that this notice puts the custodier under a duty to 
yield up the goods to the transferee.
33
 The lack of any need for such notice may be 
justified in the case of a bill of lading, because the carrier knows from the start that 
he is to hand over the goods to whichever person appears with the bill when the 
goods arrive, and that that person will not be the same person as the consignor. 
Carey Miller talks specifically of 'transfer of ownership by bill of lading'. If 
the characterisation of the bill of lading as a document of title is to be taken to mean 
that ownership is transferred by means of the bill itself, it cannot be accepted. In 
itself, the bill only gives possession, not ownership, and the precise significance of 
the delivery of the bill in a particular case depends on the causa of that delivery. 
Delivery of the bill on a basis other than the transfer of ownership will not have the 
effect of transferring ownership.
34
 This is what leads to the conclusion that it is 
possible to pledge goods by delivery of a bill of lading.
35
 Even were that not so, 
                                                                                                   
Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC 
(Butterworths 1992) 47-56, especially 47-51. 
30
 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables 172-173. 
31
 Sanders Bros v Maclean & Son (1882-83) LR 11 QBD 327, 341 (Bowen LJ). 
32
 Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70. Where the transaction is a sale of goods, the 
seller is not taken to have fulfilled his obligation to deliver the goods until the custodier has 
acknowledged that he holds on the buyer's behalf, except where the transfer of a document of title is 
involved (Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 29(4)). This, however, does not appear to affect the general 
question of how possession is acquired. 
33
 Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70, 74, (Lord Watson). 
34
 A Rodger, 'Pledge of Bills of Lading in Scots Law' 1971 JR 193, 202. 
35
 On this issue, see Steven, Pledge and Lien, paras 6-30–6-33; Rodger (n 34); Gretton (n 20). 
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possession of the bill of lading would not be conclusive as to ownership, for the 
property transfer provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 appear to apply as much 
to goods at sea as they do to goods on land.
36
  
 The view taken here therefore is that, while a bill of lading may be said to be 
a symbol of the goods, and possession of the bill possession of a symbol, this is the 
same sense in which a key is a symbol. The holder of the bill has actual, civil 
possession of the goods, and delivery of the bill of lading is a transfer of civil 
possession of the goods. It operates in the same way as any other transfer of 
possession where the goods are held by a third party custodier, but with a shortcut 
(lack of requirement for intimation to the custodier) recognised by mercantile 
custom. This is not a case where a symbolical act stands in for the physical element 
of possession. This is not, therefore, a case of symbolical acquisition of possession as 




Special rules exist on the ownership of ships. A register of ships exists, and the 
registered owner of a ship has 'absolute power to dispose of it'.
37
 This is done by way 
of a 'bill of sale' in a form prescribed by statute.
38
 This, followed by registration, is 
regarded as being sufficient to give ownership.
39
 These rules appear therefore to 
override the common law requirement for delivery (and indeed the rules in the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979) for the transfer of ownership in the case of ships. This transfer 
by bill of sale could perhaps be seen as a form of symbolical delivery. Indeed, it has 
been so seen in the United States.
40
 However, it appears that this is better seen as a 
replacement for the normal rules for transfer of ownership. There is nothing in the 
relevant legislation to indicate that a transferee taking by bill of sale is to be seen as a 
possessor without an actual taking of possession in the normal way. 
 
                                   
36
 Certainly, no exclusion appears in these provisions, which are in general terms. 
37
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sch 1 para 1(1). 
38
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sch 1 para 2(1). 
39
 C Mackenzie, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Reissue Shipping and Navigation (2005), para 25. 
40
 Rodgers (n 21) 327. 
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(4) The Factors Acts 
 
The Factors Act 1889, extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890, 
makes certain provision regarding the authority of mercantile agents. Section 3 of the 
1889 Act provides that a pledge of the 'documents of title' to goods is 'deemed to be a 
pledge of the goods'. The term 'document of title' is defined in section 1(4) to 
include:  
 
...any bill of lading, dock warrant, warehouse-keeper's certificate, and warrant 
or order for the delivery of goods, and any other document used in the 
ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or 
authorising or purporting to authorise, either by endorsement or by delivery, 
the possessor of the document to transfer or receive goods thereby 
represented. 
 
In the normal course of things, the goods represented by the document of title may be 
in the hands of a third party. A bill of lading, mentioned in the definition and 
discussed above, is an example of this. However, there is nothing in the Factors Acts 
requiring this. The possibility appears to arise, therefore, of the delivery of a 
document of title creating a valid pledge even though the goods are still in the 
custody of the party delivering the document. In such a case, there could be said to 
be a truly symbolical delivery. However, this is a special case, relevant only where 
the Factors Acts apply. It provides no authority for any general acceptance of 
acquisition of possession through symbolical acts, and so falls outside the scope of 
this chapter, which is concerned with that general question. As has been made clear 
by the House of Lords,
41
 this provision only applies to the acts of mercantile agents. 
There is here no general authority for the creation of pledges by symbolical means, 
with the result that a mercantile agent has the power to do something on behalf of the 
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 Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70. For discussion of this decision, see Gow (n 27). 
42
 Brown (n 21) 154. Although s 3 itself is worded generally, the House of Lords inferred this 
limitation from the context in which it is found: Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70, 71 
(Lord Chancellor); 75 (Lord Watson); 76 (Lord Herschell). 
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C. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Symbolical acquisition of possession has been defined for present purposes as 
meaning possession obtained in circumstances where some symbolical act is 
accepted as equivalent to the physical element of possession. That definition 
excludes cases where the 'symbol' does in fact give physical control of the property, 
either directly or through an agent, or where the law dispenses with the requirement 
for possession altogether. Also excluded from the present discussion is any case 
where symbolical acquisition of possession is allowed in some special circumstance 
only. We are concerned with the acceptability of symbols for the acquisition of 
possession generally. 
 In Roman law, there were suggestions in the early classical period that a 
symbolical delivery of goods, by placing markings on them, would be effective. Paul 
reports an opinion of Alfenus to the effect that ownership of timber beams which had 
been sold was transferred to the purchaser when the latter put his seal on them.
43
 
Likewise, Ulpian tells us that: 
 
Trebatius says that if the purchaser has sealed a cask, it is deemed to have 
been delivered to him, but Labeo correctly states the opposite; for sealing is 





Both Trebatius and Labeo were jurists of the late Republic. The fact that Labeo is 
stated to give a different rule from that given by Trebatius suggests that the issue was 
one that caused disagreement even in their time. However, whichever view was 




 It may be noted, however, that the Codex contains a passage that appears to 
contradict the position that actual control is necessary for delivery. In an imperial 
decision of AD 210, it was held that delivery of documents of title to slaves was 
equivalent to delivery of the slaves themselves. The transferee was accordingly 






 A Watson, Roman Private Law around 200BC (Edinburgh University Press 1971) 65 n 3. 
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entitled to maintain an action in rem with respect to them.
46
 It should be stressed that 
this situation is unlike that of delivery of a bill of lading, as discussed above. In the 
bill of lading case, the goods are in the hands of a third party, whereas here the 
transferor appears to have retained custody of the slaves.  
 If the decision is accurately stated, it is difficult to account for, given that the 
compilers of the Digest required an actual delivery of the property for traditio to 
operate.
47
 Any solution that is consistent with the general law as stated by Justinian 
requires the reading in of additional facts. Gordon discusses the various 
interpretations that have been put forward.
48
 For example, Savigny
49
 assumes the 
presence of the slaves. Gordon's suggestion
50
 is that the decision was originally 
longer, and was abbreviated, overly hastily, to remove need for traditio for the 
perfection of gifts under the lex Cincia.
51
 However, as he admits, it is difficult to see 
how the compilers failed to see difficulty with text as it stands, given its shortness. 
 Whatever the truth may be about this decision, it is the position as given in 
the Digest that was accepted in the ius commune. Symbolical delivery has not been 
accepted as effective. In South Africa, for example, delivery by markings has been 
disallowed, in a case on branding of livestock.
52
 This was on the basis that the 
purpose of the branding is ambiguous, being equally consistent with the intention 
merely to identify the animals, although this reasoning has been criticised by Carey 
Miller, on the basis that it is inconsistent with the clear inference as to intention to be 
drawn from the existence of a contract of sale.
53
 Nor does delivery by marking 
appear to be accepted in Germany. Thus, the attachment of a sign to goods will not 
be sufficient for delivery.
54
 For France, referring to a passage by Ulpian,
55
 Pothier 




 Although it does appear that this requirement was reduced by post-classical developments. An 
example is the retention by the transferor of a usufruct for a nominal period, transfer then operating by 
a kind of constitutum possessorium: C.8.53(54).28. 
48
 Traditio 82-86. 
49
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51
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 Carey Miller, 'Transfer of Ownership' 742. 
54





holds that markings placed by a purchaser on goods are not sufficient for traditio.
56
 
Among modern writers, too, actual control is required. Purely juridical acts, which 





 This being the case, Cashin Ritaine's statement that it is sufficient for 
possession to receive 'license [sic] documents of a boat'
59 
must be taken to be 




D. INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER EARLY WRITINGS 
 
One looking at Roman law and the ius commune will therefore find little support for 
symbolical acquisition of possession. However, among the Scottish institutional 
writers, Stair is more receptive to this. He allows that possession may be acquired by 
delivery of a symbol of the goods, as with the following cases: 
 
...delivery of a parcel of corns for a stack or field of corn, or some of a herd 
or flock for the whole flock, being present; in which the symbols being also 




Stair then accepts that delivery of a sample of a thing, as a symbol of the whole, is 
sufficient delivery of the whole thing. In the passage quoted above, he appears to 
imply by the words 'being present' that the parties must be in the presence of the 
goods when the sample is given. However, he goes on to say that there may be 
'delivery of a thing bought or sold, by a wisp of straw, which ordinarily is in absence 
of the thing to be possessed'.
62
 Presence, then, does not appear to be required. For 
Carey Miller and Pope, this passage: 
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...may support the notion that delivery of movables can be constituted on the 
basis of an unequivocal manifestation of mutual intention by any means 
which can be construed to meet the physical requirements and is associated 




While this view does require a physical act of taking possession, it is reduced to a 
bare minimum and is certainly divorced from any idea of control of the property. 
There can be no doubt that Stair's view on this point represents a substantial 
modification of the concepts of delivery and, by extension, possession, compared 
with the Roman law. 





 both allow this. The latter relies on Grant v Smith,
66
 
discussed below, a case of delivery of a sample of growing crops. 
 Bankton holds that '[a]n owner's suffering the buyer to mark the things sold 
with his sign, is understood thereby to deliver them'.
67
 However, this is perhaps 
inconsistent with his rejection of symbolical delivery where the transferor has 
retained custody.
68
 Perhaps the difference is that, in the case of markings, Bankton 
envisages that this has been done by the transferee, who has therefore performed a 
clear act of possession of the goods.  
 Bell also allows symbolical delivery by marking of the goods,
69
 as was 
accepted by Alfenus and Trebatius but was rejected by Labeo. Bell indeed goes so 
far as to allow delivery by marking things that are not yet separated from the soil.
70
 
However, the case he relies on
71
 is concerned with a moveable growing crop.
72
 Its 
application to things that are heritable by accession is a matter of greater difficulty 
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 Grant v Smith (1758) Mor 9561. 
72
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 Erskine observes that the law permits symbolical delivery 'if the thing sold 
does not admit of real delivery'
74
. He does not explain what is meant here, but could 
be taken as referring, for example, to bulky items. However, elsewhere he says that 
symbolical delivery is used for heritage and incorporeal property.
75
 Accordingly, 
there is no foundation in Erskine for accepting symbolical acquisition of possession 
of corporeal moveable property as part of Scots law. 
 Most strongly opposed to the acceptance of symbolical acquisition is Hume. 
He rejects symbolical delivery as a way of acquiring possession, even in the case of 
bulky items,
76
 though he accepts that this may be inconvenient.
77
 In particular, there 
is no delivery by marking goods,
78




 There is therefore no consensus among the earlier writers on Scots law on this 
point. On the one hand, Stair, Forbes, Bankton and Bell give at least some 
recognition to the possibility of symbolical acquisition of possession. On the other 
hand, Erskine and, particularly, Hume reject it. 
 
E. CASE LAW 
 
The next step is to consider how the notion of symbolical acquisition of possession 
has been received by the courts. It may be noted at this point that the tendency 
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among modern writers on possession has been to ignore symbolical acquisition of 
possession or to disallow it,
80
 or at least to restrict its application to the context of 
bills of lading
81
 which, for reasons considered above, do not fall within the scope of 
this discussion. As we shall see, it is understandable that they should do so, given 
that there is a considerable body of authority rejecting the idea that possession may 
be acquired in this way. Nonetheless, the role of symbolical acquisition of possession 
in delivery is an issue that has been controversial since at least Stair's time. In two 
cases decided in the late seventeenth century, within a short period from each other, 
symbolical delivery was first allowed
82
 and then disallowed,
83
 though it is not stated 
in either case what form the symbolical delivery took. 
The approach taken here is to consider first those cases rejecting the 
acquisition of possession by symbolical means, before moving on to those apparently 
more supportive of the idea. Conclusions will then be drawn. 
 
(1) Rejection of symbolical acquisition of possession.  
 
In the cases on this issue, three different forms of symbol may be identified, as we 
shall see. Two of these are mentioned by the institutional writers: a sample of goods 
delivered to represent the whole, permitted by Stair and Bell; and markings made on 
the goods, allowed as sufficient by Bankton and Bell, or otherwise making the goods 
separately identifiable within the transferor's premises. The third is not mentioned by 





 considered below. This third form is symbolical delivery by 
the giving of written documents. These shall be considered in turn. No doubt others 
could be conceived that have not been considered by the courts. These can, however, 
be considered by analogy. 
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(a) Possession by giving of sample. The only reported case clearly concerned with 
whether possession can be given by the giving of a sample appears to be Hill v 
Buchanan.
86
 In Hill, the court held that there was no delivery where the property, a 
quantity of tobacco, remained in the transferors' custody except for the giving of 
samples.
87
 The court appears to have accepted the argument that the purpose of the 
giving of samples was 'merely to make known the respective qualities of the different 
parcels'.
88
 This, then, represents a rejection of Stair's view. 
 
(b) Possession by marking item. As noted above, this category covers cases where 
the goods are in some way set apart as well as those where they are physically 
marked as pertaining to a particular person. 
 This method of acquiring possession was held ineffective in Salter v Knox & 
Company's Factor,
89
 in which the goods had been measured out and set aside in the 
transferor's own premises. One of the judges is reported to have observed that:  
 
[H]owever equity may afford relief, by undoing what has been illegally done, 
it cannot, in a question with third parties, supply the want of those things 




It is clear here that the concern is not that the leaving of the goods in the transferor's 
custody suggests some scheme to defraud the transferor's creditors. On the contrary, 
it is accepted by the court that the transaction is a genuine one and that the outcome 
is unfortunate for the transferee. The difficulty is simply that delivery is a 
requirement for the transfer of ownership, and what has been done does not 
constitute delivery. 
 That case concerned goods identified by being set aside. Another case, Smith 
v Alan & Poynter,
91
 involved goods physically marked. In this case, the goods had 
been placed by the transferor, marked with the transferee's name, in a warehouse kept 
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by a third party. When the warehousekeeper released the goods to the transferee 
without the transferor's consent, the transferor sought damages.  
Strictly, this case is not direct authority on the question of whether the 
marking of goods is sufficient for delivery. The ratio of the decision was that the 
contract between the transferor and the custodier was one of deposit,
92
 which is a 
contract 'to hold, and not to deliver'.
93
 In fact, even if the marking had been sufficient 
to transfer ownership, this would still not have entitled the custodier to hand over the 
goods to the transferee. The custodier's contract was with the transferor, and to hand 
over the goods to anyone else without the transferor's consent would have 
represented a breach of that contract.
94
 
Nonetheless, there is comment in this case on the purpose of the marking of 
goods, which is said to be identification.
95
 This is, in effect, the same reasoning as 
that of Labeo, reported with approval by Ulpian,
96
 and the South African case Botha 
v Mazeka.
97
 The decision is therefore supportive of a conclusion that this form of 
symbolical delivery is ineffective. 
 
(c) Possession by writing. By far the most common form of alleged symbolical 
acquisition of possession that has been considered has been the written document. In 
Arbuthnott v Paterson,
98
 a number of tenants were under an obligation to deliver 
grain to their landlord. They were instructed instead to deliver the grain to the 
landlord's granary for a third party. When the third party became insolvent before 
payment it was held that neither acceptance of the instruction nor delivery to the 
granary was enough for delivery to the third party. 
 Arbuthnott v Paterson was a fairly weak case for recognition of symbolical 
delivery, though as noted above it was treated as such by Hume. After all, the 
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document was delivered, not to the transferee, but to the transferor. Perhaps this 
would be better seen as an intimation of an assignation to the third party of the 
landlord's right to delivery of the grain. 
 There are, however, cases where the role of the document as an attempted 
symbol of possession is clearer. In Thomsone v Chirnside,
99
 a conveyance of 
moveables in this way was held ineffective where the transferor retained possession. 
In Anderson v Anderson's Tr,
100
 there was a written conveyance by a husband to his 
wife of the household furnishings, ostensibly in return for previous payments made 
by the wife to the husband from her own income. On the husband's insolvency 
shortly afterwards, it was sought to include the furnishings in the husband's bankrupt 
estate. The court held that the furnishings could be so included. Unfortunately, 
however, the case has no clear ratio decidendi: of the four judges considering the 
matter in the Inner House, two (Lords Young and Rutherfurd Clark) thought that the 
transaction between the spouses was not bona fide and so no effect should be given 
to it. The other two judges (the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lord Trayner) held that the 
case fell within section 1(4) of the Married Women's Property Act 1881, in terms of 
which property that the wife had 'lent or entrusted to the husband' was available to 
the husband's creditors. It does seem probable, though, that there was some element 
of question of the spouses' bona fides even with the latter two judges, given that the 
1881 Act appears in other cases to have been interpreted fairly restrictively, and 
effect given to conveyances between spouses even where they have continued to 
share use of the property in the same way as before. Thus, in Adam v Adam's 
Trustees,
101
 the 1881 Act was held not to apply where the furniture had been owned 
by the wife before the marriage. In Mitchell's Trustees v Gladstone,
102
 there was a 
conveyance of household furnishings by a husband to his creditors, who then 
conveyed to marriage trustees for the wife. Even though the furnishings remained in 
the house as before, on the husband's once again falling into insolvency it was held 
that there had been good delivery, possession being held by the marriage trustees 
through the wife. Unlike in Anderson, in these two cases there was no attempt to 
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convey property with the intention to defeat creditors. For present purposes, 
however, the point is that the written conveyance in Anderson did not cure the 
problems that existed with the transaction. Anderson was explained by Lord Young 
in Adam v Adam's Trs as being a case of symbolical delivery: 'No change had been 
made in the possession of the furniture; there was nothing but the document to shew 
that the furniture had become the property of the wife'. This was a 'sale on paper' 
only. Accordingly, effect could not be given to it. 
 As noted, in Anderson the issue arose that the purpose of the symbolical 
delivery was to defeat the transferor's creditors by giving title to the transferor's wife. 
It is, of course, the case that a debtor's power to prefer one creditor to the body of 
creditors is restricted.
103
 This seems to have been the issue in Anderson 
distinguishing it from other cases of conveyance by one spouse to another of items 
within the matrimonial home. However, it appears that recognition will not be given 
to symbolical delivery of this kind, even where the transaction would otherwise be 
legitimate as a means of giving preference to a particular creditor. Thus, in Stiven v 
Scott & Simson,
104
 delivery was made of invoices for goods in respect of apparent 
sales, but this was in fact an attempt to create a security over these goods for 
accommodation bills drawn on the 'buyers' by the 'sellers'. The goods remained in the 
latter's premises. This was held not to be valid delivery for the creation of a pledge. 
 In Fraser v Frisby,
105
 an attempt was made to give a creditor security for 
debt, by the making of inventories of goods which, however, were left in the custody 
of the debtor. This was held insufficient for the creation of a security excluding other 
creditors. 
 Again, Carse v Halyburton,
106
 the delivery of instruments of possession was 
held to be insufficient for delivery where custody was retained by the transferor. On 
the defender's arguments, the purpose of this arrangement was to give the defender 
security for debts owed to him by the transferor. The pursuer, a creditor of the 
transferor attempting to poind the goods, argued that the symbolical delivery was 
merely a device to defraud the transferor's creditors, but even were that not the case 
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there was no effective delivery. The reports of the case
107
 appear to suggest that it 
was this lack of delivery that the court founded on in reaching its decision. 
 Thus, it does not appear that the difficulty with cases of this kind is the desire 
not to allow an unfair preference to be given to particular creditors, for it is 
disallowed even where other forms of delivery would be recognised as effective. The 
problem is the shortcomings of written documents as a method of giving possession. 
Indeed, symbolical delivery of this type has been held insufficient to give effect to a 
trust deed for creditors, a device intended to protect the interests of the body of 
creditors from being prejudiced by the claims of individual creditors. Thus, in 
McCaul's Trs v Thomson,
108
 it was held that a trust deed for behoof of creditors did 
not constitute delivery of household furniture to the trustee,
109
 so likewise a third 
party taking an assignation from the trustee acquired no title where the property was 
left in the bankrupt's hands. Accordingly, a grant of a trust deed for creditors, not 
followed by delivery of the goods, will not defeat the landlord's hypothec in respect 
of rent arrears subsequently arising,
110
 subsequent sequestration of the grantor's 
estates,
111
 or a subsequent poinding.
112
 Again, In Grant's Tr v Grant,
113
 an inventory 
was made of goods and an attempt made to give effect to it through an assignation to 
a trustee for behoof of creditors. This was held to be ineffective where the goods 
were left in the debtor's custody. 
 The motivation for refusal to recognise symbolical acquisition of possession 
by writing does not, therefore, appear to arise from the need to protect the body of 
creditors from a sacrifice of their interests to that of an individual creditor. Indeed, 
the courts have refused to give effect to such attempts at delivery even where no 
issue of insolvency is present. In Hewat's Tr v Smith,
114
 it was held that a written 
conveyance to marriage trustees of the matrimonial home and its contents did not 
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bind a third party taking delivery of a number of pictures as security without 
knowledge of the prior agreement. 
 There appears, therefore, to be strong authority denying effect to written 
documents as a means of giving possession. Even where the transaction is otherwise 
a legitimate one, the need for clear physical acts, demonstrating possession, is seen 
as indispensable. This position may be justified, as Brown suggests,
115
 by the need to 
protect creditors and the general public from a wrongful appearance of ownership. 
However, it is clear that it is not merely where there is potential prejudice to creditors 
that delivery of this kind will be denied effect. 
 
 (2) Cases apparently allowing symbolical acquisition of possession 
 
There is, then, clear authority for the rejection of the idea that one may acquire 
possession by symbolical means. This is perhaps surprising given the support given 
to the idea by certain earlier writers. However, cases also exist where some apparent 
receptiveness to symbolical delivery may be found. As we shall see, though, the 
strength of this receptiveness is not always entirely clear. We shall consider these 
cases under the same headings as were used for the cases rejecting symbolical 
acquisition. 
 
(a) Possession by giving of sample. In Grant v Smith,
116
 there was 'a sort of 
symbolical delivery' of growing corns. It is not made clear in the report in Morison's 
Dictionary what form this symbolical delivery took, but the most obvious way of 
accomplishing this is to give a handful of corns as a symbol for the whole crop. 
Carey Miller assumes that this is what occurred, and sees this case as an instance of 
symbolical delivery.
117
 However, as Gordon points out, the report of the case states 
that 'servants were appointed to look after' the crops.
118
 Accordingly, while this case 
could be seen as a case of symbolical delivery by delivery of a sample, the case is 
sufficiently explained as a taking of possession by placing a guard on the property. 
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This is a method of taking possession that was recognised in Roman law
119
 and, 
given that this does give effective control, there is no reason to doubt its 
effectiveness in modern law. Accordingly, this case is at best a weak authority for the 
acceptability of this form of symbolical delivery. 
 The only other case that appears to give support to the idea is Gauld v 
Middleton,
120
 discussed in chapter 5. In this case, the sheriff observed that, in the 
case of a retiring judge gifting his collection of Session Cases to his son, living in the 
same house: 
 
[T]hat would seem to me to require no delivery as the head of the household 
is the natural custodier of his son's books, but it would no doubt be desirable 





From the cases considered in this chapter on acquisition of possession by delivery of 
writings, it may be doubted whether it is in fact so easy to make a gift to someone 
living within the same household.
122
 However, given the sheriff's view that delivery 
can be made, in effect, by intention alone in such a case, it appears that he does not 
intend the symbolical delivery to have any additional effect other than, presumably, 
making clear the parties' intentions. If interpreted to the contrary, as giving effect to 
the symbolical delivery, this comment runs into the difficulty of contradicting Hill v 
Buchanan,
123
 considered above. In any case, the comment is obiter and made without 
full consideration of authority, and so does not provide a firm basis for recognition of 
acquisition of possession in this way. 
 
(b) Possession by marking. It is in the case of possession by marking the goods or 
in some way separating them within the custodier's stock that most case law 
favourable to symbolical acquisition of possession is to be found. 
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 In Main v Maxwell,
124
 the weighing and marking of goods was held 
sufficient. However, in that case the goods were left in the public weigh-house, 
where they were weighed and marked in the presence of the buyer's wife. This is not, 
therefore, a clear case of possession by marking alone. 
 Eadie v Young
125
 concerned the conveyance of horses and carts. The carts 
were marked with the transferee's name. However, the conclusion that delivery had 
occurred was supported by two addition factors. The first of these was that the 
transferee had in fact taken momentary custody of the property before returning it to 
the transferor. Secondly, the property was returned to the transferor on the basis of a 
genuine contract of hire. This case, therefore, is perhaps better interpreted as a case 
of constitutum possessorium, the role of the marking of the goods being more to 
demonstrate the genuineness of the transaction than to give possession in and of 
itself.
126
 The same approach was taken in Orr's Trustee v Tullis,
127
 where it was said 
that: 
 
[T]he marking of the initials of Tullis on the articles, although of little use as 





 In Lang v Bruce,
129
 after sale of livestock at auction, the animals were driven 
back to and left on the seller's land. While the animals remained on the seller's land, 
the seller became insolvent. After the seller declared his insolvency, but before 
sequestration, the buyer attempted to remove the animals from the seller's land, but 
was prevented from doing so by a committee of the seller's creditors, acting on their 
own authority without the consent of the seller. A court of fourteen judges was 
evenly divided on the question of whether there had been delivery to the seller, a 
decision only being made possible by the agreement of one judge (Lord Craigie) not 
to vote. What then became the majority opinion (Lords Glenlee, Cringletie, Fullerton 
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and Moncrieff, with whom the Lord President and Lords Balgray and Gillies 
concurred) was to the effect that, as the buyer had only been prevented from taking 
possession of the animals by the unlawful interference of the creditors, the buyer was 
to be treated as having taken possession. The majority opinion therefore was that 
there had been no delivery but, owing to a reluctance to see the creditors profit by 
their own unlawful act, the buyer was to be treated as if he had taken possession. 
 It is the minority opinion of the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Meadowbank, 
Corehouse, Medwyn and Newton that is of interest for present purposes. Their view 
was that there had been no delivery in this case. However, they suggest that there 
might have been delivery if the animals had been marked by the buyer's mark. This 
would have been 'a symbolical taking of possession', meaning by this that the 




 This then appears to give some support to the idea that marking of goods may 
be effective as a form of symbolical delivery, and on that basis Carey Miller is 
certainly prepared to accept the possibility that marking 'of an enduring nature' may 
be enough.
131
 However, there are three points to bear in mind. The first is that this is 
a minority opinion, albeit one acceded to by six judges including the Lord Justice-
Clerk. The majority did not consider this point. Secondly, the comment is plainly an 
obiter dictum, and one put forward tentatively at that. Thirdly, the final quoted words 
appear to assume that the seller's continued holding is on some new basis, those 
specifically mentioned being deposit or hire. In other words, the marking is not 
treated as effective in and of itself, but as evidence of this new basis for the seller's 
continued custody, as with Eadie v Young. In other words, the suggestion appears to 
be that marking only operates as part of a constitutum possessorium, and perhaps 
would be ineffective if the goods were left with the transferor out of mere 
convenience. 
 Another possible example of recognition of this form of symbolical delivery 
is Gibson v Forbes,
132
 yet even this case is not without difficulty. 
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 The facts in Gibson were as follows. The defender had agreed to buy a 
quantity of wine from a firm of wine merchants. The wine was left on the sellers' 
premises. However, the wine was stored separately from the sellers' general stock, 
and it was noted in the sellers' stock records as belonging to the defender. Several 
years later, within the sixty day period before sequestration, with the wine still on 
their premises, the sellers without instructions forwarded the wine to the defender.  
The pursuer in Gibson was the sellers' trustee in sequestration, and had to 
succeed on two issues. First, the pursuer had to show that the wine was not delivered 
to the defender while it remained in the sellers' premises. Second, it was necessary to 
show that, when delivery was made, this represented a fraud on the body of creditors, 
and was accordingly reducible in terms of the Act 1696, c. 5, then in force, as being 
an unfair preference given to one creditor within the six months leading up to 
sequestration. Failure on either count would result in the defender being held to have 
an unchallengeable title. 
The court held by a margin of nine to four in favour of the defender, but 
divided differently on the two questions. On the second issue, concerned with the 
1696 Act, six judges
133
 were in favour of the defender and four
134
 against. On the 
first issue, with which we are concerned here, five judges expressed opinions on each 
side.
135
 The remaining three judges
136
 merely concurred in holding that the defender 
was entitled to be assoilzied, without giving detailed opinions. There is therefore no 
indication of the basis on which these three judges reached their view. It is entirely 
possible, therefore, that a majority was of the view that there was no delivery while 
the goods remained in the sellers' premises. 
If it is assumed that the view of the majority was that the wine was delivered 
while it remained in the sellers' premises, the decision is unsatisfactory. The joint 
opinion of the five judges expressing this view proceeds on the basis that the wine 
was left 'for the convenience and accommodation' of the defender.
137
 However, if 
delivery is to be a requirement, Lord Mackenzie's view is surely the better one that 
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the law cannot 'bend to any difficulty of giving delivery'.
138
 The majority view 
threatens to destroy delivery for all practical purposes. Perhaps the majority view is 
influenced by an understandable reluctance to see the defender lose the benefit of an 
actual possession obtained, in complete good faith, and paid for several years 
previous to the sellers' financial difficulties. Certainly, the Lord Ordinary notes the 
point.
139
 Be that as it may, though, the important point for present purposes is that 
there is no indication in the majority opinion that it is based on a symbolical delivery 
by marking the goods out as belonging to the defender. 
 All in all, then, the basis in the case law for recognition of symbolical 
delivery of this kind appears exceedingly slight. 
 
(c) Possession by writing. As with the other two possible forms of symbolical 
delivery considered here, the idea that the delivery of a written document can 
constitute an effective symbolical delivery, as that term has been defined for the 
purposes of this chapter, has not met with wide acceptance. In Thompson v Aktien 
Gesellschaft für Glasindustrie,
140
 the pursuer raised an action against the defender 
for wrongfully using diligence against her property for her husband's debts. The 
property in question was the furnishings of the house occupied by both. The 
furnishings had previously belonged to the husband, but he had purported to convey 
them to her by means of a written document. However, the issue of the validity of the 
conveyance itself was not discussed. Instead, the Lord Ordinary focussed on whether 
the gift to the wife was valid to the effect of excluding creditors of the husband, even 
though, under the law as it then stood, the gift was revocable as a donatio inter virum 
et uxorum. However, in holding that the gift did have this effect, the Lord Ordinary is 
evidently assuming that there has been effective delivery. 
 As the issue was not directly addressed, it is difficult to judge the significance 
of this decision. The Lord Ordinary could have founded on the fact that the 
matrimonial home was occupied on the basis of a lease in favour of the wife, 
although the rent was paid from the husband's resources. It has been held previously 
that, where occupation of premises is shared, the contents are presumed to be 
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possessed by the party with the right to possess the premises.
141
 However, this was 
not done in this case. Instead, the Lord Ordinary relied on the fact that the husband 
was solvent at the time of making the gift, even though it appeared that the gift was a 
device to shield assets from potential creditors. Accordingly, the Lord Ordinary took 
the view that the gift was valid. To make the jump from this proposition to one 
holding that there was then valid delivery of the goods is perhaps to proceed on a 
common-sense view that, where there is a gift between spouses of items within the 
matrimonial home, a clear change of physical control is hardly to be expected. Yet, 
as the Lord Ordinary observes, it is hardly to be contended that a husband cannot 
make a gift to his wife. In such a case, on this view, delivery will practically be by 
intention alone, in Thompson this intention being evidenced by the written document. 
On this view of Thompson, therefore, the role of the written document is not to serve 
as a substitute for the physical element of possession. Accordingly, the decision 
gives little support to the idea that possession may be taken by the delivery of a 
document representing the property, especially when it is read alongside other 




Of the three forms of possible symbolical delivery that have been identified, rejection 
is clearest in the case of possession by writing. None of the institutional writers says 
that it is an acceptable means of acquiring possession and it is all but universally 
rejected in the case law. 
 The other two forms, possession by marking and possession by sample, are 
less easily rejected, given that they have some institutional support and also apparent 
support from case law, although, as we have seen, these cases can largely be 
explained on other grounds. Considered on the basis of a general law of possession, 
however, the acceptability of possession by sample must be questionable. The party 
receiving the sample has done nothing to exercise control over the property from 
which the sample has been taken (as opposed to control over the sample itself), nor 
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can the giving of a sample even help to identify the extent of the property to be 
conveyed, given that that property is still in the custody of the transferor. In short, to 
recognise the taking of a sample as being sufficient in itself to give possession is to 
abolish the physical element of possession. Such could only ever operate as an 
exception to the requirement for physical control. There may indeed by a case for 
making such an exception - for example, with growing crops, which obviously 
cannot be delivered until harvest - but there is little foundation for holding that such 
an exception presently exists. There is in any case the opposing argument that the 
point of requiring delivery is to ensure that ownership of corporeal moveables is as 
clear as possible, and the price that must be paid for this clarity is that sometimes the 
effectiveness of an attempted delivery will be denied when that standard cannot be 
met. 
 The strongest case for the recognition of symbolical delivery is with the 
marking of goods. This form is the one that finds the strongest support in the case 
law, and indeed if the goods have been clearly marked as belonging to a particular 
person there is little scope for anyone to be misled by the fact of those goods being in 
the custody of someone else. This is particularly the case with the marking of 
animals in circumstances where such markings are widely accepted as denoting 
ownership of the animal. This is an issue that we shall meet again in chapter 6, which 
is concerned with possession of animals. For the moment, however, we may note that 
the case law on the point has been divided. However, given that the cases supportive 
of this form of acquisition of possession have been open to interpretation on grounds 
other than symbolical delivery, the balance of the argument appears to be in favour 








(1) Significance of possession of animals 
  
Animals are in their nature different from other types of property. They can and do 
act of their own volition, in ways that may be unpredictable. An animal may wander 
or escape from the place it is kept. It need hardly be said that most types of property 
stay where they are left, unless they are moved by some outside cause. Animals 
being therefore more difficult to control, the question of how an animal is possessed 
gives rise to special issues. The matter is further complicated by the fact that 




Greatest attention in the sources has been given to the acquisition and maintenance of 
ownership of wild animals by possession, through the doctrine of occupatio. 
 
(3) Other applications of possession of animals 
 
The possession of animals has also had consequences other than the acquisition of 
ownership. For example, the Winter Herding Act 1686
1
 imposed a penalty for 
trespass of livestock on private land, and allowed the owner of that land to take 
possession of the animals as security for payment of the penalty. Possession of wild 




                                   
1
 Now repealed: Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, sch 1. 
2
 See eg Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s 11I(1)(a). 
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(4) Methods of possessing animals 
 
The most obvious way of possessing an animal is the imposition of some sort of 
physical restraint on it, to prevent its coming and going as it pleases. However, as we 
shall see, the law also holds possession to continue when an animal has the habit of 
returning. Marking or branding animals in some way or other is also common, so it 
will be necessary to consider the efficacy of that with regard to possession. Finally, it 
will be necessary to consider how possession is acquired when an animal is pursued 
by one wishing to seize it. 
 
B. POSSESSION BY PHYSICAL RESTRAINT 
 
One can distinguish two ways in which an animal can be restrained. The first is 
direct physical restraint, as where the animal is chained up or is caught in a trap. The 
second is indirect restraint, where the animal itself is not directly restrained, but its 
freedom to roam is restricted by means of a fence or a cage, or some other type of 
enclosure. Fish kept in an enclosed pond or a fish farm also fall into this category. 
Alternatively, a legal system could hold that the animal's mere presence on a 
particular person's land gave that person sufficient control to be considered owner. 
 
(1) Historical and comparative approaches 
 
(a) Roman law. In Roman law, it is clear that a person acquired no right just from an 
animal being on his land.
3
 A landowner was entitled to prevent anyone hunting or 
fishing on his land,
4
 and would possibly be able to sustain an action for iniuria 
against such a trespasser,
5
 but this was on the basis of the landowner's rights in his 
land, not on any right in the wild animals on that land. Wild animals at large were not 
owned, nor were they protected in themselves either by private law, as we have seen, 
or by any public law restrictions on the taking of game or fish.
6
 
                                   
3
 Gaius, D.41.1.5.2, 41.1.3.1; J.2.1.14. For discussion, see Thomas 167; Nicholas 131. 
4
 Ulpian, D.47.10.13.7. 
5
 Ulpian, D.47.10.13.7. 
6
 F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Clarendon Press 1951) 361. 
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 Accordingly, some form of control of the animal had to be exercised before it 
could be said to be owned. In Roman law, both direct and indirect restraint, as 
defined above, were recognised as effective. 
 On direct restraint, a passage in the Digest from Proculus is the main 
authority. It is worth quoting in full: 
 
A wild boar fell into a trap which you had set for such a purpose, and when 
he was caught in it, I released him and carried him off…Let us consider 
whether it be relevant that I set the trap on private land or on public land and, 
if on private land, whether it was my own or another's and, if another's, 
whether I set the trap with the owner's permission or without it; furthermore, 
let us consider whether the boar was so caught that he could not extricate 
himself or could do so only by lengthy struggling. Still I think that the 
cardinal rule is that if he has come into my power, the boar has become mine. 
And if you release my boar into his natural state of freedom and thereby he 




As will be seen, Proculus begins by raising a number of questions, on the one hand 
about the land where the trap was set, and on the other about the animal's ability to 
escape. Buckland takes from the opening questions that the matter 'seems to have 
depended somewhat on the position of the trap'.
8
 Voet argues to the contrary: 
 
It is indeed true that all those distinctions and others in addition to them are 
put forward in that passage. Still it is not equally to be granted that they are 





It appears that the location of the snare must be relevant to some extent, if occupatio 
is based on possession. If an animal is caught in my snare, but on land to which 
guards prevent my access, I can hardly be said to possess that animal. It is not in my 
control. Equally, however, it is clear that Proculus considers the location of the snare 
not to be conclusive. It is merely part of the factual background to the question of 
whether the animal has come into my power. In principle, it seems clear that, if a 
poacher sets a snare on private land, he possesses any animal caught in that snare as 
long as he can be said to possess the snare itself. Certainly, if for some reason he is 
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unable to recover it, he may be held no longer to possess. If the snare were to be left 
for a lengthy period, the question would perhaps become more difficult, in that the 
possessor might be judged to have abandoned possession. However, although Gaius 
implies that possession may be lost by neglect,
10
 this will not be too readily assumed. 
Thus, one may continue to possess items one has buried for safekeeping, even on 
another's ground, even for a lengthy period.
11
 As for a snare left on another's land, 
the conclusion would seem to be that abandonment would only be presumed 




 Likewise, the possibility of escape cannot be conclusive. Indeed, it will not 
always be certain at a given moment whether the animal will be able to escape. As 
Voet says, discussing this passage: 
 
[S]ome sort of disentanglement from the snare could happen through one 
effort and twist, and an entanglement which could never be undone through 




Instead, the issue seems to be whether, at any given moment, the animal is so 
entangled that it can be said to have lost its natural liberty. 
 In Roman law, wild animals could also be possessed through indirect 
restraint, ie through keeping the animal in some kind of enclosure, such as a pen.
14
 
The same rule applied to bees in a hive,
15
 birds in a cage
16
 and fish in a tank.
17
 The 
inclusion of bees here represents a slight qualification on the rule, in that bees must 
be allowed to come and go to collect pollen and nectar. It may be taken, therefore, 
that the enclosure need not necessarily prevent all escape, if the nature of the animal 
is such as to render that inappropriate. While the bee is in the hive, it may be said to 
be controlled: as we have seen in earlier chapters, the required level of control is not 
high, and the possessor of the hive can in any case prevent escape by closing the 




 Papinian, D.41.2.44pr. 
12
 This appears also to be the position in modern law: Stair, Inst. 2,1,20. 
13
 Voet, 41,1,4. 
14
 Paul, D.41.2.3.14. 
15
 Gaius, D.41.1.5.2. 
16
 Paul, D.41.2.3.15. 
17
 Paul, D.41.2.3.14. 
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entrance to the hive. As we shall see, while the bee is out of the hive it is in any case 
possessed as long as it has the habit of returning. 
 There is a difficulty, however, with large enclosures. Paul, reporting the 
opinion of the younger Nerva, observes: 
 
[W]e possess those wild animals which we have penned up or the fish which 
we have placed in tanks. But those fish which live in a lake or beasts which 
roam in an enclosed wood are not in our possession, because they are left in 






 that, in Nerva's account, a distinction is made in the language 
between animals in man-made enclosures, such as fishponds and pens, and animals 
in fenced woods or natural bodies of water. The animals in the former were placed 
there, and so were presumably possessed at least at one time. In the latter case, 
however, the animals were there all along – they have been 'left in their natural state 
of liberty'. In either case, however, as is made clear in the Digest passage, the point is 
control or lack thereof. As Lord Rodger says: 
 





The rule appears to be, therefore, that an animal in an enclosure is possessed only if 
the enclosure is such as to impose sufficient restriction on the animal's freedom that 
it can be said to have passed out of its natural state of liberty, and into the control of 
the possessor of the enclosure itself. There is insufficient evidence in the texts to 
justify the view that the question depends on whether the animal has been placed in 
the enclosure or whether an existing habitat has been enclosed. 
 Before leaving this point, it is appropriate to take note of two Digest 
passages, both taken from Ulpian, that may at first sight appear to have some 
relevance to the question. In the first,
21
 Ulpian notes that 'fish which are in a pool are 
not part of a building or a farm'. However, the context makes it clear that he is 




 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 'Stealing Fish' in RF Hunter (ed), Justice and Crime: Essays in Honour 
of the Right Honourable the Lord Emslie, MBE, PC, LLD, FRSE (T & T Clark 1993) 8-10. 
20





talking, not about the ownership of the fish, but about the parts of the building or 
farm that are carried by a sale, as Pomponius' continuation – 'no more than the 
chickens or other animals on a farm'
22
 – makes clear. In the second,
23
 Ulpian notes 
that 'I can prohibit anyone from fishing in a lake which I own'. However, it is clear, 
again, from the context, that he is concerned with the actio iniuriarum. In other 
words, he is concerned with trespass to the land, not ownership of the fish. 
 
(b) France. Pre-Codification French law took a very restrictive approach to the 
acquisition of wild animals by occupatio, reserving hunting rights to the Crown and 
Crown grantees
24
 and excluding acquisition by those without such rights.
25
 The 
French Civil Code appears to follow this in leaving no role for acquisition by 
occupatio: 
 




Although this appears to exclude occupatio, modern French law does in fact 
recognise it. The basis for this is that the original draft Code contained an express 
exclusion of occupatio. However, following consultation, the wording quoted above 
was used instead. Therefore, it is taken that occupatio is intended to be permitted,
27
 
in effect ignoring the actual words of the Code. Clearly, the current wording is still 
seen as unsatisfactory, if that was the intention.
28
 It is notable that the Louisiana Civil 
Code, although influenced by French law, has expressly permitted occupatio since its 
first manifestation, following closely the position of Roman law.
29
 






 Pothier, Propriété, paras 27-40. 
25
 Domat, Civil Law in its Natural Order, Pt 1 3,7,2,8. 
26
 Code Civil, art 713 ('Things which have no owner pertain to the State'). See also art 539, in similar 
terms. 
27
 Planiol, vol 1 para 2565; Bufnoir, Propriété et Contrat 19. 
28
 Planiol, vol 1 para 2565 suggests that the wording is still 'perhaps too general'. Carbonnier, para 902 
suggests that art 713 ought to be read to restrict its scope to land. 
29
 DV Snyder, 'Possession: A Brief for Louisiana's Rights of Succession to the Legacy of Roman Law' 
(1991-1992) 66 Tul L Rev 1853 at 1858-68, especially the textual comparison at 1858-1861 of the 
1808 Louisiana Civil Code and the Justinian's Institutes. 
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 Having allowed acquisition by occupatio, if only by implication, the Code 
Civil provides that hunting and fishing are to be regulated by special legal rules.
30
 
However, these special rules say nothing about the acquisition of ownership,
31
 and 
there is little in the Code Civil itself on the matter, so it is largely left to the courts to 
develop the relevant rules.
32
 
 Opinion is divided as to the rights of a landowner over the animals on his 
land. Planiol allows to the hunter ownership of game that he has taken,
33
 even where 
he is a trespasser or the taking is otherwise forbidden by law.
34
 However, where 
confiscation is imposed by the law as a penalty, Planiol argues that ownership is not 
acquired.
35
 He describes and responds to the contrary argument:  
 
[S]uch a provision established confiscation, that is to say a penalty, and that it 
assumes the previous acquisition of the game. The concept is subtle. Is not 




A response to this would be that there is a clear practical difference if the trespasser 
has conveyed the game to a third party, or has become insolvent. Planiol also notes a 
provision in legislation of 1829 to the effect that one who fishes illegally should pay 
the value of the fish caught to the person with fishing rights: 
 





In the case of confiscation as a penalty, Bufnoir responds that confiscation: 
 
...ne se produira pas au profit du propriétaire. C'est donc bien la preuve que 
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 ibid, para. 2574. 
38
 Bufnoir, Propriété et contrat 21 ('does not profit the owner [ie the person entitled to take the 
animal]. It is this therefore that proves that the game had been acquired on the basis of occupation'). 
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One could argue along similar lines in the case of compulsory compensation to the 




 It does not appear from this that the owner of land has any immediate right to 
wild animals on his land by sole virtue of their presence there. Some degree of 
restraint will be required. Planiol says that: 
 





Nothing is said here about the significance of the size of the enclosure or the level of 
restraint necessary. Reference to canals, however, suggests that very little restraint is 
required indeed. Presumably, on this basis, it will be enough to possess the land on 
which the body of water lies. 
 
(c) Roman-Dutch law. As with Roman law, Roman-Dutch law gave no-one 
ownership of wild animals for the mere fact of their presence on the land.
41
 
Accordingly, in principle one could acquire ownership even if trespassing.
42
 
However, the general position was complicated by the existence of extensive 
restrictions on the acquisition of certain animals to particular types of person or to 
certain times or methods of taking animals,
43
 and the rule appears to have been that 
ownership was not acquired if one was acting in breach of such a restriction.
44
 
 Voet confirms that, in Roman-Dutch law, direct restraint is legally effective, 
and a snared wild animal is possessed.
45
 This is the case even if escape is 
theoretically possible. After all, escape is always at least theoretically possible, even 
if highly unlikely. The point is that, while caught in the snare, the animal is in the 
power of the person who set the trap. As Voet says: 
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213 
 
if a bear has actually fled from his owner, or a wild animal shut up in a live 
park has broken through the fences and escaped in due course, shall we 
therefore say that before flight the bear was not at all in the power of the 
taker, or that the wild animal shut up before his escape was not in the 




The view of Grotius,
47
 that escape must be impossible, accordingly seems contrary to 
principle. 







 or other enclosure
51
 as appropriate is effective as a means of 
retaining possession, and therefore ownership. However, in the case of large 
enclosures, there is a difference of opinion. Grotius points out that 'fish in a private 
lake are no less shut in than in a fishpond'.
52
 However, if (as Grotius himself has 
said
53
) occupatio is based on possession, it must be necessary to show some level of 
control over the animal. In the case of an individual fish kept in such a large body of 
water that it can only be found again by chance, any such control appears negligible. 
Accordingly, the opinion of Voet, that such animals are unowned as having been 'left 
to their natural freedom',
54
 seems preferable. 
 In modern South African law too, it is settled that no right in animals on land 
is acquired solely by virtue of owning that land.
55
 Thus, in S v Mnomiya,
56
 it was 
held not to be theft to take honey made by bees swarming in trees, as the bees were 
ownerless until hived. Bees, being wild animals, are ownerless until reduced to 
someone's possession. Their presence on the land was entirely fortuitous, they being 
still in their natural state. Accordingly, ownership of a wild animal is acquired when 
it is captured, even if that happens in circumstances where such taking is prohibited, 
as where an animal is taken by a trespasser.  
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Unlike the apparent position in Roman-Dutch law, however, ownership is 
acquired even where the animal is taken in contravention of legislation on game or 
fisheries. Thus, in S v Frost; S v Noah,
57
 there was legislation prohibiting fishing 
during particular times of the year. Nonetheless, it was held that the legislation did 
not prevent the acquisition of ownership. As Steyn J observed in this case, '[i]f the 
person who captures a wild animal which is res nullius does not acquire the 
ownership of the animal, to whom does it belong?'
58
 To exclude the common law 
rule, he went on to say: 
 
[O]ne would have to infer that the Legislature intended to reserve to the State 
(or some other person...) the ownership of the wild animal concerned. 
 
South African law does not appear to make any such inference. 
 
(d) Germany. In pre-codification Germany, as with Rome, the general rule was 
applied that a landowner had no right, by virtue of that ownership alone, to any wild 
animals that happened to be on his land.
59
 However, in practice this rule was severely 
restricted in its application by exclusive rights of hunting and fishing in almost all of 
Germany. Where such rights existed, ownership of the animal went not to the taker 
but to the person with the right to take the animal.
60
 This follows Pufendorf, who 
holds
61
 that animals caught by us on another's land are ours, but rejects
62
 the 
argument that this applies even where taking is forbidden. As reported by Pufendorf, 
the argument runs:  
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For a prince cannot be called the owner of wild animals before he has seized 
them, and so a man who has hunted despite a decree to the contrary has not 




He however considers it contradictory to say that only princes have the right to hunt, 
but that others can acquire ownership of what they catch. His view is that 'the hunter 
himself...has by his capture made the game the property of the prince'.
64
  
It is, however, not at all clear that there is any contradiction here. To have the 
right to take an animal does not imply a right to the animal itself. To say that the 
taking is forbidden does not imply that taking must be punished by a denial of 
acquisition of ownership. Indeed, there are other situations in which one can acquire 
ownership even where there is no right to have the property, such as positive 
prescription and specificatio. 
For acquisition by direct restraint of the animal, Pufendorf held that a snare 
set on my land does not give you possession of a trapped animal, 'as I could have 
forbidden you entrance when you wished it'.
65
 This, however, must be read in the 
context of his general view, favouring the landowner over the trespasser. The right of 
the landowner allows Pufendorf to deny possession to the trespasser. However, this 
appears contrary to the established principles governing possession, which do not 
allow resort to consideration of who is actually entitled to possession. Possession is 
not a question of who has a right to the property, because possessory proceedings 
cannot determine who has a right to the property. Possession is simply a question of 
who is in fact in control with the necessary mental element at a given moment. This 
is not to say that the law is not capable of adjusting the precise physical requirement 
to meet particular policy objectives, but that is a different issue. In the type of case 
under consideration here, you could have forbidden me entrance, but you did not, 
and if I am standing over the animal caught in the snare I set, it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that I am in possession of that animal. The policy of the law may be to 
deny me ownership of the animal, as a trespasser, but possession seems clear.
66
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On indirect restraint, Savigny follows the view of Nerva, discussed above, 
that wild animals in a park or fish in a lake are not possessed. Their keeper:  
 
...has undoubtedly done something to secure them, but it does not depend on 
his mere will, but on a variety of accidents whether he can actually catch 




A distinction is drawn between large and small enclosures, therefore: in the former, 
there is no guarantee of being able to find any specific animal. This implies a lack of 
control, and therefore a lack of possession. Pufendorf further supports this position, 
in opposition to Grotius, on the basis that such animals:  
 
...have not yet been stripped of their natural liberty, even though they have 
been so limited in their movements that they cannot wander any place they 
will. For it is one thing to capture an animal, and another to set up an 




In other words, enclosing the animal is merely to make it easier to catch; it does not 
imply that the animal is already caught. 
In modern German law, the position is taken that animals are not property, 
being protected by special laws.
69
 However, the BGB treats animals as property for 
practical purposes, and provides detailed rules for the acquisition and loss of the 
ownership of wild animals. Ownership of wild animals is dependent on possession of 
them in the manner of an owner (Eigenbesitz).
70
 However, ownership is not acquired 
if the taking is forbidden by law or it infringes the right of another to take wild 
animals on the land.
71
 The view has been taken that this is appropriate in the interests 
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of orderly management of wildlife.
72
 The person entitled to hunt may require the 
taker to hand over the animal.
73
 The taker is nonetheless a possessor.
74
 
 All that appears to be required is that the animal is confined on private land or 
in private waters.
75
 No great degree of restraint appears to be required. 
  
(e) England. In early English law, it is broadly the case that the Roman rules of 
occupatio were applied. Bracton's account is strongly influenced by Roman thinking, 
especially through Azo. Indeed, his treatment of occupatio is 'almost in the words of 
Azo'.
76
 Thus, wild animals were acquired through occupatio, regardless of where 
they were taken
77
 There is 'no reason to think' that the Crown had any special rights 
to wild animals.
78
 The law was based on control of the animal,
79
 not ownership of 




 In later law, however, the Roman rules were largely superseded by the rights 
of the Crown and individual landowners.
81
 Subject to Crown rights, the landowner 
had a 'limited property'
82
 in wild animals on his land which, while not amounting to 
full ownership, gave the landowner the exclusive right to take such wild animals. 
Full ownership was only acquired on capture, except for animals too young to move 
themselves from the land. Such animals were said to be owned ratione impotentiae.
83
  
The consequence of this is that game chased and killed by a trespasser is 
owned by the landowner.
84
 Thus, in Blades v Higgs
85
, a number of rabbits had been 
taken by trespassers. The court held that 
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If property in game be made absolute by reduction into possession, such 
reduction must not be a wrongful act, for it would be unreasonable to hold 
that the act of the trespasser, that is of a wrong doer, should divest the owner 
of the soil of his qualified property in the game, and give the wrong doer an 




The same conclusion is thus reached as was reached by Pufendorf above. However, 
the reasoning of the House of Lords gives no support to Pufendorf, depending as it 
does on the idea of a landowner having 'qualified property' in the animals on his land. 
It need hardly be said that no such distinction between 'absolute' and 'qualified' 
ownership is known to the Civil Law tradition. The distinction is nonetheless 
significant in the English law, as a wild animal at liberty, even on private land, 
cannot be stolen.
87
 What the English rule amounts to, then, is 'in substance an 
exclusive right to reduce the wild animal into possession',
88
 rather than a right of 
ownership in the strictest sense. For such acquisition, some level of actual possession 
will be required. 
 There appears to be authority in the United States regarding the extent of 
confinement necessary for such possession as will give full ownership. In one case,
89
 
fish had been placed in an area of water with a surface area of about two acres, the 
maximum depth being about eight feet. There was an outlet from the area into a 
river, but this had been cut off by a wire net. Even though the fish could not escape, 
they were held to be ownerless. They had been restored to their natural environment 
and could only be recaptured in the same way they were originally caught. There was 




(a) Institutional and other early writings. Since early times, there have been 
restrictions on the taking of wild animals on certain types of land, such as royal 
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forests, or at certain times of year.
90
 However, there is no evidence to suggest that 













 all state that ownership is acquired even by a 
trespasser who takes an animal, although the law may order confiscation as a 
penalty.
97
 Thus there can be no conviction for theft in such a case.
98
 This appears to 
have been a long-standing rule in Scotland.
99
 Stair and Erskine both further state that 
this is also true where the right to take animals is reserved to the Crown (or, 
presumably, someone deriving right from the Crown).
100
 The position of English 
law, and of ius commune writers such as Pufendorf, is thus rejected. Only Forbes 
implies a different rule, stating that a person acquires by 'Hunting, Fowling or 
Fishing in Places where he hath a right to do so'.
101
 
 It is not enough, then, simply to have the animal on one's land. One must 
actively confine it in some way. Even if the animal habitually remains on one's land, 
it is not owned unless it is confined in some way. Thus, Stair notes of bees that they 
 
...are not proper though they hive in trees, more than fowls who set their nests 
thereupon, but if they are in a skep,[
102
] or work in the hollow of a tree, wall, 




The final part of this is somewhat obscure. It is difficult to see how bees are any 
more in my possession if they make their hives in a hollow in my wall than they are 
if they are in my tree. Even leaving aside the apparent contradiction, there seems to 
be no real element of confinement here, and there seems to be a lack of animus 
possidendi. The matter becomes clearer, however, if one considers Stair to be talking 
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of something quite different. A practice appears to have existed in northern Europe, 
and indeed still exists in some areas into modern times, of cutting hollows for 
beehives in the trunks of living trees.
104
 Again, there was a practice of building walls 
with cavities, called 'bee boles', for the accommodation of bees.
105
 This latter practice 
was found almost entirely in the British Isles, especially Scotland and England, with 
the greatest number of surviving examples being from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
106
 There is thus no reason to suppose that Stair would have been unaware 
of the practice. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that when Stair talks of bees 
working in the hollow of a tree or a wall he means a hollow made by man 
specifically for that purpose. Although the additional control given by this is 
minimal, the positive act of creating a place for the bees provides a clear assertion of 
right. 
 Wild animals that are confined, such as fish in ponds, are owned.
107
 With the 
exception of Hume, none of the early Scots writers directly addresses the issue of the 
size of the enclosure. This could be taken to indicate that the size of the enclosure or 
structure that the animal is in is unimportant. Indeed, as van der Merwe and Bain 
note,
108
 Stair refers at one point to 'deer in parks' as owned.
109
 Erskine does so 
also.
110
 This would, however, be contrary to the position in Roman law, and to the 
general view in the civilian tradition, that the enclosure must be such as gives real 
control of the animal within it. Indeed, elsewhere Stair refers to,
111
 and impliedly 
adopts, a Digest passage discussed above to that effect.
112
 For Erskine, the reason 
that animals under restraint are owned is that they 'cannot be said to retain any longer 
their natural liberty'.
113
 Accordingly, it may be suggested that there is no acquisition 
of ownership unless there is a real loss of liberty. Similarly, for Hume, wild animals 
in confinement are only owned if they are so restrained that 
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...they cannot escape, and may easily and at any time be caught; such as deer 
in a pen, rabbits in a house, or young pigeons in a dovecot: They are then in 




The larger the enclosure, the more difficult it will be to catch the animal. The 
possibility exists, therefore, that an animal left to wander at effective liberty in a very 
large enclosure may remain unowned, as with the view given above of Pufendorf, 
Savigny and Voet. If occupatio is based on possession, and possession requires 
control of the property, then there will come a point at which the enclosure is so large 
that the owner of the land cannot be said to have any control of the animal, and so the 
animal must be considered ownerless. A fish in a loch would perhaps fall into this 
category. The only one of the older Scots writers to raise this question, however, 




 Curiously, none of these writers appears to address directly the question of 
direct restraint. However, it can hardly be doubted that an animal sufficiently 
restrained by a restraint of this kind is possessed. 
 
(b) Statutory intervention. The Theft Act 1607
116
 imposes a penalty of forty pounds 
Scots on anyone convicted, inter alia, of theft of 'fisches in propir stankis and 
loches'. Lord Rodger suggests that the term 'stank' here means the same as stagnum 
meant for the Roman jurists, ie an area of standing water.
117
 The significance of this 
Act for present purposes is its interaction with the law of property. Given the low 
value of an individual fish, it seems probable that the question of whether a fish is 
owned or is res nullius is most likely to arise, not in a private law dispute over 
ownership, but in criminal proceedings for theft of the fish. For this reason, the 
common law on ownership of fish has been overshadowed by the provisions of the 
Theft Act. 
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In Pollok v McCabe,
118
 Lord Ardwall expressed the view that fish in a 
reservoir were owned by the owner of the reservoir.
119
 However, the point at issue 
was one of statutory construction of the 1607 Act, and so was obiter. In any case, as 
Lord Rodger points out,
120
 the 1607 Act says nothing about ownership, and is not so 
interpreted by the institutional writers.
121
 If the 1607 Act had been intended to 
change the ownership position, the result would have been that taking of fish would 
have been common law theft, with no need for the special statutory penalty provided 
for by the 1607 Act. That penalty, however, now having become nominal through 
changes in the value of money, it is to be supposed that future prosecutions based on 
facts of the same type as those in Pollok v McCabe would rely on common law theft. 
Accordingly, it remains necessary to know the common law position on ownership of 
fish kept in private waters. 
 
(c) Modern consideration. It does not appear to be open to dispute in modern Scots 
law that the owner of land does not, by virtue of that ownership alone, acquire any 




The rule of law is res nullius cedit occupanti. True, if the captor, in the 
exercise of this legal right he trespasses on land not belonging to himself, 
may be liable in damages to the owner of the lands; but the reparation which 
would be claimable by the latter would be only for such damage as might be 
done to the lands themselves, and not for the capture of the wild animals 
thereon. 
 
Thus, in Assessor for Argyll v Broadland Properties Ltd,
123
 there was a lease of land 
for shooting deer. The lease granted the tenant an express right to retain the carcases 
of deer shot by the tenant. The tenant was held not to be entitled to deduct the value 
of the carcases from the rent for valuation purposes, as the lease term did not add to 
the rights the tenant had anyway at common law. Wild animals are res nullius, and so 
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belong to the taker. The tenant's right to the carcases arose not from the lease, but 
from the fact of having taken them. The whole rent was therefore attributable to the 
grant of the right to occupy the land, and not to any grant of a right to keep animals 
that the tenant had shot. In Wallace v Assessor for Wigtonshire,
124
 the same 
reasoning was applied to a lease of oyster fishing rights. 
 In Wemyss v Gulland,
125
 it was accepted that the landowner had no rights in 
the animals on the land, even though he alone had the right to hunt game there. This 
was assumed to be true, even though the numbers of game were increased by the 




[W]ithout specific appropriation a wild animal, although protected and 
preserved on private land, is not the property of any one. 
 
It may be taken as settled, therefore, that ownership of land gives no right in wild 
animals on the land, with the result that such animals are open to acquisition by 
others. This is the case even if the owner of the land has acted in such a way as to 
preserve the animals on the land and to encourage growth in their numbers. Thus, in 
Scott v Everitt,
127
 one convicted of a breach of game legislation was nonetheless 
owner, and was entitled to vindicate from the procurator fiscal game that he had 
caught but which had been seized. 
 In Brown v Watson,
128
 the same principle appears with respect to 
domesticated animals.
129
 In that case, there was a sale of livestock to a farmer. In 
pursuance of the sale, sixty-six sheep were brought to the buyer's farm. The buyer 
being absent, and no-one being found to take care of the sheep, the seller left them in 
an enclosure on the buyer's farm. The court held that there had been no delivery to 
the buyer in this case. Although, as we saw in chapter 3, this case may have been 
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wrongly decided on the facts, it is consistent with the other cases here in holding that 
an animal is not possessed by virtue alone of the fact that it is on a given area of land. 
It is clear, then, that some degree of actual control of the animal must be 
exercised. There is, however, little modern authority on what level of control is 
necessary to possess, and therefore own, a wild animal. Clifford suggests that bees 
are owned 'when working in the hollow of a tree or wall'.
130
 This echoes Stair, 
although no authority is in fact cited, and for reasons given earlier may represent a 
misunderstanding of Stair's view. The view has also been expressed that: 
 
'Control'…does not mean that the animals must be closely caged. It is enough 
that they are confined within a particular area such as a deer park or pond and 





The case of acquisition by direct detention of an animal was considered in 
HM Advocate v Huie.
132
 In that case, it was held to be theft to remove fish from 
fishing nets which had been placed in the water and which had then drifted to shore. 
However, there is no indication whether the possibility of escape would have made 
any difference or, as suggested by Voet, the issue is merely whether the creature is in 
fact detained at this particular moment.  
Similar facts were considered in Mull Shellfish Ltd v Golden Sea Produce 
Ltd.
133
 In that case, there had been a lease of an area of seabed to the pursuers. The 
pursuers placed vertical ropes in the water, on which mussel larvae in the water 
would then settle. They sued the defenders, the tenants of a neighbouring area used 
as a salmon farm, for introducing a chemical to the water which damaged the mussel 
larvae before they attached to the ropes. It was accepted that, although the larvae 
were ownerless and free for any to take while floating free in the water, ownership 
was acquired by the pursuers when the larvae settled on the ropes. However, this 
appears to have been considered to be on the basis of accession rather than 
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occupatio, the larvae acceding to the ropes on attachment.
134
 It seems probable, 
though, that an argument based on occupatio would also have been successful. After 
all, if the mussels are attached to ropes in my possession, and which I have placed for 
that purpose, they seem to be just as much in my control as the ropes themselves. 
As far as indirect restraint is concerned, there appears to be little direct 
modern authority on what is required. One might have expected the point to be 
thought relevant in Valentine v Kennedy,
135
 which concerned fish that had escaped 
from a private loch. As the fish were no longer in the loch, the 1607 Act had no 
application, and so it was necessary to resort to the common law. The sheriff 
assumed
136
 that fish ceased to be ownerless if they were placed in a confined area 
such as a reservoir. The question of the size of the loch was not raised. On the other 
hand, in HM Advocate v Macrae,
137
 a number of persons were charged with mobbing 
and rioting in a deer forest. Their alleged actions involved shooting at deer.
138
 In his 
charge to the jury, the Lord Justice-Clerk observed that the deer were 'not private 
property while running wild'.
139
 It is notable that, on the evidence, this particular deer 
forest, of 30,000 acres in extent, appears to have been entirely surrounded on each 
side by either water or fencing. If, notwithstanding this enclosure, the deer were 
unowned, the implication of this is that only closer confinement will be enough to 
constitute possession in such a case. An animal left running in effective liberty will 
not be possessed, even if it in fact cannot leave the area. 
 
(3) Discussion and conclusions 
 
French, Roman-Dutch, German and English law have all departed to some extent 
from the Roman position, that mere presence of an animal on land does not of itself 
give the landowner any right to the animal. Scots law, however, follows the Roman 
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rule that I acquire a wild animal I take, even if I take it on another's land, without 
right to do so. 
It is clear that possession of an animal by direct restraint is recognised. There 
is no Scots authority on whether Voet's view, that escape need not be impossible, is 
accepted. However, for the reasons given above, it is suggested that Voet's view 
should be accepted as the more consistent with principle. The point is that the animal 
is at present under control. It may be noted that the rule that ownership is lost with 
possession takes for granted the possibility that the animal may escape, but this does 
not prevent acquisition. 
Possession by indirect restraint is also clearly recognised although, as 
suggested above, large enclosures may not be sufficient. As we have seen, I acquire 
no right to an animal merely from its presence on my land. This must be the case 
even if the animal makes its home on my land, for this does not give me the 
necessary control over the animal. If I put a fence around my land, this again makes 
no difference unless the animal is in fact brought within my power thereby. This may 
be sufficient for some animals, especially larger animals. However, one can readily 
conceive of a situation where an animal is no more easily found, because of the size 
or nature of the land, by the mere presence of a fence. It is suggested that an animal 
in an enclosed area, or a fish in enclosed water, is not thereby possessed and owned 
unless the confinement is such as to restrict its liberty to the point that it is brought 
within the control of the possessor of the land. If that person cannot find the animal 
at will, he cannot be said to possess it. An animal in such an area would only be 
possessed if some contrivance such as electronic tagging of the animal were adopted. 
Alternatively, it may be that an animal, though not fully tamed, could be trained to 
come to a call. On the other hand, if the animal does not wander, and direct control 
can readily be reassumed, there seems to be no reason to hold possession not to 
continue, even in the absence of any restraint. 
 
C. POSSESSION THROUGH THE HABIT OF RETURNING 
 
Some animals have by nature a strong homing instinct, such as bees and pigeons. As 
long as they continue to return home, the possessor of that home may be said to 
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possess the animal. For example, when the number of bees becomes too great for the 
hive, some of the bees will swarm and adopt a new home.
140
 At this point, possession 
will cease unless, as we shall see later, the swarm is pursued. 
For other animals, it will be necessary to develop the inclination to return. 
Where such an inclination has been developed, it may continue even where no 
positive inducement to return is offered, and in that case too one can readily consider 
the animal tamed. The question is more difficult where the animal only returns 
because some inducement is offered, such as food or access to mates. Such would 
give the offeror of the inducement at best a tenuous hold over the animal, which may 
indeed receive similar inducements from others: it is not uncommon for pet cats, for 
example, to be fed by more than one house.
141
 For possession, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that there must be some specific person or definable place in the control of 
the person that the animal returns to, and that this must not be merely because some 
inducement is offered but because a habit of return has been developed. Thus, for 
example, if I possess the hive then I possess the bees that return to it; if I have a dog, 
I will continue to possess as long as it continues to return to me, even if it is allowed 
to wander to an extent that would otherwise suggest a loss of possession. 
 
(1) Historical and comparative approaches 
 
(a) Roman law. The idea that an animal, though naturally wild, could be tamed was 
one that was certainly familiar to the Romans, and is reflected in their literature.
142
 In 
Roman law, an animal left at liberty to roam, but which had the habit of returning 
(animus revertendi), was held still to be possessed and owned as long as the animus 
revertendi was retained.
143
 If the animal lost the habit of returning, ownership was 
lost. This was deemed to occur when the animal stopped returning.
144
 The rule 
applied to animals with a natural homing instinct, such as pigeons and bees, and to 
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For Nicholas, this involves a 'stretching of the idea of possession'.
146
 
However, the matter need not necessarily be seen in that way. We have seen in 
previous chapters that a high degree of control is not required. In particular, I need 
not have a thing immediately to hand in order to possess it. If an animal is so tamed 
by me that it returns to me, as long as it continues to do so it may be said to be acting 
under my control. 
 
(b) France. As we shall see later, the general French law on loss of ownership of 
wild animals is overshadowed by specific rules for particular types of animal. 
However, for bees, a rule similar to that of the Roman law has been adopted. 
Swarming bees will continue to be owned as long as the owner pursues them with a 
reasonable chance of success.
147
 This was also the rule in pre-Code law.
148
 The 
existence of this rule, and a similar rule for pigeons,
149
 implies a recognition of 
possession through animus revertendi, at least for animals with a natural homing 
instinct. 
 
(c) Roman-Dutch law. Voet suggests that loss of animus revertendi does not mean 
loss of ownership.
150
 However, Grotius gives the Roman rule that ownership is lost if 
animus revertendi is lost,
151
 as does Huber.
152
 A similar rule is given by van 
Leeuwen, although he seems to place the emphasis more on the mental state of the 
owner than on the mental state of the animal – 'they have continued absent, and have 
been abandoned by us without hope of their returning'
153
 – implying perhaps that 
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ownership is lost by abandonment. Voet in any case appears to contradict himself, 
elsewhere stating in effect the Roman rule.
154
 




(d) Germany. Savigny says
156
 that wild animals are possessed so long as they have 
'the habit of returning to the spot where their possessor keeps them'. Jhering
157
 calls 
this psychological taming, where one has control, not of the animal's body, but (as he 
puts it) of its soul. The animal has apparent freedom, but has animus revertendi. 
Jhering however observes
158
 that, strictly, it makes no sense to talk of animus 
revertendi, as an animal's mental state cannot be known.
159
 In practice, the test is 
consuetudo revertendi. The point, then, is not why the animal is returning. Rather, it 
is enough that the animal is returning.
160
 
 In modern German law, ownership of a tamed wild animal is lost when it 






 stated the rule to be that wild animals were still owned as 




Any remaining doubts were laid to rest in Hamps v Darby.
164
 In that case, the 
plaintiff was a breeder of racing pigeons. It was his practice to release them for 
exercise at certain times, following which they would normally return after about 
fifteen minutes. On the occasion in question, however, they settled on a crop of peas 
being grown by the defendant, a farmer. The defendant shot several of the pigeons. 
At this point the pigeons had been out for more than an hour. The plaintiff raised an 
                                   
154
 Voet, 41,1,3. 
155
 Van der Merwe, Law of Things, para 133 n 1. 
156
 Possession 257-258. 
157
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action for damages, which turned in part on whether the plaintiff continued to own 
the pigeons when they were off his land. It was held that they continued to belong to 
him as long as they retained the habit of returning. It is interesting to note that these 
pigeons were taken still to have the habit of returning, even though they had delayed 
their return in favour of the destruction of the defendant's pea crop. In fact, in 
pigeon-racing, very long delays in returning are common. The effect of such a delay 
is not clear, though in principle it would appear only to be relevant as evidence of 
whether the bird retains the intention to return. As long as the pigeon cannot be said 
to have actually abandoned the attempt to return home, it would seem still to be 
owned. On the other hand, if it has established a permanent nest elsewhere than its 










 all give as the law that wild animals that have the 
habit of returning are possessed and owned as long as they continue to return. There 
is no modern authority on the question, but it seems reasonable to accept that this is 
the law. If, for example, I have a pigeon that returns to me when it is released, it 
seems to be acting under my control. It is only if the pigeon loses that habit that I 




(3) Discussion and conclusions 
 
The rule is universally found in the legal systems examined, that tamed animals are 
possessed and owned only as long as they retain the habit of returning. The 
difficulty, however, is in knowing whether the animal retains the habit of returning if 
it is delayed. Related to this is the question of whether the test is an objective one (is 
the animal in fact returning?) or a subjective one (is the animal intending to return?), 
to which there is no clear answer in Scots law, though an early source refers to 
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ownership as retained as long as the animal has 'the will and desyr'
169
 to return, 
suggesting that the test is subjective. In practice, it is difficult to know at any given 
moment whether an animal still has the habit of returning if it is not actually on its 
way home. Nonetheless, as with the English case of Hamps v Darby, discussed 
above, it is unlikely that loss of animus revertendi will be too readily assumed, 
suggesting that a test that is at least partly subjective is appropriate. One must be 
realistic about the level of control that can be required. Animals wander, and any 
account of occupatio must accept that animals will not always act entirely in 
accordance with their owners' expectations. Although the pigeons in Hamps v Darby 
had delayed their return, they did in fact return home when shot at by the defendant. 
It may be suggested that only a protracted failure to return home should lead to 
ownership being lost in such a case. How long this must be will, of course, depend 
on the individual circumstances, and expert evidence may be required on the habits 
of individual species. 
 
D. POSSESSION THROUGH DISTINCTIVE MARKINGS 
 
An escaped wild animal ceases to be owned, subject to an exception considered later. 
The obvious justification for this is the need for certainty – an escaped wild animal is 
not readily distinguishable from other wild animals of the same species that have 
never been owned.
170
 If this is the justification, it raises the question of whether there 
might be an exception for an animal that can be so distinguished, either by natural 
markings or by a mark placed by human hand. This could also apply to an animal 




(1) Historical and comparative approaches 
 
(a) Roman law. Although the marking of animals, and the keeping of non-native 
animals, was known to the Romans,
172
 there is no evidence that the law of property 
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made any special provision for them. The normal rule applied, that such animals 
were only owned so long as they were possessed. If such an animal escaped beyond 
power of pursuit, ownership would be lost. 
 Watkin suggests that the law may have set its face against the protection of 
ownership of exotic animals on their escape for the reason that the keeping of such 
animals for vulgar profit or as luxury items offended the sensibilities of 
traditionalists: 
 
[F]rom the disapproving perspective of the Roman traditionalists, those who 
sought large profit or decadent delights were not pursuing objectives of 
sufficient moral and civic worth to merit the protection of the law. Thus, if a 
dispute arose between a keeper of birds and a hunter over, for instance, the 
ownership of a fieldfare or even a more identifiable bird, such as a peacock, 





So strong was this view that even ringing or otherwise marking the animal was 
insufficient.
174
 Certainly, the Roman literary sources referred to by Watkin support 
the suggestion that such a feeling existed. However that may be, though, it is clear 
that the law had no special provision for escaped wild animals on the basis that they 
were identifiable. 
 
(b) France. No trace has been detected of any rule of this kind in French law. 
Malaurie and Aynès state
175
 that tigers are owned when detained, implying that the 
general rules on occupatio apply to non-native species. Nothing to the contrary has 
been found with respect to marking of animals. It will be noted below that the 
general rules on escaped animals are of limited application in French law in any case. 
 
(c) Roman-Dutch law. Aside from a hint in a comment by Huber that 'wild and 
unmarked' swans are ownerless,
176
 the only Roman-Dutch writer appearing to give a 
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rule to this effect is Grotius.
177
 His view is that ownership is not lost where the 
animal can be identified due to the attachment of identification marks or a bell. 
However, his argument is based on his view that loss of ownership on escape is 
based on presumed abandonment, rather than the loss of possession. As discussed 
below, this view seems untenable as it would seem that it ought to apply equally to 
domesticated animals. Pufendorf also criticises Grotius on this point, suggesting that 
such marking can only be accepted as an indication that an animal has been tamed.
178
 
 As to animals that are not native in their present location, this does not appear 
to have been considered by the Roman-Dutch writers, or indeed by any writer on 
modern South African law. 
 
(d) Germany. There does not appear to be any rule of this kind in German law, 
although, as we will see below, the consequences of its absence are somewhat 
mitigated by a lenient attitude to the retention of ownership by pursuit. 
 
(e) England. There is an observation in the Case of Swans
179
 that swans that are 'not 
marked' become ownerless on escape, the implication being that marked swans are 
not subject to the same rule. It appears also that some cases on the point in the USA 
have been decided on the basis that the fact of the animal being non-native puts a 






Comparative and historical sources, therefore, provide very little basis for any rule 
that ownership is not lost if the animal remains identifiable. For Scots law, Bell states 
that where animals 'are marked for private property, as deer and swans with 
collars'
181
 ownership is not lost when the animal escapes. This rule does not appear in 
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 It is clear enough that an animal that has escaped beyond realistic hope of 
recovery is no longer possessed. Accordingly, any rule allowing the retention of 
ownership of such an animal is contrary to the general principle that ownership of 
wild animals is dependent on continued possession. Bell himself accepts this 
principle, but states as exceptions to the principle that ownership is retained if the 
animal has animus revertendi or is marked as private property.
183
 The first of these 
stated exceptions, however, is explicable on the basis that one still has control over 
an animal that returns. The proposed exception for marked animals, therefore, stands 
alone and in need of justification. 
 It is unfortunate that Bell gives no source for his rule, though it is not entirely 
surprising given the state of the authorities as they existed in his time. It has already 
been noticed that the existence of a rule of this kind is not securely attested in the 
comparative and historical sources considered above, and no other institutional writer 
gives this rule. If Bell's view is tenable, it is surprising that no-one else gives such a 
simple way of avoiding the rule requiring continued possession. It is scarcely a 
difficult matter to mark an animal. Such an exception would remove much of the 
force of the general rule, so it is barely conceivable that the other institutional writers 
would give the rule without the exception. 
 There is good reason to support a rule of the kind stated by Bell, as a practical 
exception to the requirement for continued possession. It seems harsh to say, for 
example, to one who has paid a large amount of money for a prize racing-pigeon that 
ownership will be lost if the pigeon ceases to return home, even if it is marked. As 
was noted above of the position that has sometimes been taken in the USA, a finder 
of a marked animal can hardly fail to realise that it has been in someone's possession. 
However, rightly or wrongly, it has been the policy of the law that ownership of wild 
animals should be precarious, and last only as long as possession. In favour of this 
policy, it may be said that it allows one hunting lawfully to do so in the assurance 
that an animal living apparently wild will not be held to have an owner who may take 
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an interest in the matter. It should also be borne in mind that a marking may not 
always be visible at a distance. No doubt one who shoots at an animal, in the belief 
that it is wild, bears the risk that it may turn out to be owned,
184
 but this should not be 
pushed too far. A privilege given to markings may be seen as over-protecting a 
former possessor from whose possession the animal may have escaped some 
considerable time ago, and who may indeed have given up hope of recovering it. We 
may also note, therefore, that the markings would not mean that the animal was still 
owned, for it might have been abandoned. Indeed, the markings do not necessarily 
indicate that the animal has ever been owned. For example, if a researcher into 
animal behaviour attaches a tag of some kind to an animal, this seems to be done 
more so the animal may be identified and tracked than it is to demonstrate any claim 
of ownership of the animal. Finally, it will be recalled that, in chapter 6, the view 
was reached that the marking of property was not a sufficient act for the acquisition 
of possession. 
In any case, if the rule that follows from the long-standing policy of the law is 
thought no longer to be appropriate, the appropriate course is for the policy to be 
reconsidered by the legislature. To adopt as law the exception stated by Bell would 
not be a natural development of the principle. Instead, for practical purposes it 
eliminates the principle altogether. Given these considerations, it appears unsafe to 
conclude that any such exception to the general rule exists in Scots law. To the 
argument that injustice arises from this position, the answer is that the reasonable 
owner will insure against escape of the animal if that is considered appropriate, in the 
same way as one may insure against the death of the animal. 
The related question of the position of non-native species has been 
considered. Carey Miller, basing the rule that ownership is lost when a wild animal 
escapes on the fact that such an animal cannot be distinguished from one that has 
never been owned, suggests that the same rule should not apply to non-native 
animals. Such animals 'do not have a natural state in Scotland'.
185
 Similarly, van der 
Merwe and Bain suggest that a wild animal cannot be said to have returned to its 
state of wildness if it cannot fend for itself.
186
 They claim to find support for this 
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position in Bell, who talks of the animal becoming ownerless by returning to its 
'natural liberty',
187
 and Stair, who talks of animals which 'return to their ancient 
wildness'.
188
 For Carey Miller: 
 
The better view is that such a creature must become an unowned thing, 
vesting in the Crown, on termination of an existing state of possession 





Presumably the vesting of the animal in the Crown is on the basis of abandonment by 
the owner.
190
 In any case, this may be construing the idea of an animal's natural state 
too narrowly. When the institutional writers talk of an animal returning to its natural 
state, the point seems to be that it is then no longer in the power of the (former) 
owner, whether because it has escaped from confinement or because it has lost the 
habit of returning. When Stair talks of tamed animals returning to their ancient 
wildness, he is expressly talking of a loss of tameness, not a return to the animal's 
natural habitat. The position is likewise with Bell and 'natural liberty'. This is the 
same whether the animal is native or not, and whether it can survive in the wild or 
not. No distinction is made between native and non-native animals. 
Nonetheless, the idea that non-native species should be treated differently 
does appear to have influenced the court in one case. In Valentine v Kennedy,
191
 a 
number of rainbow trout had been bred in a fish farm and then bought to stock a 
reservoir, from which they escaped. They were caught by the accused, who were 
then charged with theft. The Sheriff expressly declined to hold that rainbow trout 
were not ferae naturae. Instead, he based his decision on the idea that rainbow trout, 
being of a non-native species, continue to be owned on escape 'insofar as they can be 
identified'.
192
 The implication of this is that native species become unowned because 
they cannot be identified. 
However, expressed in this way, the significance of identification is surely 
only an evidential matter, as it assumes that the animal continues to be owned; all 
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that is wanting is the proof that it is this animal that was owned rather than another of 
the same species. No such rule is mentioned in institutional writers, even though 
importation of non-native species was known in their time. They clearly consider 
loss of possession to be the determining factor, not the inability to identify the animal 
following escape. It may be noted that Lord Deas, in Sutter v Aberdeen Arctic Co,
193
 
stated that 'a tiger in a jungle' would be open to acquisition. It is true that this form of 
words assumes the tiger is in its native habitat, but what would be the purpose of 
mentioning tigers if a different rule applied to them if they were in Scotland? 
Certainly, Lord Deas is expressing himself in the manner of someone giving an 
example of a general principle. The tiger is the only animal he mentions that cannot 
be found other than in captivity in Scotland or the surrounding waters (the others 
being foxes, eagles, whales and hares), but he makes no reference to that fact and 
gives no indication that the tiger is a special case. Nor does any such rule appear in 
the Roman or ius commune sources. 
Such a rule would also encounter considerable practical difficulty. Some non-
native species used to be native (eg wolves) and sometimes a non-native species may 
become native (eg grey squirrels). The latter category would include also formerly 
native animals that have been reintroduced to Scotland. Whether a species is native 
therefore provides too uncertain a test. Perhaps a better test would be whether the 
animal is capable of surviving in the wild in Scotland, as was not the case with the 
trout in Valentine v Kennedy. However, even then this is uncertain. Genetic variation 
within the species may mean that some are able to survive, even if the majority 
cannot. It is suggested, therefore, that such a rule should not be adopted, as it 




It appears, therefore, that in Scotland there is no secure basis for a rule that 
possession or ownership is retained through distinctive markings alone, whether 
those markings are natural or artificial. The strongest assertion of a contrary rule in 
the comparative and historical sources is that of Grotius, but his view cannot be 
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accepted for reasons given above. On the other hand, the view that one cannot retain 
possession of an animal through its markings is consistent with the position taken in 
chapter 6, that possession of corporeal moveable things generally cannot be acquired 
through markings alone. 
 
E. POSSESSION BY PURSUIT 
 
Before it is possible to make use of a wild animal, it must first be caught. There may 
be competition in the catching of the animal. The question must then be asked, when 
does one acquire ownership of an animal one is pursuing? Any interference with a 
hunt in progress is likely in any society to be seen as, at least, bad manners,
194
 though 
the legal response will vary.
195
 A legal system basing acquisition of ownership on 
acquisition of possession may take the view that nothing short of actual capture will 
be enough. This view could be supported by an argument of economic efficiency, 
that acquisition by mere pursuit would excessively encourage investment by those 
lacking the skills or resources to make good on that investment. Posner, for example, 
talks of 'the ocean blanketed with amateurs good at flinging harpoons but not good at 
actually killing whales'.
196
 Only the acquisition of actual physical control would be 
enough. It must be said, however, that Posner's argument here is not entirely 
convincing. To have ownership does one no good at all if one cannot actually make 
use of the property. If an individual harpoons a whale which then escapes, for all 
practical purposes he is in the same position whether we say he is owner or not. 
Thus, even if the law gives ownership to one who is merely pursuing, this provides 
no greater incentive to anyone who is not confident of actually capturing an animal 
than would the contrary position.  
It must be borne in mind here that, if the law allows ownership of wild 
animals to be acquired in this way, litigation is most likely to occur where the animal 
has been pursued by two separate parties, the ensuing litigation being between the 
one who pursued first and the actual captor. One may indeed with justice consider 
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that one who has expended time and effort, and possibly money, on the pursuit of an 
animal ought not to be thwarted by one who comes onto the scene later to make the 
final capture. This is particularly the case where the former's efforts have exhausted 
the animal to the point that capture is made easy. One who takes an animal in such 
circumstances seems to be taking an unfair advantage from another's efforts. If, as 
Posner suggests, it is desirable to exclude the unskilled, that can be achieved easily 
enough merely by requiring a high degree of probability of capture. Similarly, where 
the issue arises in criminal legislation concerning the pursuit of game, it is one thing 
to set out to pursue game on private land, but quite another to continue a pursuit 
where an animal mortally wounded in one place, where the hunter is entitled to hunt, 
manages to make its way onto private land before dying. Where one has fatally 
wounded an animal on land where one is entitled to be, it seems unduly harsh to 
apply the taint of criminality if that person goes onto the private land to collect the 
animal, where that trespass would not otherwise be criminal. It is also wasteful, if it 
means the animal must just be left to rot. Locke's view, however, that the mere 
pursuit of the animal is enough to remove that animal from its natural state and bring 
it within private ownership,
197
 is less easy to accept, if acquisition of ownership by 
occupatio is to be said in any sense to be based on possession: I do not acquire 
control just by pursuit, without some clearer indication of control, or at least of the 
likelihood of acquiring control. Where, however, it appears probable that full control 
will be acquired unless some other person interferes, it does not seem unreasonable 
to give ownership of a wild animal to the first to pursue, even though such control as 
has been exercised is rather minimal.
198
 
 Equally, once caught a wild animal may nonetheless escape. As we have 
seen, escape will be held to end ownership. If the animal escapes, its owner is likely 
to pursue it, and the law must consider its response to this. It may be held that 
ownership can be retained if the animal is pursued; alternatively, the law may insist 
on actual recapture, without which the animal is held to be ownerless. 
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(1) Historical and comparative approaches 
 
(a) Roman law. It appears to have been disputed in earlier law whether ownership 
could be acquired before actual capture of a wild animal that was being pursued. 
Gaius notes the opinion of Trebatius, a jurist of the late Republic, that an animal 'so 
wounded that it may be captured'
199
 is owned by its pursuer as long as pursuit 
continues. Watson suggests that this was the general view in the Republic.
200
 
Nonetheless, Gaius prefers what he states to be the majority view, that actual capture 
is necessary, 'because many circumstances can prevent our actually seizing it'.
201
 One 
may dispute the strength of this argument. After all, the possibility of dispossession 
cannot conclusively determine possession. I may lose possession of anything I have, 
but this does not mean that I am not in possession now. Certainly, where the pursuit 
does not have a high likelihood of success, there is no reason to award ownership to 
the pursuer. However, things are arguably otherwise where the pursuer is almost 
certain to take the animal, but for the interference of a third party. Nonetheless, 
Justinian confirms the view given by Gaius.
202
 
 Gaius is concerned here with the pursuit of a wild animal. As Buckland 
notes,
203
 we are nowhere told in the surviving Roman texts whether it is sufficient to 
kill the animal. If the initial pursuer kills the animal with an arrow, but another 
comes in and takes the animal, who is owner?  
One text appears at first sight to be of assistance. Ulpian says, of an escaped 
bear, 'if I kill the bear, the corpse is mine'.
204
 However, he is concerned not with a 
competition between two hunters, but with the scope of the actio de pauperie, 
concerning delictual liability for injury caused by animals. The point is that the 
escaped bear is now ownerless, and so there is no liability in delict on the part of the 
(former) owner for its actions. The comment on subsequent acquisition of ownership 
of the bear is a mere aside. Ulpian is not addressing himself to the present question, 
and is not considering the situation where the killer is prevented from getting his 
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hands on the animal by a third party's intervention, and so he cannot be relied on as a 
guide to the point presently under consideration. 
In fact, there is good reason to think that killing the animal was insufficient 
without further acts. If occupatio is based on possession, some act will be needed to 
supply the corpus element. If wounding is insufficient, killing should also be 
insufficient. The difference between a serious wound and death may be merely 
chance or, indeed, time. Moreover, it may be impossible for a third party to tell 
whether the animal is dead or merely incapacitated without examination. If the 
animal is struck by arrows from both pursuers, it may be impossible to say which 
killed it. Accordingly, the law should, for practical reasons if for no other, favour 
either the first to strike or the first to take. Finally, it may be observed that, even with 
a dead animal, it is nonetheless the case that 'many things can happen to stop you 
catching the animal',
205
 which is equally true if the animal is dead – someone may 
take the carcase before the actual killer can get to it. Accordingly, to hold death to be 
enough is inconsistent with the general position of Roman law. 
 Once ownership of a wild animal is acquired, its continued ownership is 
dependent on continued possession.
206
 However, Roman law allowed ownership to 
be retained by pursuit of the escaped animal. 
 The loss of ownership happened, according to Gaius: 
 





There are therefore two requirements for the loss of ownership. The first is escape 
'from our custody', meaning presumably escape from actual control or confinement. 
The second requirement, return to the animal's 'natural state of freedom', is met when 
the animal 'escapes our sight or, though still visible, is difficult of pursuit'.
208
 
The same rule is applied to swarming bees
209
 and, presumably, to other 
animals formerly having animus revertendi. It will be noted that ownership is lost, 
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even if pursuit is continued, if recovery is 'difficult'. In the texts referred to on pursuit 
of bees, the language used is that ownership is only retained if pursuit is not difficult. 
The implication is that if there is any difficulty at all in pursuit, ownership is lost. It 
is not enough that success is possible, or even probable, according to the language 
used in the Roman sources. Buckland suggests that: 
 
[P]erhaps the true account is that the beast ceased to be owned when the 
chance of recovering him was not materially greater than that of capturing 




However, this does not appear to reflect the Roman texts. An animal may have 
become difficult to pursue, but still be easier to catch than another wild animal. Only 
the former is required by the texts. 
 It is not clear, however, that an escaped animal is still possessed, even if 
pursued. After all, it can hardly be said to be under the control of the pursuer. It may 
be, in fact, that loss of ownership here is based on a general rule that ownership of 
moveable property is lost if the property itself is lost beyond recovery. Ulpian
211
 
refers to a suggestion of Pomponius to this effect. Pomponius is discussing a case of 
a pig carried off by wolves and recovered by a third party. A pig is a domesticated 
animal, not a wild animal. Nonetheless, the rule may be, says Pomponius, that 'the 
thing remains ours so long as it can be recovered'.
212
 This is essentially the same rule 
as given above for wild animals, but it is expressly applied here, by analogy with 




(b) France. Domat's view was that a wild animal being pursued was acquired 'by the 
bare fact of our laying our hands upon [it]',
214
 actual seizure being necessary.
215
 
Pothier, on the other hand, took a view at the other end of the scale: 
                                   
210
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[I]l suffit que je sois à la poursuite d'un animal, quand même je ne l'aurois 





Thus Pothier rejects any requirement for a serious wound, allowing acquisition by 
pursuit alone, even without wounding. 
 The modern position in French law does not allow acquisition quite so easily 
as is implied by Pothier's statement of the rule. The modern rule appears to be that an 
animal under pursuit is acquired when it is either wounded such that it cannot escape 
or under such close pursuit that escape is not possible.
217
 The point then appears to 
be the inability of the animal to escape. Planiol acknowledges
218
 the difficulty of 
judging the seriousness of the wound, and the difficulty where the animal is shot by 
two hunters or is momentarily lost sight of by the first pursuer, but gives no answer 
to the question. 
The position on retention by pursuit is less clear. Malaurie and Aynès state
219
 
that wild animals in captivity, such as boars in a park or tigers in a cage, are equated 
with domesticated animals. Presumably, if they ceased to be in captivity, they would 
therefore equally well cease to be owned. However, any general rule regarding loss 
of ownership of wild animals is in French law largely superseded by two specific 
rules. 
One of these is contained in the French Code civil, which provides
220
 that 
pigeons, rabbits and fish which pass into another dovecot, warren or fish farm pertain 
to the owner of that dovecot, warren or fish farm. Ownership is thus lost. This rule is 
derived from pre-Code law.
221
 
With respect to bees, the French Code rural provides: 
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Le propriétaire d'un essaim a le droit de le réclamer et de s'en ressaisir, tant 
qu'il n'a pas cessé de le suivre; autrement l'essaim appartient au propriétaire 




Interpreted literally, says Bufnoir,
223
 this would mean that the bees were never 
ownerless. In practice, however, it is interpreted to mean same as Roman law. The 
swarm continues to belong to its owner as long as it is within sight. The rights of the 
landowner on whose land the bees take up residence are unclear, however. 
According to Jourdain, the bees automatically become the property of that landowner 
by accession, unless there is fraud.
224
 This was also the view of Pothier.
225
 Bufnoir, 
on the other hand, denies that this is a form of accession and insists that some form 




(c) Roman-Dutch law. The position taken in Roman-Dutch law was that it was 
necessary to catch the animal to acquire ownership,
227
 though the first pursuer may 
have remedy against one who takes first for 'unsportsmanlike behaviour'.
228
 Contrary 
to the position suggested above for Roman law, Van Leeuwen
229
  implies that killing 
is sufficient. 
Modern South African law also adopts the view that actual capture is 
necessary. Mere wounding or close pursuit is not enough. The leading case is R v 
Mafohla,
230
 which concerned a charge of theft of a wild animal, specifically a kudu. 
The animal had been shot and fatally wounded by a hunter, but had escaped sight. 
When, the following morning, the hunter tried to locate the carcase, it was found that 
it had been removed by the accused. It was held that the accused had not committed 
theft. The kudu was ownerless at the time it was taken by the accused, the hunter not 
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having actually captured it. This case may also imply that killing is insufficient 
without actual capture. The actual charge was of theft of 'the carcase of one kudu', 
but there appears to have been no discussion of that point. It seems probable that the 
point would have been raised had it been thought likely to be relevant. 
 Once the animal has been captured, ownership may be lost when it escapes. 
Grotius says that ownership is lost when sight of the animal is lost.
231
 Elsewhere, 
referring specifically to bees, he says that ownership is lost when there is no hope of 
recovery.
232
 It is not clear whether these requirements are meant to be cumulative or 
whether they are meant to be alternatives, or indeed whether this is a special rule just 
for bees. However, Huber
233
 says that ownership of a wild animal is lost when the 
animal is: 
 
...out of sight, or is indeed still visible, but with little hope of fetching him 
back. 
 
This suggests that the requirements stated by Grotius are to be taken as alternatives. 
Ownership is lost when either the animal is out of sight, or there is no hope of its 
recovery. However, whether the true position is Grotius' 'no hope' or Huber's 'little 
hope', Roman-Dutch law appears to be more in favour of the pursuing owner than the 
Roman law, which deprived the pursuer of ownership when pursuit became difficult. 
 Grotius elsewhere gives a very different approach to the problem. He states 
that: 
 
[O]wnership is not actually lost because the wild beasts have escaped, but 
because of the natural inference that we have abandoned ownership on 




It is difficult to see any basis for such an inference, however. The idea that one gives 
up hope of recovering property merely because it is difficult to find is a surprising 
one and, even were it sound, the same ought to apply to absconding domesticated 
                                   
231
 Grotius, 2,4,4. 
232
 Grotius, 2,4,15. 
233
 Huber, 2,3,18. 
234
 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 2,8,3. 
246 
 
animals. There appears to be no trace of the application of the rule to domesticated 
animals. 
In South African law, ownership lost when sight is lost of the animal or it is 
difficult to pursue, following the first of the two alternatives given by Grotius.
235
 
This is subject to an exception created by the Game Theft Act of 1991, which 





(d) Germany. On acquisition of animals by pursuit, Pufendorf said that: 
 
[I]f an animal has received a mortal wound or been seriously crippled, it 
cannot be taken by another so long as we keep up the pursuit of it...while this 





This view was rejected by Savigny:  
 
When a man wounds a wild animal (fera natura) mortally, and follows it up 
close, he does not nevertheless obtain Possession of it until he actually 





For the modern law, the BGB gives no direct answer, providing only that the animal 
is ownerless as long as it is in its state of freedom,
239
 but becomes property when it is 
taken into possession.
240
 The fact that, as we have seen, German law allows 
acquisition only by one with a right to acquire, and not by trespassers, severely limits 
the scope for disputes of this nature. However, it has been suggested that all that is 
required for these purposes is the likelihood of controlling the animal,
241
 implying 
that ownership may be acquired at a point short of full physical control. 
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For retention of an animal by pursuit, Pufendorf followed the Roman rule that 
it was necessary to pursue 'with the probable hope of recovering it'.
242
 
 Modern German law requires less. In the modern law, ownership is lost if a 
wild animal escapes, and the owner unduly delays or gives up pursuit.
243
 Nothing is 
said in the BGB about the difficulty of pursuit. Accordingly, it seems that any effort 
to locate the animal will be sufficient, as long as this is done without undue delay and 
the pursuit is not given up. Indeed, it has been suggested that even such minimal acts 





(e) England. The position stated by Bracton is that:  
 
It is not pursuit alone that makes a thing mine, for though I have wounded a 
wild beast so severely that it may be captured, it nevertheless is not mine 
unless I capture it; rather it will belong to the one who next takes it, for much 




The language used here is strikingly like that of Justinian. Bracton, however, applies 
this even to extent that no acquisition by me when an animal is caught in my net but 
carried off by someone else.
246
 
The rule given by Bracton, that actual capture is necessary, was applied in 
Young v Hichens.
247
 In that case, the plaintiff was fishing, and had nearly 
encompassed a number of fish in a net, when the defendant sailed into the opening 
and took some of the fish in his own net. The court held that actual capture was 
necessary, and that even near certainty of capture was insufficient. It is interesting to 
note that the views of Stair and Bell, discussed below, were cited to the court, but 
were held to be inapplicable to an English case. 
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 (1844) 6 QB 606; 115 ER 228. 
248 
 
The same position, that pursuit alone does not give ownership, has been taken 
in the United States.
248
 Thus a person who pursued a fox to exhaustion did not 
acquire ownership of it,
249
 although it appears to have been held that one may acquire 
by such wounding that capture is inevitable, the point being that the animal has 
thereby been brought within the pursuer's control.
250









[I]f they escape out of his private waters into an open and common river, he 
may bring them back and take them again...But if they have gained their 
natural liberty, and are swimming in open and common rivers, the King's 
officer may seise them in the open and common river for the King: for one 





On this point, the case relied on Bracton. It would appear that the pursuit must be 
such as to allow the swans to be distinguished from wild swans. Presumably, then, 
only very close pursuit will be enough. This is certainly implied by Bracton, who 




The issue was considered more recently in Kearry v Pattinson.
255
 In that case, 
the plaintiff's bees swarmed and settled on a neighbour's land. The court's view was 
that the plaintiff owned the bees as long as they were in sight and he had the power 
to pursue them, but that this power ended if they went onto land where he was not 
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entitled to go. As the bees became ownerless on entering the neighbour's land, he 




(a) Institutional and other early writings. On the question of when in the pursuit 
ownership of a wild animal is acquired, the earlier Scots writers do not speak with 
one voice. At one extreme, Hume implies that actual capture is necessary: 
 
If I wish, for instance, to secure for myself a wild animal in the fields...the 
means which nature points out to me for that purpose is to bring the thing, if I 
can, under my natural power and dominion – to form a close and immediate 
connection with it, such as shall hinder every other person from interfering 





The word 'wrong' is presumably meant to be read with the word 'violence' as a word 
of emphasis here, for the wrong that exists in the taking of my property is a 
consequence rather than a cause of my right in it. With that in mind, we can see that 
Hume demands a very close physical connection with the animal. Clearly, pursuit 
alone will not be sufficient, for another can take an animal I am pursuing without 
doing any violence to me. Forbes gives the same rule: 
 
Things belonging to no Body are acquired by one's laying Hands upon them, 




It must be said, though, that neither Hume nor Forbes is here considering directly the 
question of a competition between two hunters who have both pursued the animal. 
 At the other end of the scale, Bell holds that the animal can be acquired at a 
point before actual capture: 
 
The act of appropriation is effectual to vest the property only when complete. 
But it is held complete while fairly proceeding towards full accomplishment. 
So, if one wound an animal to death, or so that it cannot escape, or if one, 
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without wounding it, have an animal in pursuit, and not beyond reach, 
another coming in and taking the animal does not deprive the first of his right 




This is clearly a much lower standard. Mackenzie gives the same rule.
259
 The 
approach is a long-standing one in Scots law.
260
 It would appear, on Bell's view, that 
one can acquire ownership without actual capture, or even wounding, as long as, 
presumably, capture was certain or at least to a high degree likely but for the 
interference of another. A cornered animal might be an example. 
 Stair's view is unclear. In his account of the matter, he initially appears to 
give a similar view to that of Bell: 
 
[I]t is the first seizure that introduceth property, and not the first attempt and 
prosecution; as he who pursueth or woundeth a wild beast, as fowl or fish, is 
not thereby proprietor, unless he had brought it within his power, as if he had 
killed it or wounded it to death, or otherwise given the effectual cause 




On this view, the animal is acquired once the pursuit has reached the point at which it 
can be said that the animal is in the pursuer's power. This may happen before actual 
capture although, unlike in Bell's account, there is no indication that ownership can 
be acquired by pursuit without wounding. The example Stair gives is of a whale 
forced onto the shore by its wound. However, he then goes on to give a somewhat 
different account: 
 
Though the falling in upon another's game when he alone is in prosecution, 
may be uncivility or injury, yet it hindereth not the constitution of property; 
though it be a just ground to annul the right of the first possessor, and make 
him restore to the first prosecutor, if he continue his pursuit with a probability 
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This appears to be the same as the view expressed by Grotius. Bankton gives the 
same view,
263
 subject to capture by the first pursuer being 'certain' but for the 
interference. Adam Smith
264
 also gives this view, on the basis of his idea of exclusive 
privilege, discussed below. 
 Both Stair and Bankton rely on King's Advocate v Rankine.
265
 This case arose 
during war with the Netherlands. A prize was pursued by a French ship, but was 
taken first by a Scottish privateer.
266
 On analogy with occupatio, it was held that the 
prize went to the French ship unless it would have escaped but for the privateer's 
intervention. However, it is not clear from the case whether the correct view is that 
the pursuit was sufficient on its own, or whether the second view expressed by Stair 
is the correct one. Only a case where the first to capture became insolvent, or 
conveyed the animal to a third party, before it was handed over to the first pursuer 
would give a different result depending on which rule was adopted. There has been 
no such case. If, though, the first to capture is owner, it is difficult to see what the 
basis for the first pursuer's claim might be. It also seems unduly complex to make the 
former owner but to make this subject to an obligation to yield up the property to the 
latter. 
 If a wild animal escapes (or, if tamed, loses the habit of returning) then, as is 
true elsewhere, possession can be maintained by pursuit. On this, the institutional 
writers are more consistent. For Stair, possession is lost, and with it ownership, 'so 
soon as the owner ceaseth to pursue for possession'.
267
 For Bankton, ownership of a 
tamed animal is lost 'after the former owner leaves off prosecution, which is likewise 
the case of an [sic] hive of bees that fly away'.
268
 Erskine says that an escaped animal 
is free for acquisition 'after the former proprietor has given over the pursuit'.
269
 
Likewise, for Bell, swarming bees continue to be owned only 'while pursued by the 
owner'.
270
 What is notable about these views is not only the striking unanimity 
between the institutional writers, but also that fact that there is no reference here to 
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the difficulty of pursuit. Only Mackenzie gives a different view, that escaped animals 
are retained only 'if they be yet recoverable by us'.
271
 Curiously, there is some 
indication that a rule similar to the Roman rule was followed at an earlier period.
272
  
Arguably, the majority view is consistent with the suggestion by Grotius that 
loss of ownership here is based, not on loss of possession, but on deemed 
abandonment. Certainly, there is no equivalent in Scots law of the Roman rule, 





(b) Adam Smith and exclusive privilege. Adam Smith comments distinctively on 
this issue as part of his general discussion of real rights. He identifies four real rights, 
namely property, servitude, pledge and inheritance.
274
 The last is included on the 
basis that an heir has the right of 'excluding all others from the possession untill [sic] 
he determine whether he will enter heir or not'.
275
 
 He goes on to argue on this basis that all such exclusive privileges are also 
real rights, giving as further examples intellectual property rights
276
 and commercial 
monopoly rights,
277
 on the basis that the holder of such a right is entitled to exclude 
all others from its enjoyment.
278
 Similarly, he says, a hunter may be said to have a 
right not to be disturbed in the chase, even though he is not owner until actual 
capture: 
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[T]he trespass here is plainly against the exclusive priviledge [sic] the hunter 




The nature of the hunter's exclusive privilege is, however, unclear. Smith makes 
clear that it is not based on a breach of a property right.
280
 On the basis that this 
exclusive privilege arises in any case of pursuit of an animal, even 'in a state of 
hunters...before the origin of civil government',
281
 Metzger suggests that:  
 
Smith would presumably class both rights [ie the exclusive privilege of a 
hunter and that of an heir] as among a man's (natural) right to liberty, or some 




The difficulty with this view, however, is that Smith refers specifically to someone 
with some special right to hunt, rather than to any general public right to take wild 
animals. The language he uses – 'one who has a right to hunt'
283
 – suggests this. 
Moreover, he elsewhere gives a general position that is contrary to any general 
exclusive privilege belonging to those in pursuit of wild animals. He states that one 
chasing a hare, but who has not yet caught it, does not have sufficient power over it 
that a reasonable observer would consider him to have suffered an injury if another 
takes it.
284
 It is true that he is talking here about the earliest age of humanity, his Age 
of Hunters, in which for him all ownership was based on continued possession.
285
 
However, there is no indication that the rule of acquisition is to be different in later 
ages. When Smith comes to the next age of humanity, the Age of Shepherds, the only 
difference that he notes with regard to wild animals is that ownership may now be 
retained when the animal is 'tamed so as to return back to us after we have let them 
out of our power, and do thus habitually'.
286
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 Elsewhere, though, Smith does give a view consistent with Metzger's 
account, dropping the reference to the right to hunt.
287
 The explanation for this 
apparent discrepancy appears to lie in the nature of the Lectures on Jurisprudence as 
they have come down to us. The published edition is based on two reports of the 
lectures by students attending them. The earlier, based on the lectures delivered in 
1762-3, takes up the first 394 pages of the published edition. The later, based on the 
1766 lectures, takes up the remainder of the book
288
. The passage referred as giving 
the restricted view, that only those hunters with some actual right to hunt have an 
exclusive privilege to those animals they are pursuing, belongs to the earlier report; 
that reflecting the broader view belongs to the later report. It seems probable, then, 
that what we see is Smith's views developing between the two series of lectures. 
There is, of course, nothing unusual in a lecturer's ideas developing between 
sessions. 
Either way, we see that Smith to some extent allows to hunters in pursuit an 
exclusive right to the animal pursued which is not based on ownership. As we have 
seen, this is inconsistent with the majority view of the institutional writers. We shall 
see, too, that it is not the view followed in case law. Nor is there any indication in the 
cases that one with a right to hunt is in a better position than one without, as is 
implied by Smith's view in the 1762-3 report. Where the issue is raised in the cases, 
it is only as the basis of a defence to a charge of trespassing in pursuit of game. It is 
never said that a hunting privilege gives any better right to the animals pursued. 
 On ownership of escaped animals, Smith follows other writers in allowing 
ownership to be retained by pursuit. However, he differs from the institutional 
writers in requiring a 'probability of recovering'
289
 the animal, on the basis that the 
connection with the animal that was acquired with ownership is lost when the animal 
has escaped beyond any probability of recovery. The former owner's relationship 
with that animal is then no different from his relationship with any other animal of 
the same kind. 
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(c) Whales. Whales, of course, will often be caught in international waters, where 
there is no particular reason to apply Scots law specifically. Instead, customary rules 
have tended to apply. The most common of these is the 'fast and loose' rule.
290
 This 
rule holds that the whale belongs to the ship that first struck it as long as the harpoon 
is still attached to the ship and the whale or, even if the harpoon has become 
detached from the whale, the whale is tangled in the line. If, however, the line 
breaks, or the harpoon becomes detached from the whale, the whale is once more 
free for acquisition. 
 In Sutter v Aberdeen Arctic Co,
291
 the pursuers were owners of a whaling 
ship, the Clara. The defenders were owners of another ship, the Alibi. The two ships 
were engaged in whaling. The pursuers were using an unconventional method of 
whaling. Instead of wounding the whale with a harpoon attached to the boat by a 
line, and allowing the whale to drag the boat through the water until it is tired enough 
to be easily taken, the pursuers had adopted a technique from the natives of the area, 
known as 'drogging'.
292
 This involved releasing the line from the boat once the whale 
had been harpooned, with inflated seal skins, known as 'drogs', attached to the end. 
The idea was that the whale would exhaust itself by having to drag these drogs 
through the water, and would thus be easily caught. An employee of the pursuers 
drogged a whale. However, before the whale could be taken, employees of the 
defenders moved in and killed the whale. On the basis that both ships were 
European, and had not accepted the native custom, the Lord Ordinary applied the fast 
and loose rule and found in favour of the defenders.
293
 A majority of the Inner 
House, however, reversed this decision, and applied the Scots law of occupatio, 
although Lord Curriehill, in the minority, appeared to consider the fast and loose rule 
to be a specific application of the same principle, compliance with it being 'the 
test…of a whale in such circumstances being within the power of man'.
294
 The House 
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of Lords, though, considered that the fast and loose rule applied in these 
circumstances, and not the general Scots law of occupatio. 
What is problematic about the decision of the House of Lords in this case is 
that, arguably, the fast and loose rule is inappropriately applied. It is one thing to 
apply the rule to conventional whaling, using a harpoon fixed by line to the ship. 
This is what the rule is designed for, and at least has the merit of producing a clear 
result in a competition between two ships whaling using this method. However, the 
method used by the pursuers in Sutter was an entirely different method. There is no 
reason why a rule developed for one method should apply to another method.
295
 The 
logical result of the reasoning of the House of Lords is that no whale could be 
acquired in any way other than by the conventional method. The clearest indications 
of possession would be insufficient, unless the customary rule could be shown not to 
apply.
296
 As a result, innovation is eliminated, for no-one is likely to use a method of 
whaling that is legally ineffective, even if, for all that is known, it may be a superior 
method. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor acknowledges
297
 the possible superiority of 
drogging, eliminating as it does the problem of the pursuing ship being forced to cut 
the line if the whale dives in water deeper than the length of the line available.
298
 In 
addition, the Lord Ordinary noted
299
 that drogging had the advantage that a single 
boat could be used to catch a whale, as opposed to the conventional practice of the 
whale being killed by men on a number of boats belonging to the same ship. 
Drogging may therefore be seen as superior in terms of both safety and efficiency, 
yet is excluded by the decision of the House of Lords in this case. In the House of 
Lords, Lord Chelmsford
300
 appeared to consider that the operation of two rules 
would be likely to lead to conflict between the two. However, with all due respect, it 
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is difficult to see how such a conflict could arise. The two are simply different 
methods of acquiring ownership. At any given time, either a given person has 
acquired ownership, or else he has not. In the latter case the animal is still open to 
acquisition. In the former, it is not. 
It would be unfortunate if the law were so restrictive as to require customary 
rules be followed to the extent of restricting other methods. In fact, however, in at 
least one case,
301
 discussed below, the normal Scots law of occupatio was applied to 
whales. 
 
(d) Legislative intervention. The taking of wild animals is now extensively 
regulated by statute
302
. The focus of these provisions, however, is not on ownership 
of animals. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the common law of occupatio 
may be helpful in interpreting such legislation in appropriate circumstances. Thus, it 
is an offence to trespass on land 'in search or pursuit of game'.
303
 On the basis of 
cases on this provision, it has been suggested that:  
 
[E]ntry on land to retrieve dead or moribund game or game apparently dead is 





With respect, however, this is not a necessary implication. To say that an animal is 
being pursued implies that it is attempting to escape. It could equally form the basis 
of such a rule as is described here that dead or moribund game is no longer being 
pursued, due to its inability to attempt to elude capture. Indeed, in one of the three 
cases cited by Gordon in support,
305
 it was not in fact proved that the stag removed 
by the accused had actually been killed by the accused. As the Lord Justice-Clerk 
said in that case: 
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A man trespassing in search or pursuit of game...is a man whose object is to 




Nonetheless, the question of when ownership was acquired was held to be decisive in 
one of the other cases cited by Gordon,
307
 and the same approach is implicit in the 
other.
308
 Accordingly, it does appear that some guidance can be obtained from 
criminal cases on the game laws. 
 The Game (Scotland) Act 1832 is repealed by the Wildlife and Natural 
Environment (Scotland) Act 2011. The 2011 Act creates no direct equivalent to the 
offence of trespassing in pursuit of game. However, section 7 of the 2011 Act inserts 
into the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 a new section 11G, which imposes a 
criminal penalty on any person who 'intentionally or recklessly kills, injures or takes' 
a wild hare or rabbit. There is a defence of consent of the person entitled to take wild 
hares or rabbits
309
. The issue of acquisition of ownership could arise under these 
provisions, if 'taking' is taken to be equivalent to acquisition of ownership. If 
ownership may be acquired by pursuit, the animal may be held to have been taken on 
one area of land in respect of which permission has been given, even if it is only 
finally captured on another area of land. 
 
(e) Acquisition of possession by pursuit. The general rule appearing in case law is 
that ownership may be acquired, in certain circumstances, by pursuit. It is not 
necessary to catch the animal. Thus, in Nicoll v Strachan,
310
 a rabbit was shot on a 
public road, ran onto private land and then fell dead. In an appeal against conviction 
for trespassing in pursuit of game, it was held that its retrieval was not a trespass 'in 
search or pursuit of game', as long as the rabbit was so injured that it couldn't make 
its escape. This implies that it was the infliction of this wound that gave ownership. 
A passage in Rankine's Landownership,
311
 apparently to the contrary, is explained by 
Lord Guthrie
312
 as referring to the situation where the animal is only slightly 
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wounded. There is no indication that, despite what Stair, Bankton and Smith say, the 
hunter acquired any right less than ownership on wounding the animal in this 
manner. If the first pursuer of a wild animal acquired only an 'exclusive privilege' to 
the animal pursued, it would have been necessary to conclude that the accused in 
Nicoll v Strachan was still 'in...pursuit of game' when he entered private land to 
recover the rabbit. 
The same principle, that actual capture is not necessary, was applied by the 
Inner House in Addison & Sons v Row.
313
 In that case, a whale was harpooned but 
then got loose. It was taken by a ship that had come to assist. The view of the court 
was that: 
 
[I]f I once seize upon the animal, and it breaks away from me, and I still 
continue in pursuit, I do not thereby lose my right as first occupant, so long as 




There is here no indication that the wound must be severe. The question must be 
asked, therefore, whether there are circumstances in which a lesser wound will be 
sufficient. 
As we have seen, in Aberdeen Arctic Co v Sutter the House of Lords applied 
the fast and loose rule. However, in the Inner House the general common law 
approach was adopted. The two judges giving substantial opinions for the majority 
differed somewhat in approach on this question. The Lord President appears to give 
the pursuer ownership as soon as the whale is struck by the harpoon, which 
ownership is retained by pursuit,
315
 although he was clear that the whale was 
disabled when caught. By contrast, Lord Deas stressed the extent of the injuries, 
implying that ownership was not acquired by the pursuers until the whale's injuries 
were such as to bring it within the power of the pursuers. For him, the rule is that: 
 
A wild animal mortally wounded or totally disabled by one sportsman, who 
continues in hot pursuit, cannot be claimed by another sportsman who strikes 
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in and kills it outright, just as the other is coming up. The first sportsman may 




When the drog is first attached to the whale, it cannot be said to be in such a 
condition. Accordingly, it would appear on this view to have been open to 
acquisition by another even when struck. In his dissenting opinion, Lord Curriehill 
takes in his account of occupatio the same approach. He takes a differing 
interpretation of the evidence, holding the whale to have been 'in quite a lively 
state'
317
 just before capture. The one significant point of difference between the 
statements of the law of Lords Curriehill and Deas is that the former will not excuse 
any losing of sight of the animal during the pursuit. For him, the whale while 




 The approach of Lord Deas was the same as that taken in Donald v 
Boddan.
319
 In that case, there was a charge of entering land in pursuit of game. The 
accused had mortally wounded a hare on land where he was entitled to be, but the 
hare was actually killed by a dog, under the control of the accused, on neighbouring 
land. In support of the argument that ownership was acquired on wounding, the 
views of Pothier and Pufendorf were cited.
320
 This argument was accepted, even 
though there was no continuous pursuit – the accused had left off the pursuit to get 
the dog, and then returned to the pursuit. The accused had accordingly lost sight of 
the hare. The significant point may be that the accused only broke off pursuit for a 
very brief period. A longer delay in carrying through the pursuit may be taken as 
abandonment of the pursuit
321
. A distinction may be made, however. In Donald v 
Boddan, the hare was traceable, the pursuer merely having to break off pursuit 
temporarily to fetch a dog. If, on the other hand, the animal is lost track of altogether, 
the fact of its being wounded will not give ownership. Some flexibility is allowed on 
this, however. As we have seen, in Sutter v Aberdeen Arctic Co, the whale was under 
water for extended periods. The expectation was, however, that the whale would be 
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forced to come to the surface. If, however, the pursuer had left the fishing ground, 
that would have been taken to constitute abandonment of the pursuit.
322
 
The decision in Wilson v Dykes
323
 shows the necessity of carrying through the 
pursuit. That case concerned a charge of theft. The complaint was that the accused 
had picked up, on a public road, a pheasant dead or totally disabled by shot. It was 
held that the natural inference from these facts was that the pheasant was ownerless. 
It was necessary to libel facts indicating how the pheasant was already private 
property. The court did not say what facts would be enough, but this implies that 
wounding alone, without following through pursuit, is not enough. 
 It will be recalled that Bell allowed acquisition by pursuit even without 
wounding. This proposition finds little support from case law. The main case on the 
point is Stove v Colvin,
324
 concerning ownership of whales captured off the island of 
Yell, in Shetland. A party of men from the south of the island drove the whales into a 
bay on the island. They were then joined by a party from the west of the island, who 
helped in killing the whales and dragging them to the shore. It was held that the West 
Yell men were entitled to an equal share of the whales. This implies that the driving 
of the whales into the bay and trapping them there was not enough to give 
ownership. It was only when the killing started that ownership of the whales was 
acquired. 
 It would be going too far, however, to conclude from this that possession can 
never be acquired by pursuit, without wounding. The point appears to be the level of 
control that has been exercised. Fatally wounding the animal will normally imply a 
higher degree of control than mere pursuit, but this need not be the case in all 
circumstances. A wild animal that has been cornered, for example, may be said to be 
under the pursuer's control. Indeed, there may be reasons why, in the circumstances, 
wounding is undesirable. McArthur v Jones,
325
 for example, concerned an attempt to 
detain animals under the Winter Herding Act 1686. Five cattle belonging to Jones 
trespassed on McArthur's land. McArthur sent an employee to take possession but, 
when he was at about six yards from them, the cattle moved off onto the public road, 
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where they were turned by the employee and driven back after they had gone about 
200 yards along it. The acts that took place before the cattle left McArthur's land 
were held to be insufficient for possession. As the Lord Justice-Clerk said,
326
 acts 'of 
an overt nature' were required. This would not mean necessarily wounding the 
animals – that would clearly be inappropriate when the animals were only to be 
detained as security. However, it may reasonably be supposed that acts more clearly 
indicative of an intention to possess, and showing clearer control over the cattle, 
would be required. As it was, the employee's actions were equally consistent with an 
intention to drive the cattle from the land. 
 
(f) Retention of possession by pursuit. In one modern textbook, the position is 
stated as follows: 
 
[T]he animal is still owned so long as the owner pursues it and has a 




It will be noticed that this statement of the law departs from that of the institutional 
writers in adding a requirement that there be a reasonable chance of recovery of the 
animal. Unfortunately, there appear to be no modern cases directly considering the 
retention of ownership of wild animals by pursuit. In only two reported cases does 
the issue appear of potential relevance.  
In Valentine v Kennedy,
328
 discussed above, a number of fish escaped from a 
loch, but this point was not considered. It was assumed that the fish continued to be 
owned on escape, unless they were abandoned, in which case they would fall to the 
Crown, although as Rodger
329
 points out there is no warrant in authority for holding 
fish to fall to the Crown when abandoned, if fish are truly ferae naturae. It is notable 
that the sheriff in Valentine v Kennedy expressly declined to hold that the fish had 
ceased to be ferae naturae.
330
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 concerned a charge under the 1832 Act. A tenant 
farmer was entitled to snare rabbits, but not hares. The accused, an employee of the 
farmer, took a hare, apparently dead, from a snare. The hare revived and ran off, but 
was caught by the accused's dog. This was held not to constitute a contravention of 
the Act, but not because the hare was owned by the accused's employer, and by 
pursuing it he was maintaining that ownership. Instead, the basis of the decision was 




Accordingly, although in either case the court might have used this principle 
as the basis for its decision, in fact it did not. Nonetheless, there seems to be no 
reason to doubt that the statement of the law given by the institutional writers is 
accurate. This suggests that any degree of pursuit will be sufficient. It may be 
supposed also that ownership will be retained even if there is some delay in 
beginning pursuit, as long as that pursuit is not unreasonably delayed. After all, it is 
hardly to be supposed that the owner will necessarily witness the escape. It is 
probably more likely that the owner will only become aware of the escape at some 
time afterwards. As we have seen, this is the position of German law. 
If any pursuit is sufficient for the retention of ownership, regardless of the 
difficulty of capture, this implies that Gibb is wrong when he suggests that swarming 
bees are still owned by their former possessor 
 





Unfortunately, only English authority is given for this suggestion, which does not 
seem consistent with principle. It may be true that the owner of private land may 
prevent entry in pursuit of an escaping animal. No doubt, if the landowner does so, 
ownership of the escaping animal will be lost. However, that does not imply the 
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conclusion given by Gibb. We have seen that, unlike the rule in England, even a 
trespasser becomes owner of any wild animal caught. Equally, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that, even if it be an actionable trespass to do so, if one in fact pursues an 
escaping animal onto private land, ownership will be retained. 
 
(3) Discussion and conclusions 
 
On the question of acquisition by pursuit, either view can be justified by principle.
334
 
It is just a question of how much control is required. The authorities indicate, 
however, that actual capture is not necessary in Scotland. Of the other systems 
considered, only France takes the same approach. 
In most cases, it is likely that wounding of the animal will be necessary. 
However, if the point of occupatio is possession, then the issue is whether the animal 
has been brought under the control of the party in question. Wounding can hardly be 
required in all cases, therefore. A tranquilizer dart, for example, would have the same 
effect as a bullet as far as ownership is concerned. Equally, an animal that has been 
cornered such that it cannot readily escape, may be held to be possessed. Likewise, it 
seems probable that Young v Hichens, had the same facts occurred in Scotland, 
would have been decided differently, the level of control over the fish being much 
greater than, for example, the level of control of the whales in Stove v Colvin before 
the killing started. Nor, as is indicated by Sutter v Aberdeen Arctic Co and Donald v 
Boddan, is it an obstacle that the animal is temporarily lost sight of in the pursuit. On 
the other hand, wounding or even death will not be enough if capture is not probable. 
Thus, trace of the mortally wounded animal having been lost, the result in R v 
Mafohla
335
 might well have been the same had the facts occurred in Scotland. 
As far as retention by pursuit is concerned, in light of the unanimity of the 
institutional writers, and in the absence of contrary authority, it would appear that the 
view of the institutional writers should be followed. Accordingly, ownership of a 
wild animal is retained, even on its escape, as long as the owner continues pursuit. 
There is no requirement that the pursuit be likely to succeed. 
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As long as such pursuit is carried on, therefore, the current law is consistent 
with the policy argument of van der Merwe and Bain,
336
 referring to Valentine v 
Kennedy, that: 
 
[T]here seem to be cogent grounds for supporting [the sheriff's] conclusion 
that wild animals born in captivity and exploited for commercial gain should 
remain the property of the owner of the stank or game farm from which they 
escape. 
 
This can be achieved, they suggest, even without actual pursuit, by following 
Germany or Grotius.
337
 However, as we have seen, Grotius's position is based on 
deemed abandonment of the animal. There is no trace of any such doctrine in the 
Scots authorities. Equally, modern German law appears to have reached the position 
where the requirement for pursuit is all but abolished. Even were such a development 
permissible on the basis of the Scots authorities, it is doubtful whether it gives 
sufficient notice to a third party who may deal with the animal as if it were 
ownerless. 
All of this raises the question whether this is possession at all. After all, 
control is an aspect of possession which is entirely absent where the animal has 
escaped, even if it is pursued. Stair's wording may be taken to suggest that the 
pursuer is not in possession – 'property thereof is lost so soon as the owner ceaseth to 
pursue for possession'.
338
 To talk of someone pursuing for possession is perhaps to 
imply that he is not presently in possession. 
 Moreover, if 'control' in the context of common law liability for animals 
means the same as possession, further support is added to the view that an escaped 
animal is not possessed, even if pursued.
339
 There is one reported case on liability for 
animals that may be thought to be of assistance in this regard. In Stillie v Wilson,
340
 a 
bull belonging to the defender was released from a vehicle to be placed in a field. 
However, the bull broke free and ran off. The bull ran along the road, where it 
injured the pursuer. Because the bull had not previously exhibited any dangerous 
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tendencies, under the law applicable at the time
341
 the defender's responsibility was 
to take all reasonable care to seek to confine it. It is clear from the reasoning of the 
court that merely pursuing the bull would not constitute confinement. Clearly, 
'confinement' and 'possession' are different concepts. However, equally clearly they 
are related concepts. Confinement here cannot mean confinement in an enclosed 
area, or it would be very difficult to move such livestock from one place to another. 
Presumably, confinement here is to be taken to mean something like 'control'. 
Accordingly, the reasoning of the court in this case is at least consistent with a view 
that an escaped animal is no longer possessed, even if pursued. The rule that 
ownership of an escaped wild animal is retained by pursuit therefore becomes an 
exception to the general rule that ownership of such animals is dependent on 
continued possession. 
 There remains one final point to note. If acquisition by pursuit is based on 
possession, and ownership may be retained by any pursuit without reasonable 
prospect of success, there is perhaps a conflict between these rules. Suppose that I 
am in pursuit of an animal. I have wounded it sufficiently that my success is 
probable. According to the current rule, I have acquired possession and ownership 
already. Suppose, then, that contrary to expectation the animal eludes me. It is 
attempting to escape from my possession and ownership. According to the rule on 
retention of ownership by pursuit, I ought to be able to retain ownership by 
continuing my pursuit even without hope of success. Yet this does not appear to be 
the law. The conflict could be resolved by requiring actual capture for acquisition, or 
a reasonable chance of success for retention, but neither seems permissible on the 
basis of the authorities as they stand. Presumably, then, the rule on retention by 
pursuit only comes into effect when the animal has been fully brought under control. 
Nonetheless, one can easily envisage borderline cases (perhaps with an animal that 
has only just been brought under control), leaving the law with an unsatisfactory lack 
of clarity. 
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As we have seen, occupatio in Scots law is broadly based on possession, though 
some modification is necessary due to the special nature of animals. Thus, for 
example, even if the animal is not presently confined, possession may still be 
retained if the animal has the habit of returning. Likewise, special consideration has 
been given to the question of how possession is acquired – most types of property 
will not try to run away. In Scots law, as we have seen, pursuit without actual capture 
may sometimes be enough, though most of the systems considered have a stricter 
rule. 
 Policy arguments too, such as the view that ownership of a perhaps valuable 
animal should not be too easily lost, allow some departures from strict adherence to a 
rule based on possession. Thus, ownership of a wild animal may be retained by 
pursuit, even though it is not at all clear that the animal is still possessed in such 
circumstances. Roman law at least required some probability of recapture, but Scots 
law appears to be more lenient to the pursuer. There is, however, no secure basis for 
the efficacy of the marking of an animal in retaining ownership or possession, 
despite some comments to the contrary. 
 As far as possession of animals for the purposes of the possessory remedies is 
concerned, there is no direct authority. The role of possession in the acquisition of 
ownership by occupatio means that disputes over possession of wild animals almost 
invariably resolve into disputes over ownership, even where spuilzie is mentioned.
342
 
However, subject to the exception for animals that have escaped but which are under 
pursuit, the rules for occupatio stated here appear to be consistent with the general 
requirements for possession of corporeal moveables.
                                   
342





The purpose of this thesis was to consider the physical element of possession of 
corporeal moveable property, in relation both to acquisition and loss of possession. 
Although the focus was to be on Scots law, the law of Rome, France, Germany, 
South Africa and England was also to be considered in the hope that this comparative 
and historical consideration would shed some light on the issues raised. 
 To acquire possession, it is necessary to satisfy two requirements, one mental 
and one physical. The mental element in Scots law can be defined as the intention to 
hold for one's own benefit. The physical element, which is the subject of this thesis, 
may be exercised by the possessor personally or by another holding on the 
possessor's behalf. Scots law is very much in the Civilian tradition, and opposed to 
the Common Law approach, in conceiving of possession as something entirely 
distinct from ownership and from the right to possess.
1
  
 A further, at least potential, divergence between the Civilian and Common 
Law traditions arises from the question of whether possession is a unitary concept. 
As we saw in part B of chapter 1, while Civilian writers seem generally content to 
consider possession in this way, a number of Common Law writers appear to 
consider that possession is a term with numerous (albeit related) meanings, varying 
depending on the area of law in question. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
consider whether this is the case in Scots law as far as the mental element of 
possession is concerned. However, in relation to the physical element, it is striking 
that in none of the areas of law considered do the requirements for the physical 
element appear inconsistent with the requirements in the others. It must be said that 
certainty on this point is reduced by the fact that particular issues tend to come up 
predominantly in specific areas of law: for example, possession of animals arises as 
an issue almost entirely in relation to the doctrine of occupatio,
2
 and attempts to 
possess through symbolical means come up almost entirely as attempted delivery of 
goods.
3
 As is suggested below, where there are apparent divergences, this may be 
attributable more to the effect of differing circumstances rather than to differences of 
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principle. As far as may be determined, though, it does appear that, at least as far as 
the physical element of possession is concerned, Scots law is more consistent with 
the Civilian approach. 
In part B of chapter 2, it was suggested from the consideration of comparative 
and historical material that the physical element of possession required actual control 
of the property, rather than merely the ability to take control. This control does not 
have to be of a high level, however. The possibility of interference, for example, 
need not be excluded. More important is that, as the physical manifestation of the 
intention to possess, the control exercised be such as to give an appropriate 
impression to the hypothetical objective bystander. In other words, the physical acts 
that are carried out must be such as to be consistent with an assertion of a right to the 
property. What is required depends on the circumstances, with the result that the 
same acts may be sufficient in some circumstances but not in others. This may in part 
explain some apparent differences in the way that the concept of possession is 
applied in different areas of the law. Thus, merely to hold an object in the hand will 
be enough against the background of an agreement to buy the property, but clearer 
acts will be needed to establish possession where that would be unlawful.
4
 
 In chapter 3, Scots law was found to be consistent with this approach. The 
physical element of possession exists where the property is under someone's control 
in such a manner as to indicate an assertion of a right to possess the property. It is not 
necessary to exclude others, unless those others are carrying out acts inconsistent 
with the possession. Indeed, the level of physical control required is not high. The 
control requirement may, for example, be satisfied by a merely momentary holding,
5
 
and in the case of animals mere pursuit may be enough, normally with the animal 
having been wounded but in appropriate circumstances without even requiring that 
much.
6
 Although it may be minimal, however, the control must be genuine. As a 
result, merely symbolical acts are insufficient.
7
 
In chapter 4, we saw that possession is not lost through mere absence or where 
there is merely the possibility of interference by a third party. In the former case, it 
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was suggested that absence only leads to a loss of possession where this is of a nature 
and duration that it suggests to an objective bystander that possession has been 
abandoned, regardless of whether the possessor has in fact intended to abandon 
possession.
8
 This therefore suggests again an objective approach to possession: from 
the point of view of the objective bystander, the situation is much the same whether 
the possessor has intended to give up possession or the possessor is being prevented 
in some way from returning to resume control. As far as potential interference is 
concerned, as long as I am in fact continuing to exercise control I continue to 
possess, even if I could not resist the interference with that possession.
9
 Finally, 
possession is lost when property is lost beyond recovery by normal searching.
10
 Scots 
law appears broadly consistent with the other systems considered, except on this last 
point, in relation to which it appears that English law may allow possession to be 
retained even when the property is not recoverable.
11
 
An exception to this general approach is found with animals. As we saw in part 
E(2)(F) of chapter 7, ownership of an escaped wild animal is lost only when the 
owner ceases to pursue. Unlike the other systems considered, Scots law does not 
appear to hold ownership to be lost even where continued pursuit is difficult and is 
unlikely to succeed. If it is accepted that ownership of wild animals is dependent on 
continued possession, this implies that an escaped wild animal continues to be 
possessed as long as it is pursued, however unlikely that pursuit may be to succeed. 
The alternative and, it is suggested, better view is to see the rule on retention of 
ownership of escaped wild animals as a special rule applicable only in this context, 
rather than being a rule of the general law of possession. As is noted above, this 
represents an exception to the view that possession is a unitary concept. 
                                   
8
 Chapter 4, part B(1), (3). 
9
 ibid, part B(4). 
10
 ibid, part B(2). 
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